

The Relationship of Italian Neo-Scholasticism and Phenomenology to Naturalistic Anthropology

An Exploration via the Views of Sofia Vanni Rovighi

Tymoteusz Mietelski

ABSTRACT This article explores the anthropological views of Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908–1990), an Italian philosopher who identified herself as a Thomist while advocating a broadening out of this classical approach through the incorporation of phenomenological elements. The text outlines her conception of the human being, distinguishing between phenomenological and metaphysical levels. A key focus here is her critique of naturalism—which, she argued, is unjustly reductive in its approach to human beings. This polemical reflection situates her views within a broader context, addressing in particular the call for a re-empiricization of Thomistic anthropology.

KEYWORDS anthropology; Italian philosophy; neo-scholasticism; phenomenology

INTRODUCTION

This article presents the anthropological views of Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908–1990), an Italian philosopher and professor of medieval philosophy, the history of philosophy and theoretical philosophy at the Catholic University of Milan. When discussing the philosophers most important to her academic background, Vanni Rovighi highlighted two individuals: Amato Masnovo, a leading representative of Italian neo-scholasticism, and Edmund Husserl, whose ideas she explored in her first monograph in Italy (Vanni Rovighi 1959, 185–94). Her focus on these two authors outlines two key currents that permeate her work: her self-identification as a Thomist and her advocating of a broadening out of this classical approach through the incorporation of phenomenological elements.

The paper consists of four sections. The first provides a brief introduction to Vanni Rovighi herself. The second discusses her understanding of phenomenology, as Husserl's theory inspired certain changes in her Thomistic approach to anthropology. The third presents the main elements of Vanni Rovighi's conception of the human being, which seeks to oppose naturalistic (and spiritualistic) conceptions as a starting point. The fourth section then offers a critical summary of her conception of anthropology.

THE HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF VANNI ROVIGHI'S SCHOLARSHIP

Sofia Vanni Rovighi was born on September 28th, 1908, in San Lazzaro di Savena, and passed away on June 10th, 1990, in Bologna. Immediately after completing her studies in 1931 she began her teaching career, which continued until 1978. In 1939 she obtained the *libera docenza* (a qualification equivalent to habilitation), and in 1948 she was appointed as a professor at the Catholic University of Milan, where she lectured on medieval philosophy, the history of philosophy, theoretical philosophy and moral philosophy. Between 1962 and 1971, she served as the editor-in-chief of *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*, an Italian journal modelled on the *Revue Néo-Scholastique de Philosophie* journal published in Louvain (Sina 1990, 490; 2006, 12013–15).

At a time when the dominant (and to some extent politically mandated) philosophy in Italy was Giovanni Gentile's idealism, Vanni Rovighi studied medieval philosophy under the guidance of Amato Masnovo, one of the leading figures of Italian neo-scholasticism. She wanted to deepen her understanding of medieval philosophy and examine whether it could address the issues raised by modern and contemporary thought. Early in her career, Vanni Rovighi focused on the philosophy of thirteenth-century

Franciscan thinkers (1936b), followed by the thoughts of St Thomas Aquinas (1947, 1965, 1973b) and St Anselm (1949, 1969b, 1987). Many of her writings were collected and reissued in two volumes published to commemorate her seventieth birthday (1978b).

Vanni Rovighi's philosophical exploration, however, extended beyond medieval philosophy. She also engaged with the thoughts of modern philosophers (especially Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel) and contemporary philosophers (notably Husserl, Scheler, Stein, Heidegger and Hartmann). Regarding the latter, she not only studied their works but also attended some of their lectures: in the summer semester of 1932 she participated in Heidegger's lectures in Freiburg, and in that of 1938 she attended Hartmann's lectures in Berlin (Sina 1990, 491; Vanni Rovighi 1976, 1980a).

In her teaching, Vanni Rovighi focused on neo-scholasticism, the most significant result of which is her three-volume work *Elementi di Filosofia*, first published in 1941 and reprinted multiple times, serving successive generations of students. In this work, Vanni Rovighi presents the key topics of Thomistic philosophy, developed in the context of modern and contemporary thought (1985–86). She also authored textbooks on epistemology, anthropology, and the philosophy of God (Vanni Rovighi 1963; 1980b; 1986).

VANNI ROVIGHI'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HUSSERL
Vanni Rovighi's interest in contemporary philosophy, particularly phenomenology, arose at a time when it was virtually unknown in Italy. Her first work on phenomenology appeared just seven years after the first Italian study dealing with that same field (Vanni Rovighi 1930), and her 1938 book was the first monograph in Italy to comprehensively present Husserl's views (Vanni Rovighi 1938b; 1939). She also authored the "Edmund Husserl" entry in the renowned Italian *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (1957c), as well as numerous other texts on his philosophy (1938a; 1946a; 1946b; 1957a; 1957b; 1966; 1969a; 1973a; 1973c).

Vanni Rovighi considered Husserl's most significant achievement to be his formulation of the theory of intentionality and eidetic intuition. However, she attempted to demonstrate that one of the sources of the concept of intentionality could already be found in medieval Franciscan philosophy (Ales Bello 2018, 45). Regarding Husserl's concept of ideas, Vanni Rovighi argued that it is epistemological rather than metaphysical, and concluded that various regional ontologies cannot effectively compete with their corresponding natural sciences. That changes, however, when it comes to human life (especially moral and religious aspects), or formal ontology, where phenomenological analyses do yield results (Lenoci 1994, 62;

Vanni Rovighi 1969a, 69; 1939, 100–05). According to her, anthropology was an area where the phenomenological method has produced positive outcomes.

Furthermore, Vanni Rovighi believed that the theory of intentionality and universalizing abstraction were the elements that connected Thomism and phenomenology. The observation of convergent elements in various philosophical currents led her to the conviction that *philosophia perennis* exists (Vanni Rovighi 1959). However, this conviction was not about identifying Thomism as the *philosophia perennis*, but rather about recognising the enduring significance of the fundamental doctrines of Western philosophy and understanding philosophy as the progressive deepening of humanity's comprehension of reality. This process of arriving at knowledge of reality occurs through human rationality and its expression, which must be continually refined and enriched (Vanni Rovighi 1959, 192; cf. Sina 1990, 493; Mangiagalli 2008, 330–34).

Commenting on Husserl's thought, Vanni Rovighi argued that one of the greatest paradoxes of reality is the human being, who constitutes the world in their consciousness yet is, like all humans, a part of that world. Husserl attempted to resolve this paradox in *The Crisis* through an analogy: the ego that exists in time, from the past towards the future, presupposes the existence of the current ego—just as the various egos existing in the world are actualizations of the transcendental ego (Husserl, 1970, 178–86; cf. Vanni Rovighi 1975, 277–79).

Vanni Rovighi contended that this solution was entirely different from what neo-scholasticism proposed (i.e. that reality is intelligible because a supreme Intelligence created it—that humans can grasp its intelligibility because they participate ontologically in the Intelligence that founded it (1975, 278–79)). Husserl, on the other hand, rejected this perspective, and on her view this was due to his aversion to concepts that could be ascribed a religious character.

For this reason, although she valued phenomenology, she ultimately rejected it (Vanni Rovighi 1975, 269–79; Vasoli 1994, 32). However, Vanni Rovighi's rejection of phenomenology was not rooted in an acceptance of religious claims—she was firmly convinced of the complete autonomy of philosophical inquiry, particularly in anthropological and moral domains—but rather in a preference for better-substantiated arguments, regardless of whether or not they aligned with religious doctrines (Vanni Rovighi 1936a).

Vanni Rovighi also maintained that phenomenology did not provide a clear response to metaphysical problems, particularly those concerning

God, the soul and the relationship between contingent beings and the Absolute (Lenoci 1994, 65; Vanni Rovighi 1939, 162–64).

Therefore, although phenomenology was not her chosen approach to philosophy, it did teach her to “read Thomistic texts with different eyes” (Vanni Rovighi 1959, 192).¹

According to Cesare Vasoli (a historian of Italian philosophy), her stance stemmed from her belief that phenomenology is:

the most direct interlocutor of neo-scholasticism, capable of recovering the foundations of the philosophy of being and aiming to reformulate its essential principles within a debate open to the most rigorous results of gnoseology, epistemology, science, and contemporary analysis of consciousness. (Vasoli 1994, 31)

It should be noted, however, that in her anthropological considerations, especially those concerning the soul, Rovighi relied on the views of Max Scheler, as she explicitly stated several times (1980b, 194–98).

Nevertheless, the phenomenological aspect of anthropology solely aims to uncover, describe and thematize the data of consciousness (Vanni Rovighi 1978a, 8). In summary, what Vanni Rovighi offers here is an instrumental use of the phenomenological method typical of certain philosophical circles (which will be discussed more below). The fourth section of this article will explain that while this approach is not isolated, some consider it insufficient for gaining an adequate understanding of human metaphysics.

OUTLINE OF VANNI ROVIGHI’S ANTHROPOLOGICAL VIEWS

Anthropology, which Vanni Rovighi called the ‘metaphysics of the human being,’ was always at the centre of her intellectual pursuits. In this field, she drew upon the solutions offered by St Thomas Aquinas, not out of deference to his authority but due to the strength of his arguments (Sina 1990, 496). It was precisely because of Thomistic anthropology that she identified herself as a Thomist (Gregory 1994, 20).

It is worth noting at the outset that in her view, the term ‘naturalism’ can have various meanings. It usually refers to the reduction of every being to its corporeal existence. Nevertheless, since classical anthropology refers to the concept of nature, Vanni Rovighi describes it as ‘naturalistic’ in the proper sense of the term. As such, Thomistic anthropology is far removed

1. All quotations from Italian (Vanni Rovighi, Vasoli) and Polish (Wojtyła, Styczeń) are translated by the author.

from Cartesian dualism and monism, whether materialistic or spiritualistic (Vanni Rovighi 1985–86, vol. 3, 124).

Vanni Rovighi argues that the natural or social sciences cannot resolve certain issues concerning human beings. At some point in their reasoning, these sciences always include, either explicitly or implicitly, a reference to a particular conception of human beings (1978a, 13 ff.). Philosophy seeks justifications for the conception adopted. To achieve this, what or who a human being is must be examined. According to Vanni Rovighi, such an examination proceeds in two stages: phenomenological and ontological.

The phenomenological stage involves describing what experience and self-awareness reveal about the human being, while the ontological stage involves drawing conclusions from this description about the essence of the human being (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 9 ff.). As the philosopher states:

From the data revealed by phenomenology, metaphysical psychology attempts to conclude what the human being is and about the principle that characterizes them—the principle traditionally called the soul. At this second stage, the path becomes more difficult, requiring subtle investigations, *diligens et subtilis inquisitio*, as St Thomas says. (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 11)

As the first stage of anthropology, phenomenology is no mere reiteration of the theses of the human sciences or of philosophical conceptions, but rather a revelation of what these disciplines assume and imply (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 10). She undertakes an analysis of the various conceptions of the human being that may underlie the vision of humanity presented in the natural sciences, social sciences, or culture. She argues that contemporary thought is dominated by the conceptions of the human being proposed by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. She defines these conceptions as naturalistic, as they portray the human being as a product of a nature that is corporeal, in contrast to the long-standing tradition of understanding the human being as a spiritual being.

Vanni Rovighi considers Marx's conception to be naturalistic, as history—the context in which human beings are born—is determined by economic variables (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 15 ff.). On this view, the equality of persons is assumed not as a fact but as a postulate. According to Vanni Rovighi, the concept of equality among persons originates in Stoicism and Christianity. In Stoicism, it is based on the acceptance of rationality as the specific difference distinguishing humans from other beings. In Christianity, it rests on the concept of divine filiation, which also presupposes the Stoic thesis. This raises the question of the basis for equality as proposed

by Marx. The latter believed that equality is determined by recognising the human being as a creature that produces the means of subsistence (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 28 ff.): economic structures must be transformed to achieve equality. However, according to Vanni Rovighi, inequalities are caused by deeper factors, and Marx's view reduces the human being to mere matter.

On the other hand, Nietzsche's anthropology assumes people's inequality, making it more materialistic than Marx's conception (Vanni Rovighi 1980b: 32). Human reason is subordinated to instinct, and freedom is proportional to strength (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 37 ff.). The ideal human being is one in whom vital values (strength, courage, and the ability to dominate) are predominant—in essence, a description of animality. The inhumanity of this approach stems from elevating these traits to the level of the highest values, which in turn leads to the reduction of the majority of people to mere means for achieving the goals of a select few individuals (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 49). There is also a reduction of the human being in Freud's anthropology, wherein unconscious instincts play the leading role (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 64).

Despite their differences, the conceptions of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud all share a naturalistic character, as they reduce the human being to nature understood as corporeality or animality. This occurs as a reaction to spiritualistic concepts originating in modernity with Descartes, whose anthropology serves as a reference point for modern and contemporary thought (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 73 ff.).

Meanwhile, according to Vanni Rovighi, experience reveals two fundamental aspects of human life: its profound unity and its irreducibility to corporeality. The above runs contrary to Cartesian dualism, and also to the reduction of the person to pure spirit or a material body (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 171). Throughout the history of philosophy, one of these aspects has often been emphasised at the expense of the other. The best examples of this, in Vanni Rovighi's view, are Plato and Aristotle. The former emphasised the spiritual nature of the human being and treated the body as a burden. The latter, by focusing more on the unity of the human being as expressed in the concept of the soul as the form of the body, overlooked its transcendence (Vanni Rovighi 1985–86, vol. 3, 160 ff.).

Therefore, a proper anthropology, derived from human experience, requires a holistic approach. The profound unity of the human being and their irreducibility to corporeality oppose both the reduction of the human being to pure spirit (which is less common today) and to corporeality (which is widespread today, especially among philosophers who accept ontological naturalism). As such, an anthropology that corresponds to experience will be both anti-naturalistic and anti-spiritualistic.

Thomistic anthropology presents the human being as irreducible not only to matter but also to the spiritual dimension:

[A human being] is not a kind of angel who has fallen into a world alien to them but is woven from the same fabric as other bodies; not only that, they have a soul analogous to the forms of other living beings. There is, therefore, a similarity among the beings that make up the universe, even if there are species-specific differences. A human being is part of nature, despite possessing a substantial form that, in some of its aspects, transcends nature and enables them to dominate it. (Vanni Rovighi 1978b, 16; cf. Gregory 1994, 23; Bettinelli 2008, 184–88)

Based on the unity of human experiences, as grasped in experience, and the irreducibility of the human being to the body, Vanni Rovighi identifies three fundamental characteristics of the human being: unity, spirituality and freedom. The first and third are revealed on the aforementioned phenomenological level, while the second must be arrived at deductively on the metaphysical level (Vanni Rovighi 1978a, 99; 1980b, 233).

A human being consciously perceives themselves, first and foremost, as a subject of feelings and experiences whose directly perceived characteristic is corporeality. Through reflection on their cognition, they further ascertain the existence of objects outside themselves. Subsequently, the human being perceives themselves as a unity: the bodily *ego* is the same *ego* as the cognitive *ego*. Moreover, a person experiences that it is the case that their most characteristic actions cannot be reduced to solely spiritual or physical facts. For instance, affections are partially rooted in blood ties and sexuality, but also transcend these biological foundations. Technical activity, which by its nature concerns matter, is an expression of our knowledge of matter and mastery over it. Social life, determined by bodily needs (such as defence and species preservation), contributes to spiritual development (Vanni Rovighi 1985–86, vol. 3, 169 ff.).

In order to apprehend the second characteristic of human being, which is spirituality, it is necessary, according to Vanni Rovighi, to refer to metaphysics, because conclusions about the nature of the human being must be drawn from the data grasped in experience. The thesis that human beings know themselves through the recognition of their actions follows the thesis that actions are known through their objects. Humans are capable of acquiring knowledge of necessary truths and universal concepts—this mode of cognition is an activity independent of their animality, and thus reveals a subject of activity that transcends animality. Vanni Rovighi refers here both

to Thomistic abstraction and to phenomenological eidetic reduction; the existence of the soul is inferred precisely from the existence of these specific human activities, because the existence of some act whose subject is a soul without a body implies the existence of the soul not only as the form of the body, but also as the subject (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 192–94, 235 ff.).

Freedom is closely tied to the spiritual nature of the human being. Vanni Rovighi asserts that there is, on the phenomenological level, an experience of freedom. Free will is based on the desire for perceived good and is directed toward particular things, but only because these are recognised as good and understood as furnishing a means to achieving fullness of being (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 236).² Freedom is a distinctive expression of human spirituality, especially when it transcends one's bodily nature, as in the case of sacrificing one's life for another (Vanni Rovighi 1980b, 174 ff.). While instinct is not difficult to explain, freedom, by its very nature, poses a question to the subject: *why* does one choose this particular thing? The answer, however, is not found in the desired object itself: rather, the subject grants the object its determining aspect by recognising and deciding in a practical judgment that it is good (Vanni Rovighi 1978a, 101).

Vanni Rovighi writes:

A human being reveals their spiritual nature in the world, where they come to know . . . corporeal things. Their spiritual nature is not a festive garment worn on special occasions, nor is it an escape from the world of everyday life, nor an intuition of pure beings; it manifests itself in the world that the human being knows, in the world of experience. (Vanni Rovighi 1985–86, vol. 3, 185)

A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

The foregoing presentation of Vanni Rovighi's views on neo-scholastic and phenomenological philosophy, and on the practice of anthropology, supports the conclusion that she advocated using the phenomenological method to provide a fuller description of the reality of the human being. This approach brings to mind another figure in contemporary Italian philosophy: Paolo Valori. This philosopher, a significant figure in the second wave of phenomenology in Italy, advocated combining Thomism with phenomenology in the study of moral experience. Valori believed such

2. On the issue of free will, an evolution in Vanni Rovighi's views can be observed. At first, she believed that the existence of free will was self-evident and undeniable (1985–86, 151 ff.); in later texts, she attempted to make this appeal to evidence more explicit and motivated (1980b, 219 ff.).

an analysis should proceed in at least three steps (a fourth could involve moving beyond philosophy into the realm of moral theology). The first is to establish the background for any such study, using the human sciences. The second involves applying the phenomenological method to distinguish moral experience and value. But while the phenomenological method proves fruitful, it is insufficient, and hence the need for a third step: ontological analysis. For Valori, this involves complementing phenomenology with analyses that ultimately allow for the constructing of a metaphysical system. Although he does not explicitly state that this refers to classical metaphysics, the proposed features of moral ontology roughly correspond to the Thomistic framework (Valori 1977, 1985).

It can thus be said that Vanni Rovighi represents a broader trend proposing the combination of classical philosophy and phenomenology—a position not unique to Italy. The idea of such an integration was already noted and, in a way, advocated by Karol Wojtyła. For instance, during a conference at the Catholic University of Lublin in 1967, he stated:

Alongside the rise of the philosophy of consciousness and the development of its proper cognitive tools (the phenomenological method), new conditions are being shaped for enriching the concept of the human person with the entire subjective, ‘consciousness’ aspect, which was, in some way, overshadowed in metaphysical ‘naturalism’. This enriched concept of the human person can and should be incorporated into the interpretation of Revelation. In moral theology, it must be postulated that this ‘transformation,’ which has already largely taken place in ethics, should be increasingly assimilated. (Wojtyła 1967, 1080)

At the same time, it should be noted that, at least according to the view of Wojtyła and the tradition he represents, it is impossible to replace metaphysics with phenomenology. As early as in his postdoctoral thesis on Max Scheler’s views, Wojtyła both recognised the need to use the phenomenological method and pointed out its insufficiency (Wojtyła 1959; Mazur 2023a).

Meanwhile, the goal of the philosophers of the Lublin Philosophical School in Poland was not merely to supplement metaphysics—particularly ethics or anthropology—with first-person experience of the subject such as is characteristic of phenomenology. As Mazur argues, the issue identified within this school was the lack of empirical grounding for the metaphysical image of the human being (2023b). This led to the conviction of the necessity to “re-empiricize the Thomistic system in its entirety” (Mazur 2023b, 279).

Mazur identifies two such attempts, undertaken, respectively, by Wojtyła and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec. While there is no need to delve into the details of Mazur's analyses here, his conclusion is significant:

Despite its realistic character, Thomistic anthropology was unable to demonstrate how to move from experience to a system. Its re-empiricization entailed assimilating cognitive tools developed in the modern philosophy of the subject, especially the phenomenological description of inner experience. (2023b, 285)

However, this use of the phenomenological method differs from that of Vanni Rovighi (or Valori in ethics). It is not about simply applying this method to describe and explain anthropological (and moral) facts. As Mazur notes:

In their interpretations, Wojtyła and Krąpiec searched for their 'own' anthropological facts which could constitute a starting point for the Thomistic system. Both looked for such facts in the first-person experience of the subjectification of personal acts. (2023b, 285)

Specifically, Wojtyła based his approach on the experience of performing a human act, while Krąpiec focused on the subjective experience of existence.

In this context, it is also worth mentioning Wojtyła's student, Tadeusz Styczeń, who emphasised the need to connect ethics with metaphysics. He addressed this issue as follows:

The way of linking the experience of morality with metaphysics—resulting in the ethics we propose—can, therefore, be most generally characterized either as the translation of relevant metaphysical theses into the language of the experience of morality (the concretization of metaphysics) or as—what ultimately amounts to the same thing—the metaphysical interpretation of the data of the experience of morality. (Styczeń 1972, 194)

Vanni Rovighi's position can thus be evaluated in this context as amounting to an attempt to address the diagnosed inadequacy of classical metaphysics. However, even such an approach would be considered insufficient by some proponents of Thomism, a few of whom advocate the re-empiricization of Thomistic anthropology. Vanni Rovighi, on the other hand, does not go that far: she limits herself to utilising

the phenomenological method to describe reality, and to then drawing metaphysical conclusions.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, Sofia Vanni Rovighi, a philosopher little known in Poland, belongs to the tradition of Italian neo-scholasticism. Despite her clear affiliation with this philosophical tradition, she played a significant role in Italian phenomenology, authoring the first Italian monograph on Husserl's views.

Second, Vanni Rovighi defends the anthropological thesis of the human being's psychophysical unity and irreducibility to corporeality. She opposes Cartesian dualism and the reduction of the person to either pure spirit or a material body, considering the most important characteristics of human beings to be unity, spirituality and freedom.

Third, she employs Thomistic arguments but, as she herself claims, reads Thomas' texts with different eyes thanks to phenomenology, incorporating elements inspired by Husserl's views into her own reasoning.

Fourth, such an approach may be considered in at least some branches of Thomism to be inadequate (see, e.g., Krapiec, discussed above). Certain proponents of classical anthropology regard the phenomenological solution (as proposed by philosophers such as Rovighi and Valori) as unsatisfactory, and advocate a re-empiricization of classical anthropology. Others, such as Vanni Rovighi and Valori themselves, argue that using the phenomenological method yields positive results. Furthermore, openness to working with other philosophical traditions and sciences is essential in this context.

In summary, Sofia Vanni Rovighi's views represent an intriguing example of a creative dialogue between classical Christian philosophy and contemporary thought—in this case, Husserl's phenomenology. As such, her views encourage philosophers of various traditions and backgrounds to engage in such collaboration.

REFERENCES

- Ales Bello, Angela. 2018. "Husserl, oltre Husserl: La fenomenologia secondo Sofia Vanni Rovighi." In *La fenomenologia in Italia: Autori, scuole, tradizioni*, edited by Federico Buongiorno, Vincenzo Costa, and Roberta Lanfredini, 35–62. Roma: Inschibboleth.
- Bettinelli, Carla. 2008. "Edith e Sofia: Sentire e sapere la persona umana." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 100 (4, suppl.): 183–94.
- Gregory, Tullio. 1994. "Gli studi di filosofia medioevale di Sofia Vanni Rovighi." In *Sapientiae studium: La giornata operosa di Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908–1990)*, edited by Mario Sina, 13–26. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1970. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Translated by David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

- Lenoci, Michele. 1994. "Il contributo della filosofia contemporanea negli studi di Sofia Vanni Rovighi." In *Sapientiae studium: La giornata operosa di Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908–1990)*, edited by Mario Sina, 55–80. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- Mangiagalli, Maurizio. 2008. "Astrazione, intuizione e intuizione astrattiva: Sofia Vanni Rovighi e Edith Stein." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 100 (4, suppl.): 315–34.
- Mazur, Piotr Stanisław. 2023a. "From Experience to a Method: The Significance of Karol Wojtyła's Habilitation Dissertation in the Development of His Concept of Philosophical Cognition of Man." *Logos i Ethos* 61 (1): 121–38. <https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.61108>.
- . 2023b. "Wojtyła and Krapiec: Two Ways of Re-empirizing Thomistic Anthropology." *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 71 (1): 273–88. <https://doi.org/10.18290/rf23711.13>.
- Sina, Mario. 1990. "Sofia Vanni Rovighi." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 82 (2–3): 490–496.
- . 2006. "Vanni Rovighi, Sofia." In *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, vol. 4, 12013–15. Milano: Bompiani.
- Styczeń, Tadeusz. 1972. *Problem możliwości etyki jako empirycznie uprawomocnionej i ogólnie ważnej teorii moralności*. Lublin: TN KUL.
- Valori, Paolo. 1977. "Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi: Scienze umane, filosofia, teologia." *Gregorianum* 58 (1): 55–86.
- . 1985. *L'esperienza morale: Saggio di una fondazione fenomenologica dell'etica*. Brescia: Morcelliana.
- Vanni Rovighi, Sofia. 1930. "Festschrift Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet, Halle a.d. Saale 1929." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 22 (6): 491–94.
- . 1936a. "Filosofia e religione nel pensiero di Max Scheler." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 28 (suppl.): 157–69.
- . 1936b. *L'immortalità dell'anima nei maestri francescani del secolo XIII*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- . 1938a. "Edmund Husserl." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 30 (3): 338–40.
- . 1938b. *La filosofia di Edmund Husserl*. Milano: Unione Tipografica.
- . 1939. *La filosofia di Edmund Husserl*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- . 1946a. "Il movimento fenomenologico." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 38 (2–3): 207–11.
- . 1946b. "La fenomenologia di Edmund Husserl." *Humanitas* 1: 141–49.
- . 1947. *Antologia politica di Tommaso d'Aquino*. Milano: Cisalpino.
- . 1949. *S. Anselmo e la filosofia italiana del secolo XI*. Milano: Fratelli Bocca.
- . 1957a. "Husserliana." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 49 (1): 54–72.
- . 1957b. "Il colloquio sulla fenomenologia." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 49 (2): 197–211.
- . 1957c. "Edmund Husserl." In *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, vol. 1, 1146–52. Firenze: Sansoni.
- . 1959. "Edmund Husserl e la perennità della filosofia." In *Edmund Husserl 1859–1959: Recueil commémoratif publié à l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance du philosophe*, 185–94. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- . 1963. *Gnoseologia*. Brescia: Morcelliana.
- . 1965. *L'antropologia filosofica di San Tommaso d'Aquino*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- . 1966. "Problema della conoscenza e problema del conosciuto." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 58 (2): 163–74.
- . 1969a. *La fenomenologia di Edmund Husserl: Note introduttive. Appunti dalle lezioni introduttive ai seminari per l'anno accademico 1968–1969*. Milano: Celuc.
- . 1969b. *Opere filosofiche di Anselmo*. Bari: Laterza.
- . 1973a. "La fenomenologia di Husserl." *Verifiche* 2: 3–17.
- . 1973b. *Introduzione a Tommaso d'Aquino*. Roma: Laterza.
- . 1973c. *La fenomenologia di Husserl: Appunti delle lezioni*. Milano: Celuc.

- . 1975. "Rileggendo alcuni testi husserliani sull'intenzionalità." In *Studi di filosofia in onore di Gustavo Bontadini*, vol. 2, 269–79. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- . 1976. *Storia della filosofia moderna: Dalla rivoluzione scientifica a Hegel*. Brescia: La Scuola.
- . 1978a. *Appunti di antropologia filosofica*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- . 1978b. *Studi di filosofia medioevale*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- . 1980a. *Storia della filosofia contemporanea: Dall'Ottocento ai giorni nostri*. Brescia: La Scuola.
- . 1980b. *Uomo e natura: Appunti per una antropologia filosofica*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- . 1985–86. *Elementi di filosofia*. 3 vols. Brescia: La Scuola. First published 1963.
- . 1986. *La filosofia e il problema di Dio*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- . 1987. *Introduzione a Anselmo d'Aosta*. Roma: Laterza.
- Vasoli, Cesare. 1994. "Gli studi di filosofia moderna e contemporanea di Sofia Vanni Rovighi." In *Sapientiae studium: La giornata operosa di Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908–1990)*, edited by Mario Sina, 27–44. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- Wojtyła, Karol. 1959. *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera*. Lublin: TN KUL.
- Wojtyła, Karol. 1967. "Etyka a teologia moralna." *Znak* 159 (9): 1077–82.