



Adam Machowski

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0681-0728>

The Jagiellonian Academy in Toruń, Poland

ksadam@op.pl

Social communication as a necessary condition for community-building: Lessons from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas for modern education

Submitted: 30.12.2024

Accepted: 21.11.2025

Published: 31.12.2025



Keywords:

Aristotle,
Aquinas,
social education,
family education

Abstract

Research objectives and problems: The aim of this research is to re-discover the educational sources of social and political community. Since these sources originated in antiquity and the Middle Ages, it is useful to revisit the ideas of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The article is a comparative inquiry into their views on the social and political value of education.

Research methods: The source materials consist of texts written by both authors. In my study, I use the method of hermeneutic text analysis to uncover the meaning of their writings, alongside comparative analysis—the main method used—which examines the two authors' texts in their historical and cultural contexts.

Process of argumentation: Such a comparison is possible and legitimate because Aquinas repeatedly commented on, and creatively interpreted, the thought of the Stagirite. Both classical thinkers emphasized the role of proper communication in the co-creation of a social community. Multidimensional education—transmitting knowledge and virtues—served this purpose by constructing a community of shared values. However, while Aristotle's doctrine focuses on the political dimension of communication and pedagogy (the first part of the article), Aquinas discovers and analyzes the social, pre-political reality of community life (the second part). This generates important differences between them. While Aristotle maintains a strictly political orientation in his understanding of education, Thomas Aquinas emphasizes the more familial nature of social dialogue and instruction (the third part).

Research findings and their impact on the development of educational sciences: The analysis shows the need for education oriented toward community-building. These authors' reflections on social relations and the necessity of mutual communication in a political community remind us of the importance of social education. In Aristotle, we find a strong call for conscious political education of citizens, whereas in Thomas Aquinas, we encounter an appeal for education in social relations and for building smaller communities such as families, associations, and congregations.

Conclusions and recommendations: The purpose of this article is to show the importance that classical authors attached to social education as a prerequisite for the existence of a political community. This is important in our postmodern times, which are characterized by radical individualism and the breakdown of community ties. In this commentary, I propose rediscovering the ideas of both philosophers for contemporary education, which help us appreciate and properly apply communication in the creation of social and political bonds.

Introduction

Both Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle emphasized the role of proper communication in the co-creation of a social community. Multidimensional education—ensuring the transmission of knowledge and virtues—served this purpose by helping to build a community based on shared values. However, whereas Aristotle's doctrine focuses on the political dimension of communication and pedagogy, Thomas Aquinas emphasizes the more familial nature of social dialogue and instruction.

I. A political community needs its own education system

As Aristotle states in the *Politics*, any political system requires proper education. Only under this condition does any political community have a chance to survive and develop.

Now nobody would dispute that the education of the young requires the special attention of the lawgiver. Indeed, the neglect of this in states is injurious to their constitutions; for education ought to be adapted

to the particular form of constitution, since the particular character belonging to each constitution both guards the constitution generally and originally establishes it—for instance the democratic spirit promotes democracy and the oligarchic spirit oligarchy; and the best spirit always causes a better constitution. (Aristotle, 1944, 1337a)

A properly targeted education system becomes, in effect, a guarantor of a well-functioning political system, while disregarding it leads to political turbulence.

But a political community and education are not possible without proper communication. This is what allows any polis to configure its inherent ethos, so importantly created and shared by all citizens. This is the crucial role of language and literacy, which the barbarians did not possess, according to Aristotle, and were therefore incapable of forming a civic community. This view was characteristic not only of Aristotle, but of all Greeks. “The Greeks have been distinguished since ancient times from the barbarians as being cannier and freer from silly simple-mindedness, and the Athenians are considered first in wisdom among the Greeks” (Gottesman, 2014, p. 119).

It can be said that language or the ability to communicate is not an end in itself, but its purpose is to create a common ethos of political life. Without this ethos, living together is simply impossible. A common ethos is something that integrates individuals and families into the polis. Language and human communication are not just important for communication in ordinary daily affairs, but also for discerning what is just and unjust. As Aristotle writes in Book I of *Politics*, “but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state” (Aristotle, 1944, 1253a). As Naomi T. Campa (2024) notes, the Greeks explicitly emphasized the importance of a common language and equal voice for all citizens as something that forms the common foundation of their political system.

So Athens came to flourish—and to make manifest how important it is for everyone in a city to have an equal voice (isēgoria), not just on one level but on all. For although the Athenians, while subjects of a tyrant, had been no more proficient in battle than any of their neighbors, they emerged as supreme by far once liberated from tyranny. This is proof enough that the oppressed will never willingly pull their weight, since their labors are all in the service of a master—whereas when freed, each was eager to achieve for himself. Freedom from tyrants is tied to equality of speech (ἡ ἰσηγορία), the type of speech that is associated with political participation, such as in the Assembly, and that is a hallmark of democracy. (Campa, 2024, p. 31)

Human speech provides equal access to shared concepts, shared education, and shared life, while the sounds made by animals as an expression of only basic feelings cannot form the basis of such a highly developed community.

Moreover, according to the Stagirite, this distinguishes human communication from that of animals, who warn each other of danger and indicate pleasure, but are unable to construct a political community. “The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another)” (Aristotle, 1944, 1253a).

Without proper communication and education, it becomes impossible to construct a political community or for that community to realize its goals, including the most important one: a good life for its citizens, that is, a life lived in accordance with virtue. Hence, *aretē* itself in the Stagirite’s doctrine is strictly political in nature. Aristotle dedicated his other major work, the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle, 2014), to this subject. As Lang explains, “The book that follows from this one is *The Politics*, in which he sets out what kinds of citizens and political arrangements can best inculcate the virtues. Importantly, *The Politics* ends by discussing education, because it is only through education that we can create good citizens” (Lang, 2023, p. 315).

Linguistic communication, education, and a virtuous life enable human beings, in Aristotle's account, to transcend the limits of mere biological existence. This introduces a contrast between the natural state and political existence, what later neo-Scholastics would call "second nature" to distinguish it from the original, biological nature of man. Therefore, the political community has an exclusive/inclusive character: on the one hand, it excludes those who do not use language as being incapable of teaching and living according to virtue and participating in political life in general, while on the other hand, language, education, and virtue (ethos) make it possible to create a polis.

The question "in what way does the living have language?" corresponds exactly to this other: "in what way does the naked life inhabit the polis?" The living has logos by removing and retaining in it one's own voice, in the same way, it inhabits the polis by leaving relegated in it one's own naked life. Politics then presents itself as the structure in the fundamental proper sense of Western metaphysics, given that it occupies the threshold at which the articulation between the living and the logos is fulfilled. In bare life, "politicization" is the metaphysical task par excellence, in which the humanity of the living man is decided, and in taking on this task Modernity does no more than declare itself faithful to the essential structure of the metaphysical tradition. The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not friend–enemy, but rather naked life–political existence, zoe–bios, exclusion–inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes to himself his own naked life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to it in an inclusive exclusion. (Agamben, 2018, p. 21)

Therefore, the political community in Aristotle is something qualitatively and radically different from other, pre-political communal forms of human life. It is not just a matter of the number of people who make it up. For Aristotle, human rationality and communicative/linguistic abilities are strictly political in nature. In this way, he radically opposes the biological structure as such. Human rationality in politics realizes its dynamism

and creativity in a way unknown to the physical and biological structures that exist in the world (Martinez Barrera, 2006, pp. 17–19). The physical and biological constitution of human beings must also be taken into account here. This is why only a political community is a perfect community (*communitas perfecta*), one that ensures the fulfillment of human goals in a unique way.

II. Aquinas' perception of the difference between the political and the social

However, Aquinas, interpreting Aristotle's texts, identifies a sphere that connects the political with the natural: the pre-political, social sphere of human life which is strongly linked to family life. We can see this in the very reformulation of the Greek *zoon politikon* into the Latin *animal politicum et sociale*. Some interpreters consider this merely a repetition by Thomas referencing one sentence in Aristotle's *Politics*, without a difference in meaning (Rocha Martins, 2049, p. 1560–61), but in my opinion, Aquinas intentionally introduces here the second term *sociale* with the desire to go beyond what the Stagirite expressed (Machowski, 2023, p. 49).

Firstly, social reality is far more present in his writings than in Aristotle's. The latter, after mentioning the family at the beginning of *Politics* and comparing it to the political community, basically abandons the topic. For him, ethics, virtue, and morality are strictly related to political life. Meanwhile, for Aquinas, morality is also pre-political in nature, which I show later in the article using the example of the virtues attached to justice. The perception of this sphere of human functioning as moral was influenced by Christianity (as shown by Hanna Arendt) and by Roman thought, with its concept of *societas* being adopted and expanded by Aquinas (Arendt, 2016).

Some even believe that, with the help of Roman terminology, Aquinas simply converted the political into the social:

By seemingly attempting to equate the city with the domestic community, surreptitiously transforming the former into the latter, Thomas Aquinas performs a social metamorphosis of the political, making society (*societas*) the true mold of the political. For this reason, contrary to Albert the Great's own view, Thomas Aquinas interprets the term *civis* in the sense of *socius*, manipulating its meaning inherent in the Aristotelian polis. By stating that "man is a political animal," Aquinas as philosopher actually means that "man is a social animal." (Habermas, 1963, p. 54)

But, in my opinion, Aquinas does not go this far—he retains the political, but at the same time emphasizes the social (Machowski, 2023, p. 4132–33).

Secondly, Aquinas elaborates much more than Aristotle on the issues of nature and its influence on the functioning of society. Admittedly, Aristotle himself notes that the marital or family community is more natural than the political community (Aquinas also notes this when commenting on the *Nicomachean Ethics*), but he does not elaborate on this topic, while Thomas draws out the implications as noted by Piwowarski (1960). I will quote a passage in which Aquinas, referring directly to Aristotle's teaching, emphasizes more strongly the more natural character of the family in comparison to the state.

Praeterea, in 8 Ethic., cap. 12, dicit Philosophus, quod homo magis est naturaliter conjugale animal quam politicum. Sed homo est naturaliter animal politicum et gregale, ut ipse dicit. Ergo naturaliter est conjugale; et sic conjugium, sive matrimonium, est naturale

Furthermore, in *Ethics* 8, chapter 12, the Philosopher says that a human being is more naturally a conjugal animal than a political one. But man is naturally political and social, as he himself says. Therefore, man is naturally conjugal, and thus wedlock, or marriage, is natural. (Aquinas, 1858, dist. 26, a. 1., s. c. 2)

A consequence of the naturalness of human family life is that it is very similar to animal life, which cannot be said of political functioning.

In what is familial, the human natural state is closer to animal nature. This is why the term *gregale* appears in Aquinas' writings as a synonym for social life and for the word *sociale*. In fact, Aquinas' books actually contain passages in which he speaks of real social life among animals without any mention of their political functioning (if only by analogy) (Aquinas, 1979). For example, as Thomas notes in his commentary on the *Ethics*: "*Est quidem enim naturale homini ut sit animal mansuetum, secundum communem naturam speciei, in quantum est animal sociale; omne enim animal gregale est naturaliter tale*" ["To be a peaceful animal is natural to man by the common nature of the species, inasmuch as he is a social animal (for every gregarious animal is naturally of this kind)"] (Aquinas, 1969, n. 1391). In this sense, what is social in Aquinas is closer to the natural world of herd animals. He does not make such a radical distinction as Aristotle between what is political (human) and biological (animal). *Homo socialis* appears in Aquinas as a kind of bridge between *homo politicus* and *animal gregale*.

III. The strictly political nature of Aristotle's education and Aquinas' social/familial education

This proximity to the state of nature results in the chronological precedence of the family community over the political community, and reflects the fact that the family fulfills more basic human needs such as giving birth, feeding, and educating. The tasks of the political community are different, such as ensuring peaceful coexistence among citizens. "*Propagatores autem et ordinatores corporalis vitae secundum duo attenduntur: scilicet secundum originem naturalem, quod ad parentes pertinet; et secundum regimen politicum, per quod vita hominis pacifica conservatur, et hoc pertinet ad reges et principes*" ["The propagators and directors of the life of the body are required from two points of view, namely, in respect of natural origin, which concerns the parents, and in respect of political order (whereby man is assured a peaceful life), and this regards kings and governors"] (Aquinas, 1961, lib. 4, c. 58).

For Aristotle, education has the same purpose as communication: to prepare a person for civic life. In the development of a young man, a number of virtues are needed for political functioning. “Moreover, in regard to all the faculties and crafts certain forms of preliminary education and training in their various operations are necessary so that manifestly this is also requisite in regard to the actions of virtue” (Aristotle, 1944, 1337a).

As we have seen, Aristotle makes his points about human communication and education by directly applying them to political life. This is the exact fulfillment of the scheme of purposeful cause, according to which a political community is the ultimate goal of human nature.

And inasmuch as the end for the whole state is one, it is manifest that education also must necessarily be one and the same for all and that the superintendence of this must be public, and not on private lines, in the way in which at present each man superintends the education of his own children, teaching them privately, and whatever special branch of knowledge he thinks fit. But matters of public interest ought to be under public supervision; at the same time we ought not to think that any of the citizens belongs to himself, but that all belong to the state, for each is a part of the state, and it is natural for the superintendence of the several parts to have regard to the superintendence of the whole. And one might praise the Spartans in respect of this, for they pay the greatest attention to the training of their children, and conduct it on a public system. (Aristotle, 1944, 1337a)

For this reason, according to Aristotle, education should be organized or at least controlled by the state.

Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, while adopting most of Aristotle’s views, introduces some modifications. In his writings, communication and education have a distinctly pre-political character. Aquinas emphasizes the very social role of the family and of other communities smaller than the state. They are necessary for proper education and learning interpersonal communication.

It is true that Aristotle, contrary to Plato, also mentioned the need for their existence, though he did not elaborate on their particular role in communication and education. Aquinas, in turn, recognizes this role and seeks to describe it. We can see this most clearly in the treatise on social virtues attached to the virtue of justice as the principal virtue. While justice and prudence remain primarily political virtues for Aquinas, the virtues associated with them belong to the social (pre-political) forms of life. This is the case, for example, with the virtue of friendliness, which Aquinas relates to domestic and neighborly relationships. We must remember at this point that Aristotle, writing about friendship, had in mind relationships that were primarily political. For Aquinas, this is not the case. Friendliness enables one to communicate at a more basic level, among the people with whom one interacts in daily life. We can see this in the text on natural law, where Aquinas uses the Latin term *conversare* to show the necessity of friendliness and mutual communication of the people among whom we live.

Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant

And in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law—for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination. (Aquinas, 1891, q. 94, a. 2, corp.)

The same process of depoliticizing Aristotle's thought, so to speak, can be observed in Aquinas' interpretation of educational issues. For him, education belongs mainly to the family or to the community of the church. One could say that somehow the state is disappearing here. Historical conditions probably played their part, i.e., the already long and relatively stable position of the polis in the case of Aristotle and the weak medieval states that were only being formed and the great role of the Church in the case of Thomas.

Aquinas also recognizes—with the spirit of his age—the value of proper communication in economic life or other pre-political forms of social life. This difference between ancient and medieval approaches was noted, for example, by Hannah Arendt (2016) in *Human Condition* and by Anthony Black (1961) in *Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present*. Human communities that are smaller and qualitatively different from political communities are capable of creating bonds and moral principles and transmitting shared values (Machowski, 2023, p. 260).

Aquinas also evidently describes the family as the place where virtues are formed and notes their pre-political—i.e., social—functioning. This can be seen, for example, in his treatment of the virtue of generosity, in which the point of reference is the family and its welfare. Similarly, religious formation—concerning the virtue of religiosity—takes place in the family, which is why marriage is a sacrament. “*Matrimonium igitur secundum quod consistit in coniunctione maris et feminae intendentium prolem ad cultum Dei generare et educare est Ecclesiae sacramentum: unde et quaedam benedictio nubentibus per ministros Ecclesiae adhibetur.*” [“Therefore, matrimony, as consisting in the union of a man and woman who intend to beget and educate children for the glory of God, is a sacrament of the Church; hence the bridal pair receive a blessing from the ministers of the Church”] (Aquinas, 1961, lib. 4, c. 78).

This can also be seen in the case of the virtue of liberality. Aquinas argues the need to exercise some moderation in this virtue in order to be able to support one’s family, whereas Aristotle only warns against spending too much, taking into account the possible future donations that may be more necessary and important than current ones. Aquinas’s stance is evident in the following passage from the *Summa Theologiae*: “*Et tamen etiam in temporalibus rebus non pertinet ad liberalem ut sic aliis intendat quod omnino se et suos despiciat. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., est illa probanda liberalitas ut proximos seminis tui non despicias, si egere cognoscas*” [“And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (in *De Offic.* I),

‘It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want’] (Aquinas, 1899, q. 117, a. 1, ad. 1).

Aristotle’s position, which Aquinas cites in his reply to the following argument, does not refer to the family situation, but only to individual life. “*Ad secundum dicendum quod ad liberalem non pertinet sic divitias emit-tere ut non sibi remaneat unde sustentetur, et unde virtutis opera exequatur, quibus ad felicitatem pervenitur. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod liberalis curat propria, volens per hoc quibusdam sufficere.*” [“It does not belong to a liberal man to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (in *Ethics* IV) that ‘the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people’] (Aquinas, 1899, q. 117, a. 1, ad. 2). A very characteristic passage can be found in the *Ethics*, where Aristotle, speaking of the vice of excess in relation to the virtue of generosity, mentions boasting instead of the need to protect the family and its goods—contrary to Aquinas’s later interpretation (Aristotle, 2014, 1192a–b).

Aquinas generally describes these abilities as auxiliary to justice, which, like prudence, is strictly political in nature, as in Aristotle. In questions 80 to 120 of the *Secunda Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae* (Aquinas, 1899, q. 80–120), Thomas discusses the virtues connected to the principal virtue of justice; they are primarily developed and exercised in family life and in local communities. It is only later that the man thus formed moves on to political life. However, virtues such as friendship and vengeance are important in relationships other than political ones. As quoted by Anthony Black (1961), the orders of the Guild of London state: “For friendship as well as for vengeance we shall remain united, come what may” (pp. 4–5). In Aristotle, meanwhile, the question of friendship is discussed and considered possible only in terms of political relationships.

A similar process of depoliticizing Aristotelian virtue can be seen in Aquinas’s treatment of vengeance, which he associates more with natural human inclinations than with political life. As Aquinas writes about the virtue of vengeance:

I answer that, as the Philosopher states (Aristotle, 2014, II, 1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the fulfillment of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (in *Invent. Rhet. ii*) that by “vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure (i.e., derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it.” Therefore, vengeance is a special virtue. (Aquinas, 1899, q. 108, a. 2, ad. 1)

Thomas Aquinas, recognizing and emphasizing the natural, pre-political nature of human morality and education, establishes a clear continuum in human relations and communication from smaller communities to the political community. This smooth transition is missing in Aristotle, which means that his vision of political life can be seen as suspended in a kind of social vacuum.

This is one of the reasons why contemporary politics is detached from social issues. The postmodern elites tend to shut themselves off in their own elite world, losing touch with what ordinary people feel and experience. Communication fails and think tanks provide analyses that are politically in demand; hence the growing wave of populist movements, which, in the eyes of the people, identify their problems and speak their language.

One solution could be to rediscover the political value of smaller communities, such as the family, and to recognize their community-building potential. This can also make political issues and actions more realistic and renew our political communities. This, in turn, would imply a task for education, at least in the Western world, to rediscover and promote

the family and other smaller social communities as those that create common bonds and shared values. Only such a remedy can cure the diseases of postmodernism, such as extreme individualism and the erosion of common values (Bauman, 2000).

Conclusions

Both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas state clearly that a lack of proper communication and education leads to the dissolution of the political community and its regression into atomized forms of individual or tribal life. The human condition will then be worse than before and will revert to “the law of the jungle” and the ruthless competition and struggle of each against each.

For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice. For unrighteousness is most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of virtue man is the most unholy and savage of animals, and the worst in regard to sexual indulgence and gluttony. (Aristotle, 1944, 1253a)

Some observers of the postmodern era we are living in identify similar trends in the current disintegration of political communities. Aristotle and Aquinas agree that without proper communication and education, a human community cannot be formed and existing political communities will be progressively destroyed.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Conflicts of interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

References

- Agamben G. (2018), *Homo sacer. El poder soberano y la vida desnuda* [Homo sacer. Sovereign power and naked life] (M. Ruvituso, Trans.). Adriana Hidalgo editora
- Arendt, H. (2016), *La condición humana*. [The Human Condition] (R. Gil Novales, Trans.). Paidós (Original work published 1958).
- Aristotle (1944). *Politics*. (H. Rackham, Transl.) Harvard University Press.
- Aristotle, (2014). *Nicomachean Ethics*. (R. Crisp, Transl.) Cambridge University Press.
- Bauman, Z. (2000), *Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień* [Postmodernity and Its Discontents] Wydawnictwo Sic!
- Black, A. (1984). *Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Campa N.T. (2024) *Freedom and Power in Classical Athens*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gottesman A. (2014). *Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens*. Cambridge University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1963). *Theorie und Praxis, Sozialphilosophische Studien* [Theory and Practice, Social Philosophy Studies], Suhrkamp,
- Lang A. F. (2023). Regulating Weapons: An Aristotelian Account. *Ethics & International Affairs* 37, p. 309-320.
- Machowski, A. (2023). *Cnoty społeczne u Konfucjusza i Tomasza z Akwinu* [Social virtues in Confucius and Thomas Aquinas]. Jagielloński Instytut Wydawniczy.
- Martinez Barrera, J. (2006). El comentario de santo Tomás a la *Política* de Aristóteles: un análisis desde *Prooemium* [Saint Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's Politics: an analysis from Prooemium]. *Veritas* 51, p. 15-49.
- Piwowarski, W. (1960). Rodzina jako społeczność naturalna według św. Tomasza z Akwinu [The family as a natural community according to St. Thomas Aquinas] *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 6, p. 89-111.
- Rocha Martins A. (2019). The zoon politikon: Medieval Aristotelian Interpretations. *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 75, p. 1539-1574.
- Thomas Aquinas (1858). *Commentum in quartum librum Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi* [Commentary on Sentences IV]. Typis Petri Fiaccadori, p. 872–1259.
- Thomas Aquinas (1979). *De regno ad regem* Cypri [On Kingship]. Editori di San Tommaso, p. 417-471.
- Thomas Aquinas (1961). *Liber de veritate catholicae Fidei contra errores infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles* [Summa Contra Gentiles]. Marietti.
- Thomas Aquinas (1891). *Prima secundae Summae theologiae (Opera omnia iussuimpensaue Leonis XIII P.M. edita 6)* [Summa Theologiae First Part of the Second Part]. Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide.
- Thomas Aquinas (1899). *Secunda secundae Summae theologiae* [Summa Theologiae Second Part of the Second Part]. Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.
- Thomas Aquinas (1969). *Sententia libri Ethicorum* [Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics]. Ad Sanctae Sabinae.