Forum Philosophicum

Health Responsibility

Wesley Kim Soguilon — 2026-06-13

The paper explores the views of St. Thomas Aquinas on the virtue of charity and the increasing problem of antibiotic resistance in the contemporary world. In my work, I will explore how the virtue of charity in Aquinas may help shed light on the formulation of possible solutions to addressing this problem. In this exploration, I argue that Aquinas’ charity forms the individual, out of love, to be responsible for one’s and others’ health, especially regarding antibiotics. To achieve this, I shall discuss the following: first, I shall deal with Aquinas’ idea of the virtue of charity and the place of the common good in it; second, I shall give a cursory background on antibiotic resistance and its consequences; third, I shall discuss how Aquinas’ idea of charity would be helpful in man’ formation on using antibiotics responsibly, bearing in mind that his use of such not only impacts him but others.

Fragment and Totality

Wojciech Słomski — 2026-06-13

This article offers a philosophical analysis of Gregory Palamas’ One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, focusing on the philosophical form through which the text articulates unity and totality. Rather than treating the fragmentary structure of the Capita as a secondary vehicle for doctrinal content, the study argues that fragmentation performs a constitutive philosophical function.

Situated within the context of ancient and late antique philosophy, particularly Neoplatonism and the Pseudo‑Dionysian corpus, the analysis explores how fragmentary articulation safeguards unity from reduction to a conceptual system. In these traditions, such a mode of ontological articulation affirms totality without totalisation. Against this background, Palamas’ work is interpreted as enacting a model of unity that resists discursive synthesis.

The article demonstrates that the coherence of the Capita arises not from linear argumentation or deductive order, but from relations of resonance, repetition, and mutual illumination among autonomous fragments. Totality remains operative as a real horizon of intelligibility without being constructed or closed. Ultimately, the philosophical form of the Chapters is presented as an instance of “totality without system,” offering a significant alternative to modern totalising models of metaphysical thought.

Between Object and Event

Ezequiel Murga — 2026-06-13

This article proposes the concept of the iconic object as a phenomenological category capable of reconciling givenness and objectivity. Drawing on Jean‑Luc Marion’s distinction between idol and icon in his early theological works, and between object and event in his phenomenological writings, I argue that not every objectification is metaphysical. Beyond the a priori reduction that guarantees certainty by suppressing excess, there is a possible a posteriori objectification that recognizes its derivative character and preserves the distance that givenness requires. The iconic object designates precisely this mode of objectification: one that receives the given without exhausting it. The notion finds conceptual support in Marion’s “iconic use of concepts” and in Pascal’s doctrine of the three orders, which allows for the subordination rather than the abolition of metaphysics. Finally, the article explores how this framework can illuminate various fields such as medicine, education, and ecology.

Proof as Sign, Conversion as Condition

Steven Umbrello — 2026-06-13

Lonergan’s chapter 19 “proof,” in Insight, for God is typically assessed as a putative demonstration whose success rises or falls with the minor premise that “the real is completely intelligible.” Yet both the structure of Insight (proof as a “set of signs” requiring the reader’s self‑performance of rational judgment) and Lonergan’s later methodological turn (proof presupposes a horizon that cannot itself be proved) suggest that the apologetically decisive contribution of Insight 19 is not a freestanding inference but a meta‑apologetic, that is, an account of the normative conditions under which any natural‑theological proof can function as evidence. This article argues that Lonergan offers a two‑level model of apologetic rationality. On the first level, proofs function as instruments of clarification and as invitations to grasp a virtually unconditioned. On the second level, their cogency is conditioned immediately by intellectual conversion and, in the later Lonergan, within the fuller horizon shaped by moral and religious conversion. Interpreted this way, Insight 19 is not discarded by later Lonergan but re‑situated. It becomes a diagnostic and constructive tool within method, capable of exposing counterpositions and stabilizing conversion, without pretending to generate a horizon ex nihilo.

The Primal We

Justin Sean Luis Canaria — 2026-06-13

Studies of Karol Wojtyła’s personalism have consistently kept to his theme of understanding the person in a way that begins with the individual, prior to addressing the community. Following the paradigm of Person and Act, the I is seen as the ground for understanding the We, as it is through experience that one has contact with reality, and the community is itself composed of individual subjects. This article, however, inverts the question. Can a Community‑First approach strengthen personalism without falling into the trap of collectivism? I argue that the community is not merely a result of individual participation, but also the primordial soil that allows the subject to emerge as a person.

Third Reply to Professor Kemp

Michał Chaberek — 2026-06-13

This paper is the third reply to Prof. Kemp. It begins with a brief summary of the polemics between him and the author. The author states that Kemp misquoted St. Augustine and that he did not present any conclusive argument against Catholic monogenism. Then the argument is presented against the distinction proposed by Kemp into "biological" and "theolgical humans". The author restates that such distinction is either biologically impossible or is reducible to equivocation. The paper ends with a response to the three points of critique presented by Kemp in his previous paper. At the end the author explains why Humani Generis encyclical by Pius XII does not support the evolutionary origin of man rather it just opens the debate without settling the issue.

The Exchange over Monogenesis:

Kenneth W. Kemp — 2026-06-13

So, after Fr. Chaberek’s three critiques of my 2011 article on monogenesis and two replies from me, it is time to bring this exchange to a close. Where do matters stand?

Franciszek Bargieł SJ: Adalbertus (Wojciech) Tylkowski SJ (1624–1695) and His Philosophia curiosa

Jacek Surzyn — 2026-06-13

This principle has guided my work. Franciszek Bargieł’s Latin text has been translated here into English with attention not only to literal accuracy but above all to the author’s intended sense. Bargieł writes in the scholastic and Jesuit tradition, in which precision of definition and rigour of argument matter as much as manner of expression. My translation aims to highlight both. Latin and English differ in their preferred sentence structures. Bargieł frequently uses complex periodic sentences, suspending key predicates until the final clause. English does not tolerate such structures well. Where length and complexity would hinder understanding, I have split them into several sentences. This is an interpretative choice that preserves the argumentative structure while removing a barrier arising from syntactic differences alone. Orthography and Latin proper names follow standard contemporary conventions. Philosophical terms are rendered with established English equivalents; where no adequate equivalent exists, the Latin is retained, and Greek terms are given in transliteration. This posed no major difficulties, since most English philosophical vocabulary is calqued from Latin or, in part, from Ancient Greek.

The Wartime Roots of Wittgenstein’s Logic: Review of Urszula Idziak‑Smoczyńska’s Book

Józef Bremer — 2026-06-13

The content of the book Wittgenstein in Polish Galicia is skillfully, even intricately, woven around Wittgenstein’s personal notes, mainly from the years 1914‑1917. Chapter 1 is entitled “The Movement of Thought. The Parable. The Apostle – Wittgenstein’s Underestimated Idioms,” while Chapter 2 has the title “MS 101: The First War Notebook 9.08.1914 to 30.10.1914.” Chapter 3 deals with “MS 102: The Second War Notebook 30.10.1914 to 22.6.1915,” and Chapter 4 addresses “MS 103: The Third War Notebook 28.3.16 to 10.1.1917.” Finally, there is an Epilogue. Given its subject matter, Idziak‑Smoczyńska’s choice of such a structure for her book turns out to be highly appropriate for several reasons.

Between Wittgenstein and Freud: How Far Can Language-Games Go?

Jan Hertrich-Woleński — 2026-06-13

If A and B are giants of thought (be it philosophical or other), it is very tempting to compare ideas proposed by both of them (even in cases where they do not have very much in common). Sigmund Freud and Ludwig Witt‑ genstein are examples of A and B satisfying the antecedent of the preceding conditional.