Forum Philosophicum

Editors’ Note

Jacek Poznański — 2025-12-29

A Naturalist Theology

Finley Lawson — 2025-12-29

The root of the narrative that places naturalism in opposition to the central tenets of Christianity resides in the perception that a “naturalist” account of reality has no space for the nonmaterial/transcendental. That perceived dichot‑ omy, this paper will argue, resides in a categorical error about the nature and number of things in reality. The apparent conflict assumes that one faces a binary choice between matter and non‑matter, where the first of these falls under the remit of investigation by the natural sciences while the second does not, thus putting theology at odds with naturalism.
In contrast to this dichotomous account, the scientific holistic ontologies pro‑ posed by Michael Esfeld (philosopher of science) and Hans Primas (quantum chem‑ ist) provide a radically different account of foundational reality in which one can argue that there is no requirement to reconcile two fundamentally different kinds of “stuff.” The contradiction between naturalism and Christianity is only apparent. It is based on our presuppositions about the world as described by science and our commitment to particular accounts of the nature of personhood. This paper does not claim that scientifically informed holism “solves” the naturalism versus anti‑naturalism debate; however, it does provide a way to integrate naturalistic (scientific) metaphysics into our Christian thought.

The Argument from Reason Revisited

Charles Taliaferro — 2025-12-29

Arguments against naturalism and materialism have a long history, from Plato to Plantinga. The paper has three parts: First, I reconstruct an argument from reason found in Plato’s the Phaedo. Second I consider whether the argu‑ ment is relevant to contemporary forms of naturalism. I argue that the argument does constitute a serious objection to some forms of naturalism. I then defend the argument against objections from GEM Anscombe, Graham Oppy, and Peter van Inwagen.

What Is Distinctive About Human Intelligence in the Context of Artificial Intelligence?

Robert Kublikowski — 2025-12-29

Since antiquity, humans have traditionally been characterised as animal rationale or homo sapiens. Such a definition takes into account, on the one hand, the physical aspect, referring to the human body, but also, on the other hand, the mental aspect. With this in mind, the present article seeks to develop a philosophical approach to the problem posed in its title.

Various aspects of human language use and cognition are, in the era of the information revolution, being increasingly taken over by AI. So what still remains specific to humans—or, more precisely, to human, natural intelligence, given this dynamically developing context?

The article addresses this question in a series of steps. Initially, it considers whether rationality is a good candidate for a uniquely human trait. In defence of the distinctiveness of human intelligence, and using Robert B. Brandom’s semantic inferentialism, it then points to our ability and skill in understanding, as well as the normativity of language use and cognition. The ensuing discussion focuses on the normative categories of deontic status and deontic attitude, and related notions of commitment and entitlement that these in turn imply.

God as Absolute Machine: Aligning Modern Formalisms to Prove God

Ward Blondé — 2025-12-29

Let Anselm’s God denote that than which nothing greater can be conceived. The rationale of this paper is to show that not only the existence, but also three omni‑attributes of Anselm’s God—omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence—can be defined and proven via modern formalisms. The objec‑ tive is to do this via a terminological alignment of set theory, mereology and computer science on the one hand, and metaphysics and natural theology on the other. The methodology used consists of a two‑step argument: first, if physical entities are of paramount ontological greatness, then God is equal to an absolutely infinitely large, physical universe with omni‑attributes. Second, using a slightly different criterion, God can be either abstract, or concrete and non‑physical. Some important findings are that (1) a central axiom explains both God and the physical realm, (2) Cantor’s Absolute Infinite—and therefore God—can be given a consistent definition, and (3) isolated possible worlds are never observed. The essence of this paper is, in short, that “God is the Absolute Machine.”

The Nature of Monotheism

Joshua Sijuwade — 2025-12-29

This article develops a philosophical explication of monotheism through fundamentality, using Rudolf Carnap’s method of explication and Karen Bennett’s concept of ‘building‑fundamentality.’ By examining how contemporary philosophers and theologians have struggled with defining monotheism in light of Second Temple Judaism’s complex theology, this article argues that understand‑ ing monotheism as the belief in one fundamental deity provides a more philosophi‑ cally robust framework than numerical definitions. This framework helps reconcile divine plurality in Jewish theology while offering new perspectives on polytheistic traditions and interfaith debates, thus contributing to broader discussions in the philosophy of religion and theology.

The Relationship of Italian Neo‑Scholasticism and Phenomenology to Naturalistic Anthropology

Tymoteusz Mietelski — 2025-12-29

This article explores the anthropological views of Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908–1990), an Italian philosopher who identified herself as a Thomist while advocating a broadening out of this classical approach through the incorporation of phenomenological elements. The text outlines her conception of the human being, distinguishing between phenomenological and metaphysical levels. A key focus here is her critique of naturalism—which, she argued, is unjustly reductive in its approach to human beings. This polemical reflection situates her views within a broader context, addressing in particular the call for a re‑empiricization of Thomistic anthropology.

Some Difficulties of Theology Developed in the Context of Science

Ryszard Mordarski — 2025-12-29

Teologia ewolucyjna: Założenia – problemy – hipotezy (Evolutionary Theology: Assumptions – Problems – Hypotheses), by Wojciech P. Grygiel and Damian Wąsek, is an interesting and inspiring book. The attempt to formulate traditional problems of theology in the context of the natural sciences should com‑ mand special attention today. And if it is also a successful and consistently pursued attempt, then we should welcome it with particular interest. In this article, however, I do not want to dwell on the advantages of the publication being discussed, but rather to make some comments that may appear relevant when seeking to assess the theses of its authors from the perspective of a classical theist entertaining a metaphysical rather than scientific perspective on theology. I will focus on four issues: (1) the concept of Revelation developed in the context of the natural sci‑ ences, (2) the understanding of evolution, (3) the metaphorization of theological language, and (4) the panentheistic perspective of theology practiced in the context of science. In conclusion, I state that the proposed development of theology in the context of science, despite the advantage of presenting old theological problems in a new perspective, is vulnerable to the accusation of pan‑positivism, which entangles theology in too strict a context, depending as it does on the results of the empirical sciences.

Wittgenstein, Relativism, and the Second-Person Perspective

Piotr Szałek — 2025-12-29

This paper addresses the problem of the relativist implications of Witt‑ gensteinian non‑cognitivism. If moral and religious language are only an expression of language users’ attitudes, then both moral values and religious beliefs will be relative to just those language users. The paper attempts to respond to this charge in the following two ways. First, it seeks to show the common conceptual structure underlying the accusation of relativism as it relates to both Wittgenstein’s non‑ cognitivism and his position on scepticism, where the latter reflects his contextual‑ ist anti‑sceptical strategy (which is also charged with relativism). Second, it seeks to demonstrate that in both cases it is possible to offer a non‑relativist reading of Wittgensteinian thinking by affirming the commensurability of different world‑ views through an appeal to the second‑person perspective, taken as characteristic of the human way of living (or human “form of life”).

“Fake News” in Reformulated Messages

Mitchell Thomas Welle — 2025-12-29

In an age where information spreads faster than ever, the subtle manipulation of truth through rephrasing plays a pivotal role in amplifying mis‑ information. Starting from the observation that the spread of “fake news” may be significantly reinforced through reformulating a message for the sake of its mis‑ representation, we seek to address the problem of the spread of “fake news” from the perspective of the rephrasing of news for purposes of misinformation. Given such a potentially dangerous role for misuses of rephrasing, the following research question arises: what is the relation between “fake news” and reformulated mes‑ sages? This question will be addressed by analysing to what extent (i) definitions of “fake news” in the computer‑science and philosophy‑related literature, and (ii) recent linguistic studies of rephrase (as it is sometimes known), are helpful in identifying the main features of “fake news” as these relate to the latter. In this regard, we propose a research programme for addressing rephrase as a linguis‑ tic phenomenon—one that will serve as a tool for the study of communication in respect of “fake news.”

The Ethics of Responsibility in the Context of the Use of Intelligent Machines and the Problem of the Technosystem

Mariusz Wojewoda — 2025-12-29

This article is devoted to the problem of responsibility as it arises in the context of the technosystem—where the latter is enhanced by the work of intelligent devices. In this case, the system in question refers to the relationship between man, functioning in the various roles of creator, trainer, owner and user of intelligent agents, and machines equipped with artificial intelligence. Suppose we assume that the aim of technological development is the well‑being of the human being living now and the human being of the future. In that case, attention must be focused on the value of responsibility. The system of technology is embedded in a cultural and social context. The author diagnoses the causes of the disap‑ pearance of responsibility (the adjacency of actions) in the context of using smart devices, and considers what should be done to counteract this. The background for the analyses undertaken is furnished by ecosystem theory, together with the related concept of instrumentalization as construed by Andrew Feinberg, and Hans Jonas’ ethical theory of responsibility—considered as they relate to the analysis of selected cases.

Mindful Decentering, and Attention as Selection for Action

Piotr Sikora — 2025-12-29

This article examines the compatibility between one of the central phenomena discussed in the literature on the theory and practice of secular mind‑ fulness, decentering, and one of the most influential contemporary philosophi‑ cal accounts of attention—namely, Wayne Wu’s theory of attention as selection for action. I begin by presenting and critically examining Victor Lange’s recent attempt to show that decentering constitutes a counterexample to Wu’s account. I then argue that Lange’s conception of decentering is inadequate, and propose an alternative understanding according to which decentering indeed serves as a counterexample to the view of attention as selection for action. Finally, I outline possible directions for further philosophical research on attention that accommo‑ date the findings of secular mindfulness, particularly those concerning decentering.

Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism

Ewa Odoj — 2025-12-29

In the article, I present the debate on doxastic voluntarism and its rela‑ tion to doxastic responsibility. I outline the discussion in the literature, focusing on Alston’s argument against doxastic responsibility, and then present my own position in this debate. I defend a conception of doxastic freedom that remains consistent with the principle of alternative possibilities. To this end, I provide an epistemological analysis of the phenomenon I call “doxastic self‑deception.” I also introduce the notions of “doxastic strategy” and “alethic impurism”—a view con‑ cerning the possibility of pragmatic reasons for beliefs. I conclude that doxastic responsibility is possible because we have the ability to self‑deceive, and at the same time possess metacognitive capacities that enable cognitive self‑control.

Reading as an Affective and Discursive Event

Robert Grzywacz — 2025-12-29

This paper deals with a twofold understanding of the notion of event. The first construal of the latter draws upon the philosophical framework of Marc Richir, in which that concept event corresponds to a process of phenomenalization occurring within a schematism that serves as a transcendental matrix for individual phenomena. It enables access to a sphere of fluctuating phenomena correlated with the non‑intentional activity of phantasia, which precedes their symbolic institution. According to Richir, the experience of reading literature can exemplify this kind of phenomenalization, one that activates interaction with human affective experience.

The second concept of event referred to in the study is derived from the thought of Paul Ricoeur, and may be characterized as a discursive one, since the latter thinker emphasizes the transcendence of the merely event‑referring dimension of discourse in favour of the meaning it conveys. In his elaborated theory of reading, Ricoeur describes the process as both active and passive: a wandering point of view on the world opened up by the text, a dynamic synthesis of sentential retentions and proten‑ tions, a bidirectional modification of the reader’s expectations and memories, a search for meaning and a struggle with its absence, and a breakdown and reconstitution of narrative coherence. Yet Ricoeur’s category of the world of the text appears to suggest a certain kind of symbolic and ontological institution. At the stage of exis‑ tential appropriation of textual proposals, these proposals are directed toward the imagination (operating intentionally), not toward fantasy (non‑intentional).

The paper examines some consequences of both views of the act of reading through the lens of two selected narratives from Difficult Loves by Italo Calvino. The aim of this final investigation consists in assessing, from the perspective of reading literature, the joint contribution of both thinkers to an event‑oriented reshaping of human identity.

Second Reply to Fr. Chaberek

Kenneth Kemp — 2025-12-29

Is Saruman a “Peacemaker,” and Abortion “Murder”?

Michał Zalewski — 2025-12-29

Report from the 3rd International Christian Philosophy Conference, “Christian Philosophy Facing Naturalism”

Oskar Lange — 2025-12-29

Call for Papers

Maciej Jemioł — 2025-12-29