Forum Philosophicum

Reading Nicolai Hartmann. Ideas and Dialogues

Alicja Pietras — 2025-06-25

This special issue is devoted to the philosophical legacy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950), one of the most compelling and systematic thinkers of twentieth‑century philosophy. In recent decades, Hartmann’s work has attracted renewed scholarly interest, particularly in light of contemporary debates in ontology, philosophical anthropology, epistemology and the theory of values. Researchers have begun to rediscover the depth and relevance of his layered ontology, his concept of the real, and his critical engagement with both Neo‑Kantianism and German idealism. They are also starting to explore the Russian context of Hartmann’s thought.

Nicolai Hartmann and Vasily Sesemann

Alicja Pietras — 2025-06-25

The aim of this paper is to examine the parallel philosophical projects of Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) and Vasily Sesemann (1884–1963), whose philosophical paths began when they were both studying at the German gymnasium in St. Petersburg. Both Hartmann and his lesser-known friend Sesemann are considered representatives of the so-called "ontological turn" that occurred in twentieth-century philosophy. Starting with a brief description of the history of their mutual philosophical relationships, the author explore some of the similarities in the results of their philosophical research. Their main thesis is that Hartmann and Sesemann were not only two of the many proponents of the aforementioned "ontological turn," but that they understood and, more importantly, realized this turn in very specific ways that make their research valuable today. The authors argue that the essence of their ontological turn was an attempt to define being as a dialectical process and explain how Hartmann’s ontological analyses of spiritual being and Sesemann’s ontological analyses of mental being are related to their understanding and interpretation of Hegel's dialectics.

Nicolai Hartmann and the Marburg School

Alicja Pietras — 2025-06-25

The paper deals with the Marburg Neo-Kantian’s context of Nicolai Hartmann’s (1882-1950) thought to show it under new light. The novelty of his view consists in claiming that a deeper knowledge of relationships and developments within the philosophical theories of the Marburg Neo-Kantian school (Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp) leads to the recognition that Hartmann’s project of a new ontology should no longer be seen as a complete departure from Marburg Neo-Kantianism but rather as a project born out of a criticism and reformulation of their thoughts.

The New Ontology and Modern Philosophical Anthropology

Joachim Fischer — 2025-06-25

We find an elective affinity between two theories of the early twentieth century, namely between Hartmann’s New Ontology and the modern Philosophical Anthropology of Scheler, Plessner, and Gehlen, a strongly motivated affinity or alliance: it becomes an elective affinity between both approaches insofar as both detach themselves from their seemingly natural bonds: the modern philosophical anthropologist detaches himself from the connection to the classical modern subject of philosophy, while the New Ontology abandons the connection to the old teleological metaphysics. Both perspectives, i.e., of Philosophical Anthropology and of the New Ontology, understand the human being neither as a being that posits the world and values nor do they understand the world as the result of a transcendent instance of meaning. The potential of this modern alliance between Philosophical Anthropology and the New Ontology, formed in the “Cologne Constellation” of the 1920s, has only recently been (re-)discovered (Fischer 2012; 2020; 2021). It could entail – as has been said with regard to some other previous theories – a potential for some as yet “untapped” enlightenment with regard to current theoretical debates in the twenty-first century.

Hartmann versus Heidegger

Luis Fernando Mendoza Martínez — 2025-06-25

The intention of this paper is to question Heidegger’s criticism of Hart mann’s approach to the gnoseological relation and to show that his interpretation of what the Baltic‑German philosopher had in mind in his first major work, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, was biased. I start by presenting the context of the Heidegger‑Hartmann debate on the subject‑object relation. Secondly, I briefly reconstruct Heidegger’s approach to the gnoseological relation and explain why, according to him, Hartmann’s stance is subject to his criticism of the subject‑object relation. I then present the main features of Hartmann’s conception of the gnoseological relation and his peculiar idea of representation as projection as well as his gnoseological stance of human subjects as eccentric beings. Finally, I state a criticism of some of the main features of Heidegger’s conception of Dasein, and I argue that Hartmann’s idea of the subject‑object relation is more accurate in describing and apprehending our reference to the world.

Nicolai Hartmann’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Dialectics

Matteo Gargani — 2025-06-25

This paper addresses Nicolai Hartmann’s interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics with special focus on what Hartmann calls “real dialectics,” and it is divided into three parts. The first is a concise presentation of Hartmann’s interpretation of Hegel in its historical context and its main historiographical goals, emphasising its independence compared to some contemporary readings, e.g. Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Hegelianism. The second is a focus on Hartmann’s interpretation of the relationship between Aristotle and Hegel, a fundamental step towards grasping Hartmann’s understanding of Hegel’s “real dialectics.” Here in particular, it is the meaning of “concept” and the close intellectual proximity between Aristotelian aporetics and Hegelian “real dialectics” that relates the two philosophers. The third is an account of what Hartmann considers to be Hegel’s “real dialectics,” the relationship between the latter and Hegel’s Erfahrung are examined, also to bring out in conclusion all those aspects of the Hegelian “dialectics” that Hartmann considers still relevant.

Nicolai Hartmann’s Concept of Critique

Bianka Boros — 2025-06-25

This article explores Nicolai Hartmann’s concept of “critique” (Kritik) and his critical method. The most important components of Hartmann’s critical philosophy are the distinction between problem-thinking and system-thinking (problem-oriented and system-oriented thinking), the criterion of presuppositionlessness (neutral attitude, “this side” stance, which also highlights the priority of the phenomena over theory), the preference accorded to the natural attitude (toward the object) as opposed to the reflective attitude, the emphasis on the aporetic, the critique of the common philosophical methods, the critical review of Kant’s philosophy, and lastly the theory of critical realism. Linked to the analysis of Hartmann’s critical ontology, critical epistemology and critical metaphysics I also point out an uncritical concept in those. The discussion of the elements of Hartmann’s critical methodology (transcendental, descriptive, and dialectical) shows that the various meanings of the concept of “critique” in Hartmann’s philosophy converge in the methodology of aporetic phenomenology.

Echoes of Nicolai Hartmann in Czech Philosophy

Miloš Kratochvíl — 2025-06-25

The aim of this article is to follow the echoes and incorporation of Nicolai Hartmann’s ideas in Czech philosophy. For the purpose of showing the variety of philosophical fields influenced by Hartmann, I have selected the systems of four Czech philosophers: Ferdinand Pelikán, Vladimír Hoppe, Jan Blahoslav Kozák, and Vladimír Kubeš. In his attempt to clarify noetic problems, Pelikán paid most of his attention to Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. Hoppe created one of the most complete philosophical systems in the history of Czech philosophy, where the notion of intuition plays a key role. Hartmann’s ethics is also treated and assessed by J. B. Kozák. And, in the last part of this chapter, I show the echo of Hartmann’s philosophy in the ontology of law of Vladimír Kubeš. I show that Hartmann’s ideas have not only been adopted in various modifications throughout the history of Czech philosophy, but that they have also been criticized.

Nicolai Hartmann’s Conception of Free Will in the Context of the Debate Between Compatibilism and Incompatibilism

Leszek Kopciuch — 2025-06-25

In this article, I analyse the most significant elements of Nicolai Hartmann’s conception of free will in the context of compatibilism and incompatibilism. I demonstrate that Hartmann’s conception transcends both of these paradigms, since free will seems to combine deterministic and indeterministic elements. As a result, I conclude that Hartmann’s conception of reality must contain some indeterministic moments.

Ethical Diachronicity, Metaethical (Non-)Factualism, and the later Wittgenstein

Carl Humphries — 2025-06-25

Discussions of moral luck, exceptionalism, and ethical watersheds raise the question of what it would mean for our ethical commitments to exhibit, in an axiologically non-trivial way, a diachronic character. This would render a particular evaluation applicable, by virtue of its content, only at certain times and not others. It would also make whether or not there happen to be cases we can point to at a given time and for a given domain contingent on facts about what antecedently occurred in the world. I explore this first by considering how the issue relates to the metaethical division between factualists and non-factualists, and then by examining Wittgenstein’s distinctive line of thinking, in On Certainty, about how framing commitments and empirico-factual beliefs combine in ways that change over time. I conclude that theorising about ethical diachronicity in such terms leads to a problem of self-referentiality, but argue that while such an approach entails a certain “throwing away of the ladder” of philosophical analysis, this need not leave us with nothing to say. There can be a meaningful consideration of putative cases of ethical diachronicity in other ways, via personal histories and fictional narratives.

The Issue of the Pragmatist Sources of Post‑Truth, Considered in the Light of William James’ Definition of Truth

Marek Wójtowicz — 2025-06-25

“The post‑truth era” is one of the terms characteristic of modern times. It describes the widespread acceptance of deception and manipulation in public life, especially in the mass media. The investigation presented here first seeks to clarify the phenomenon of post‑truth, on the basis of an analysis of those authors who have proposed and popularized the concept, such as Steve Tesich, Ralph Keyes and Matthew d’Ancona. Next, it explores the thesis put forward by Dariusz Juruś regarding the influence of the philosophy of pragmatism on the development of post‑truth. In order to evaluate that thesis, William James’ conception is examined, including his definition of truth, his radical empiricism, and the idea of a genuine option. It turns out that the American philosopher’s pragmatism can undoubtedly not be counted among the sources of post‑truth.

Some critical and exegetical considerations on the relation between faith and reason that can be drawn from Kierkegaard’s characterisation of the Knights of Faith Abraham and Mary in Fear and Trembling

Michael Grech — 2025-06-25

Kierkegaard refers to the figure of Knight of Faith to sustain a definite picture of the relation between faith and reason, to argue that faith cannot be rationally buttressed or justified. In Fear and Trembling, he identifies Abraham and the Virgin Mary as Knights of Faith. The paper: (1) Illustrates the notion of the Knight of Faith focusing on Abraham, the Knight of Faith par excellence; (2) Considers two paradoxes the sacrificial binding of Isaac in Genesis may involve; one involving inconsistency between God’s command and moral standards, and a contradiction between God’s command and a blessing Abraham was offered; arguing that there is no ground to assert that Abraham would have been aware of the former; (3) Claims that Mary ought to be characterised as a Knight of Faith in light of a paradox involving a blessing she was promised, and certain concrete situations and events. The paper refers to historico-exegetical scholarly work to argue that, contrary to what Kierkegaard claims, when considering the attitude of these two figures when facing these paradoxes, one cannot sustain any picture regarding the relation between faith and reason.

Hermeneutics of the Holy Time

Antoni Torzewski — 2025-06-25

The aim of this paper is to present hermeneutics of the holy time. The main thesis I take into consideration is that the dialectic of holy and non-holy time through the awareness of finitude leads to skepticism which reduces religious violence. The holiness of a given time is therefore constituted on the ethical, rather than ontological grounds. The research aim in the case of this article is not to describe the factual state of affairs connected with the notion of the holy time, but rather to normatively put forward a certain interpretation of the holy time that would strive to present it as a means to reduce violence, and to reconcile it with the postmetaphysical account of (weak) religion.

The Arches and the Spandrels

Michał Chaberek — 2025-06-25

In his book „The Edge of Evolution”, Michael Behe draws on a metaphor of arches and spandrels. The arches are what holds a cathedral together and spandrels are the “fillings” that may carry beautiful ornaments, however, they have no say in whether a building stands or collapses (Behe 2007, 171-203). Behe explains that it is similar with life – some minor and non-substantial elements of living organisms can be explained by neo-Darwinism, but the complex biochemical systems, which are essential for survivability of any living organism – cannot. Thus neo-Darwinism may explain the spandrels, but not the arches of life. I think Behe’s metaphor can be taken more broadly and applied to the context of our debate. Here I will understand it as a mental attitude by which one focuses on the irrelevant spandrels at the same time pretending to be unable to grasp the arch (“core” or “essence”) of a problem. In his response Mr. Kemp reduces my critique to four points (P1-P4) which he claims we disagree on and shows why – on his view – I am mistaken. Here I will order my response according to his four points.

Review of Vasily Sesemann’s The Logical Laws and Being

Alicja Pietras — 2025-06-25

This book is the continuation of two older works from 1927, which were published under the common title “Studien zum Erkenntnisproblem. Teil 1. Über gegenständliches und ungegenständliches Wissen; Teil II. Rationales und Irrationales” [“Study of the Problem of Cognition. Part I. On Objective and Non-objective Knowledge; Part II. Rational and Irrational”]. With both of these previous works, which together are almost the same length as this new essay, the latter is so strongly related that the unity of the whole is easily noticed in the parts. Regrettably, these three parts did not appear together as one book. This is even more unfortunate because, while there is certainly an interest in such works in the circle of German professionals, it is difficult for a series of publications by a foreign university with predominantly foreign-language contributions to make it on the German book market. I feel for these reasons even more that it is my duty to draw the attention of professional philosophers to this significant and, in some respects, unique work.

Contemporary phenomenology facing the problems of modernity

Michał Zalewski — 2025-06-25

On February 28th, 2025, another of the online debates organized periodically by the Ignatianum University in Cracow took place. The subject of the discussion was the book Niepewność fenomenu. Fenomenologia w horyzontach nowoczesności (The Uncertainty of the Phenomenon. Phenomenology in the Horizons of Modernity) by Iwona Lorenc (University of Warsaw), published by the University of Warsaw Publishing House in 2024. The book comprises a selection of texts published over the years, which have now been compiled and republished in a new form, in addition to two texts presented for the first time. It demonstrates the post-Heideggerian paradigm of practicing phenomenology, as represented by thinkers such as Patočka, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Barbaras, Dufrenne, Maldiney and Escoubas, among others.