

DISCUSSIONS

Third Reply to Professor Kemp Clarifications Regarding “Theological Humans” and the Magisterium of the Church on Human Origins

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THE MISREPRESENTATION OF AUGUSTINE’S THOUGHT

First, it should be reiterated that Kemp was wrong when it comes to quoting Augustine in support of his acceptance of polygenism. As I have shown in my first critique, he misquoted the latter, as even though Augustine scorns Christians who speak nonsense about the natural world and support it with Holy Scripture, this judgement on Augustine’s part applies only to things that can be “held by virtue of the most certain reasons and experience” (*certissima ratione vel experientia teneat*), and those that non-Christians had already experienced or could perceive thanks to calculations that were not doubtful (*de his rebus quas iam experiri, vel indubitatis numeris percipere potuerunt*) (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, I, 19, 39).

As I have said, genetic speculations about the original human populations not only do not meet these criteria, but could never do so, just by virtue of the sheer fact that they refer to the ancient past that cannot be recreated in any way. In fact, any questions of origins (the origin of the universe, the origin of life, the origin of species, the origin of the human race) would always evade these criteria of Augustine, simply because these are unique events that happened only once in history and cannot be observed using a strictly scientific method (even if their effects can be).

The things that do meet Augustine’s criteria are those that can be measured, observed or tested in a laboratory, such as the fact that there is no spontaneous generation, that the Earth is spherical, that the Earth is in motion, or that the universe is much older than a few thousand years. That is why I gave the example of the movement of the Earth as a scientific truth that has rightly modified our interpretation of some biblical passages.

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In his response, Kemp says that the heliocentric model is not based on direct observation, but on inference. Yet this is sophistry of the sort that is typical of people losing the argument. I still believe that my adversary is only pretending that he cannot grasp the core of the argument, which does not rely on the word “theory” but on the straightforward distinction made by Augustine between things that are provable and those that are only stated, or simply brought forth from their (pagan) books and contrary to the Catholic faith (*Quidquid autem de quibuslibet suis voluminibus his nostris Litteris, id est catholicae fidei contrarium protulerint*) (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, I, 21, 41).

By stating that heliocentrism is not directly observed in real time, but instead is inferred directly from such direct observations in real time, Kemp does nothing to diminish my argument. Going down Kemp’s path of sophistry, one could just as easily say that looking at your own hands is not a direct observation either, because you use your eyes to do it.

To sum up, Kemp misquoted Augustine by implying that the latter would give in to genetic speculations and that he would, on their basis, completely abandon the literal meaning of the first three chapters of Genesis (because this would be the actual consequence of an acceptance of such speculations). Yet Augustine consistently adheres to the literal meaning of Genesis in each of his commentaries.

What Augustine says is that Christians should not talk nonsense about the things of nature that have been established by science, as this would undermine the credibility of Christianity. But when it comes to things produced by pagans from their books—these people “who seek to slander the books our salvation depends on” (*hominibus qui calumniari Libris nostrae salutis affectant*)—if they can truly demonstrate anything about nature, we should show that they are not contrary to Scripture. However, if they bring forth anything contrary to Scripture, i.e. to the Catholic faith, we should either somehow show that they are false or believe without any doubt that these things are false.¹

The monogenetic origin of humanity, as well as the special creation of the human body from the dust of the Earth, were considered by Augustine (and all other Holy Fathers and Doctors) a doctrine of faith. This is why he would accept heliocentrism, if presented with convincing evidence,

1. *Ut quidquid ipsi de natura rerum veracibus documentis demonstrare potuerint, ostendamus nostris Litteris non esse contrarium. Quidquid autem de quibuslibet suis voluminibus his nostris Litteris, id est catholicae fidei contrarium protulerint, aut aliqua etiam facultate ostendamus, aut nulla dubitatione credamus esse falsissimum* (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, I, 21, 41).

but would fend off the pagan challenge against monogenism even if he could not immediately respond to the so-called “genetic evidence,” which is nothing more than mere speculations. I wish my adversary had chosen Augustine’s path, rather than the one that consists in distorting Augustine’s thought in order to defend the neo-pagan challenges against the Catholic faith.²

GENETIC EVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CATHOLIC MONOGENISM

This takes us to my second point. As I indicated in my first critique, Kemp under-informs his audience when he states that the genetic evidence supports polygenism, and monogenism remains only as a “logical possibility.” I have presented three counter-arguments that Kemp has never responded to.

First, there is a great discrepancy among biologists who speculate about the size of the initial population. This fact alone means that these speculations do not have the status of things “that can be truly demonstrated” (Augustine) that could modify our understanding of Scripture.

Second, I have shown that none of these studies exclude one initial couple on the basis of inherent genetic impossibility. The argument made by Ayala only shows that this couple would have had to live 30 mya, which would allow enough time for humanity to reach its current level of genetic diversity. In other words, every study allows for there to have been one original couple, it is just that—depending on the assumptions involved—some of studies require too much time for humanity compared to what the fossil-record shows. Again, this means that the alleged exclusion of monogenism by genetics is entirely assumption-based, and does not stem from any inherent impossibility.

Third, I have shown that there are scientific studies that actually simulate a single-couple human origin no more than 0.5 mya with the same methods as, and analogous assumptions to, those of these other studies.

This last point renders Kemp’s enterprise meaningless and empty, because if a single-couple origin is actually possible, then why would any theologian wish to tinker with the traditional doctrine in the first place? To put it simply, there is no reason to look for alternative theologies, because the Catholic theology of monogenism has not been challenged by science. Indeed, it has been challenged by some ideologically driven atheists

2. Augustine calls this error on the part of certain “weaker brothers” even “more dangerous” than that of those who are so puffed up with their knowledge of secular literature that they scornfully dismiss the Biblical text as something crude and unrefined. (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, I, 20, 40)

who happen to be scientists, but this should be differentiated from a real scientific challenge. Apparently, Kemp has failed to notice the difference.

WHY TRUE HUMANS MUST BE BIOLOGICAL HUMANS, AND VICE VERSA

I don't know why my adversary poses two questions to which I have already provided quite explicit answers. First, he asks about "why, for example, he [Chaberek] does not see that showing that a term has two slightly different meanings is making a distinction, not committing an equivocation" (Kemp 2025, 295). I have answered this question in my previous paper:

In his solution [Kemp] is not "making a distinction when faced with contradiction." (Kemp 2011, 236) Instead, he takes one term in two contradictory meanings, depending on the context. So his solution is based not on a "distinction" but on an "equivocation" that he introduces into the term "human being." A human being is a rational animal. But a "biological human" is a non-rational animal, which means it is not human. Thus, Kemp in P1 is not referring to the same reality that evolutionists are, and therefore does not resolve the contradiction: rather, he is introducing a clever form of confusion. (Chaberek 2025, 281–82)

Let me add some further explanation here. When Kemp asserts that evolution produced biological humans but not theological humans, this means that either his solution does not reconcile the so-called "science of evolution" (i.e. scientific materialism) with Catholic belief, or it means that biological humans are the same as theological humans. This must be so, because no evolutionist (including Darwin himself) would ever allow that evolution was incapable of producing "true" humans—that is, people like ourselves. Since the entire goal of Kemp's enterprise is to show the compatibility of the modern theory of the evolutionary origin of man with Catholicism, it follows that those "biological humans" must be the same as what he is referring to as "true" humans. Therefore, as I said, his solution is not based on distinction, but rather relies on a clever form of confusion or equivocation in which he takes "biological humans" to be non-rational animals with human bodies in one context while in another claiming that his model reconciles evolution with faith, which would be the case only if evolution could produce "true" humans—that is, rational animals with human bodies. Kemp needs to decide which one is true: whether his model does nothing to reconcile evolution with Christianity, and thus is an empty enterprise from the beginning, or "biological humans" are the same as "true humans," which also renders his model empty as it is based on equivocation rather than any real distinction (distinction without a difference).

His second question is about “why he [Chaberek] thinks that two different beings with different powers due to one having only a corporeal and the other a spiritual substantial form show only an accidental difference” (Kemp 2025, 295).

Again, Kemp has not read my argument carefully. Let me quote from my previous answer:

Kemp believes that the difference between his biological man and his theological man consists in the soul rather than the body. If that were the case, the only difference would be in the soul, which would mean that the only difference between the two would be non-material, and it would boil down to possessing the faculty of reason (the theological human) vs. not having it (biological human). But possessing or not possessing either this or some other faculty constitutes not a substantial, but an accidental, difference (even if the faculty is of such prominence as reason). This means that the difference between the two (i.e., the biological and the theological human) consists of an accidental difference, not a substantial one.

To be sure, I grant that Kemp says that there is a new substance in the theological man, but the “novelty” of the “new substance” is reduced to the faculty of reasoning, which contradicts the very notion of a substantial form. So, nominally he claims that the rational soul is a substantial form, but actually he reduces it to a faculty that is an accident. And this means that the difference between the theological and the biological man is actually only accidental, such that there is no new substantial form in the (theological) human, in contradiction to the teachings of the Council of Vienne and Lateran V. (Chaberek 2025, 283–84)

A RESPONSE TO THREE POINTS OF CRITIQUE

In his latest reply, Kemp presents three points in opposition to my critique of the division into “true” and merely “biological” humans.

In making his first point, he writes that I seem “to think that human beings have no adaptations conducive to survival and therefore depend entirely on their rationality” (2025, 297), and that “Chaberek’s second mistake is his claim that the human body has no physiological adaptations that contribute to survivability” (2025, 298).

Here, Kemp again (as is his custom) pretends not to have understood my argument. My position clearly implies that humans have no survival adaptations relative (compared) to non-rational animals. Kemp, however, speaks about adaptations taken in an absolute sense. It is obvious that not

only humans and all other animals, but even dead things have multiple adaptations for survivability. For instance, a piece of rock can resist exposure to sunlight, so that it does not melt like a piece of ice. In this sense a piece of rock has some type of survival adaptation. In this meaning, even human nails could be considered a survival feature: after all we can scratch off dirt or open a box using them. But this is nothing compared to animal claws or hooves. And this is also why Kemp's reference to the human fist is mistaken. Surely, the fist would prove helpful in the context of fighting amongst humans, but it would not count for anything against horses' hooves or lions' claws. Humans are defenseless relative to predators, and they have little survival advantage compared to animals that are typically hunted by other animals (deer, mice, etc.).

So, my premise directed against merely biological humans stands. The reason why such creatures could never exist is that on the one hand they do not have a bodily structure geared towards survivability, and on the other they do not have reason (which comes only with the human soul), where the latter is needed to produce the tools and weapons that allow them to survive.

Even so, Kemp naively believes that behavioral patterns could make up for that deficiency. He writes:

[Chaberek's mistake] is his paying exclusive attention to "adaptations in ... bodily structure," as though nothing in an animal's behavioral repertoire could contribute to survivability. In fact, some of the very features which zoologists would list as adaptations in the primates I just mentioned are features that we human beings also have—sociability, resilience in the face of environmental variation, and complex communication patterns. Since those traits (at the animal level) are not dependent on rationality, there is no reason to doubt that merely biological human beings had them as well. (Kemp 2025, 298)

This argument betrays a strategy—typical of evolutionists—of "hiding the evidence where it cannot be found." When Darwin could not find the fossils that would substantiate his theory, he ruled that they must be hidden under the ocean beds. (Since then, we have searched through the ocean beds, but those fossils haven't been found). Another example of such a strategy is the theory of punctuated equilibrium. Stephen Jay Gould knew that species have no evolutionary ancestry in the fossil record: instead, they just pop up from nowhere. In order to resolve this conundrum he said that species evolve rapidly in ecological niches (such as ocean depths, or isolated valleys) and due to the speed and isolation of these evolutionary

events we do not find any trace of them in the fossil record. His theory was, rightly, almost universally rejected, because it is just a dodge—we do not find the evidence, so we say that the evidence is undetectable.

The same type of heuristic strategy is being adopted here by Kemp: we know that the human body has no survival or protective adaptations, so let's look elsewhere—for instance, in “behavioral repertoire.” Any specifics? No. Surely, we can also imagine that “merely biological humans” survived, because divine providence protected them from being killed off by predators. They acquired enough food because, providentially, there was always a tree with healthy fruit around—or an antelope that had broken its leg, so that they were capable of capturing it without designing sophisticated traps or tools to catch it. But again, such arguments are nothing but blurry speculations and anecdotes. There is no evidence that mere sociability or resilience to environmental change would permit survival. On the contrary, all we know about nature tells us that animals survive thanks to their bodily structure, and humans thanks to the tools they create.

Moreover, if biological humans were capable of survival without making tools, why would “true” humans ever have started to create them? Once they had acquired reason, why behave irrationally by engaging in such completely unnecessary exertions? On Kemp's account, the bodily structure of biological and theological humans is the same. If, therefore, biological humans can survive without making tools, why—as a matter of fact—cannot theological humans survive without creating them? Kemp's reasoning does not make much sense.

At the same time, there is a more fundamental problem with the entire “evolution of the body, creation of the soul” hypothesis: it necessarily implies a kind of Cartesian dualism with respect to human beings. Specifically, such a dualism pervades Kemp's thinking, according to which the human body may be animated either by a non-human or a human soul. In fact, given that the soul is the substantial form of the body (which I pointed out in my previous response), there must be perfect compatibility between the soul and the body. Since there is a substantial difference between the rational soul and the animal soul, there must be a substantial difference between the bodies as well. But on Kemp's account the animal and the human bodies are virtually identical.

There are many features pertaining to the human body that perfectly correspond to, and—in a way—imply or require, the human (i.e. rational) soul. Humans, for instance, possess an extraordinary degree of dexterity in their hands (as evinced by their highly developed ability to manipulate objects). Obviously, this bodily feature reflects the needs of the rational

soul, which thanks to the power of reason can use the entire potential of this trait in the creation of all kinds of things, performing all kinds of activities—even for purposes of communication.

And yet, in “merely biological humans” such dexterity would never be adequately utilized. Apes do not have dexterity, but they have strength in their hands, which matches their animal soul, where the latter works on instinct rather than involving creativity. Merely biological humans would also operate on the basis of their instincts, so they would need strength rather than dexterity. That means their bodily structure would be inappropriate for receiving their animal (sensory) soul.

Aquinas says that humans exhibit the greatest harmony across their senses. This is so that the experiences coming from the body can adequately furnish “material” for thinking. But animals have no such harmony (for instance, they exhibit a predominance of one sense over others)—something which makes instinctual operations more effective but at the same time means that such experiences would undermine the ability to think properly. Again, this means that “biological humans” could not operate on the basis of the instincts, because their senses would provide material for rational rather than spontaneous operations. The list of such “psychological,” behavioral, or structural incompatibilities could be extended further, but the point is that Kemp’s proposal is untenable in the light of Catholic anthropology, as it is driven by a Cartesian dualism of body and soul, implying that the human body can be animated by a non-human soul.

In my paper on the origin of man (Chaberek and Carleial 2022, 249–87), I point to one fundamental feature of the human organism that implies rationality: This feature is human bipedalism. It is unique in the animal world, because humans are the only animals that use just two out of four functional limbs in normal locomotion. This, however, results in an ineffective way of moving around. According to a study, humans are 27% less energetically effective compared to mammals of similar size (Wayman 2012). In nature, that would spell imminent death. Nevertheless, humans thrive and outcompete other animals due to their production of all kinds of tools. Human locomotion, which leaves two limbs virtually free, allows for the use of all kinds of tools and weapons during movement. So, we can make an inference from bipedalism to rationality, and from rationality to humanity. This means that wherever we encounter the human form of bipedalism we are dealing with a rational animal: i.e. a human. Once again, Kemp’s “biological human” is shown to be a non-starter—due to bipedal locomotion, which can only exist in combination with reason.

Setting out his second point, Kemp writes:

Chaberek objects that the difference between merely biologically human beings and fully human beings is scientifically undetectable. (Chaberek 2025, 286) . . . Rational beings can generally be distinguished from non-rational beings by their behavior (e.g., use of language). The fact that this is not yet true in infancy (or perhaps not at all in other cases of severe cognitive disability) just shows that not everything of importance can be established by science. Since the merely biological human beings are long gone, it is not entirely clear what moral problems he thinks come with my ideas; he does not say. The only thing I can think of is the level of respect due to fossil bones. (2025, 298)

I do not see how this point challenges what I myself have been asserting. Kemp is actually agreeing with me when he says that “not everything of importance can be established by science.” In my critique, I said the following:

Kemp consistently draws on distinctions such as that of the “biological human” vs. the “theological human.” Does this mean that humanity (what he calls “full” or “true” humanity) is scientifically undetectable? If it is detectable, then how? If the real (theological) humans differ from the unreal (biological) ones only by virtue of their soul, then how can that difference be scientifically established?

Obviously, science defines humans as what they are on the basis of biological features: they are those beings that have the human genome and phenotype and are born from other humans. But on Kemp’s account, one cannot tell the difference, because biological and theological humans are biologically identical. I shall not even mention any of the moral problems that come with his ideas. (Chaberek 2025, 286)

It should be noted that by “science” I meant natural science—e.g., biology. Now, while it would be possible to establish the difference between a rational and a non-rational animal by means of the social, or perhaps the psychological, sciences (based on, for instance, the ability to speak), this kind of criterion will not be satisfactory, because it leaves out those “true” humans who—for whatever reason—cannot speak, or manifest any of the rational activities. As I said, science (biology) establishes humanity based on the human body (the genotype, the phenotype, and the fact of being born from other humans). Once this criterion is abandoned—and it must be relinquished in the case of the division into biological and theological humans—we are left with no means of distinguishing “true” humans from “biological” ones.

The only thing Kemp finds consolation in is his supposition that those biological humans became extinct long ago. We can infer the latter, because we do not encounter “merely biological humans” today. But this is circular reasoning: we do not encounter them, because they became extinct, and they must have become extinct, as we do not encounter them. The correct, non-circular formulation is that we do not encounter them either because they went extinct or because they never existed.

The third point that Kemp makes begins with his statement that I “claim their (biological humans’) existence is contrary to Church teaching” (Kemp 2025, 299). I did not say such a thing. What I said was that their existence was impossible for biological and metaphysical reasons. But, indeed, the solemn teaching of the Church on the substantiality of the human soul implies that the concept of “biological humans” contradicts that teaching for the same reasons that their existence is metaphysically impossible.

Kemp then goes on to claim that “merely traditional beliefs can be called into question, indeed sometimes be modified or even abandoned, in the face of sufficiently convincing inference” (Kemp 2025, 300). As an example, he points to Pius XII’s *Humani Generis*. However, both parts of his claim are mistaken.

Firstly, this is because Pius XII did not “call into question” or “abandon” the traditional belief (i.e. belief in the direct creation of man according to his body and soul). Rather, the Pope gave implicit permission to have debates in the Church regarding this important matter. The Pope also explained his decision thus:

Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to defend natural and supernatural truth..., cannot afford to ignore or neglect these more or less erroneous opinions. Rather they must come to understand these same theories well, both because diseases are not properly treated unless they are rightly diagnosed, and because sometimes even in these false theories a certain amount of truth is contained, and, finally, because these theories provoke more subtle discussion and evaluation of philosophical and theological truths. (Pius XII 1950, 9)

Moreover, Pius XII sets no fewer than four conditions that any Catholic debate must meet. These are:

1. The arguments of both sides must be seriously considered.
2. One cannot present the evolutionary hypothesis as a proven fact.

3. One should always take into account the decisions of the Church.
4. Catholic scholars cannot act as if the sources of divine revelation did not contain anything that would demand the greatest moderation and caution regarding this matter (Pius XII 1950, 36).

If, in *Humani Generis*, Pius XII were “calling into question” the traditional belief (as Kemp holds), he would definitely not demand that the arguments of both sides be presented, nor would he forbid considering the evolutionary hypothesis proven. For some reason, Catholic evolutionists in general are incapable of grasping the straightforward meaning of this document.

Secondly, Kemp is wrong because there was no “sufficiently convincing inference” regarding the evolutionary origin of the human body in Pius XII’s times, and many doubt that there is anything like that today. What does Kemp mean by “sufficiently convincing inference”? That he himself is “sufficiently convinced” does not mean that the evidence is sufficiently convincing. Evolutionists believe in evolution regardless of whether there is evidence for it or not—or even regardless of mounting evidence against it. Creationists do not need to care about scientific evidence either, because no natural phenomenon can disprove the supernatural work of God.³ Ultimately, the debate is over one’s beliefs rather than the scientific evidence. What Pius XII was actually faced with was not “sufficiently convincing inference,” but the fierce materialist propaganda spread by atheists at universities, in both biology and philosophy departments. Regrettably, some “weaker brothers” (to use Augustine’s phrase) succumbed to that propaganda, influencing the Pope so that he opened up the debate, which itself immediately moved away from what the Pope had permitted to be discussed (i.e. the origin of the human body) to what he had explicitly forbidden to be discussed (i.e. polygenism).

Kemp believes that “T3 [The body of Adam was a product of evolution], although contrary to a traditional belief, was recognized as theologically

3. By this I mean that even if there were a chain of fossils leading from apes to humans, and even if we were able to trace all the genetic mutations and other changes that led to the emergence of man—currently there is not even a possibility for anything like that to be traced—the first man, Adam, could still have been created *de novo*. Similarly, there is overwhelming scientific evidence that dead people do not rise from the grave, and that virgins do not give birth. Nevertheless, Catholics believe that such unique events took place outside of the ordinary course of nature, thanks to divine power working beyond the laws of nature. The same attitude should be adopted when it comes to the origin of the first man: normally, humans are born naturally from their parents, but the first man was created directly by God, outside of the order of nature.

acceptable both by Pius XII and by St. John Paul II” (Kemp 2025, 296). I’ve just shown that it was not recognized as theologically acceptable by Pius XII. Rather, it was permitted to be discussed, with the implication that the Church would pass judgement in the future.

Now, regarding John Paul II: Kemp refers to two texts—a catechesis from 1986, and the Address to PAS from 1996. I shall be leaving aside the latter, as it does not introduce anything new and has no bearing on our debate. In the catechesis, however, the Pope states that “it can be said that, from the viewpoint of the doctrine of the faith, there are no difficulties in explaining the origin of man in regard to the body by means of the theory of evolution” (John Paul II 1986b).⁴

I do not know what the Pope was aiming to communicate, but a straightforward reading of this phrase does not allow us to conclude that he was admitting any lack of compatibility between evolution and the doctrine of faith. He is only saying that, from faith’s perspective, the theory of evolution could explain the origin of the human body. So it could be that scientists find an evolutionary explanation for the origin of the human body, and that such an account does not pose any difficulties for faith. However, it does not follow that faith could not provide an alternative explanation that would trump the evolutionary one in terms of the power of belief. To use an analogy: perhaps scientists could find a physical explanation for the multiplication of loaves by Jesus and this would not be contrary to faith. Nevertheless, out of faith the believers would still be bound to hold that the multiplication did not happen by natural means, but instead was caused supernaturally by Jesus.

Surely, such an interpretation feels forced and unnatural, but if the Pope simply wanted to say that the evolutionary explanation of the human body is the true one, and that belief in the direct creation of the human body should be abandoned, then why he did not say so?

In fact, this is the problem with all utterances of Popes in recent times regarding evolution: they never define the terms, they express different reservations (in this case, “it can be said...”), and they never state the matter clearly.

Now, if we allow that the Pope meant that the evolutionary origin of the human body is not a problem for Catholic faith, this ruling, if it had

4. In his bibliography, Kemp confuses the title of the General Audience. The catechesis that was entitled “Created Things Have a Legitimate Autonomy” was delivered on April 2nd, 1986. The General Audience from April 16th, 1986, was entitled “Man is a Spiritual and Corporeal Being.” The quotation I provide comes from a more precise translation of the Italian original. (John Paul II, 1986b)

greater authority, could be considered substantially novel in terms of Catholic teaching. However, it does not have any such authority.

Interestingly, I asked my adversary to judge for himself what kind of authority the solemn profession of faith pronounced officially to the universal Church by Pope Pelagius I had (Chaberek 2025, 279). So he did. According to Kemp, these two statements by John Paul II “have at least as much theological weight as Chaberek attributes to Pope Pelagius I’s sixth-century letter to King Childebert” (Kemp 2025, 296, f3).⁵ So, according to Kemp, the Wednesday catechesis, a pastoral text of probably the lowest possible Papal authority (barring “airplane interviews”), not only matches but could even trump the solemn profession of faith pronounced by the Pope to the universal Church. I do not think that my adversary is completely serious in passing this judgement, but if he is then he is completely wrong as well.

To summarize, the Church has never adopted, recognized or supported the evolutionary origin of the human body. Until 1950, its special creation was a part of the ordinary Church Magisterium which binds the faithful. After 1950, the Magisterium allows for a plurality of opinions without granting support to any of them. That Catholic scholars *en masse* abandoned the traditional belief means only that they did so, not that the Magisterium did. There is not a single doctrinal document that could be taken to support theistic evolution, even if only implicitly.

Given that Kemp’s last response has not introduced anything new to our debate, and seeing that almost all of his responses are based on misreading my arguments and that he has started resorting to sophistry (which is always an indication of the lack of a real argument), I do not intend to deliver any further response—unless my adversary presents an argument that actually deserves one.

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5. Here, Kemp skips over the fact that the Pope’s Pelagius profession of faith was not just a letter to a king, but was later pronounced to the universal Church as the papal standard of faith.

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