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Abstraction as a Source of Inventive Creativity: The Limits of Artistic Freedom Seen Through the Lens of Semioethics

ABSTRACT

The research framework announced in the title reflects a dual structure of this paper – conceptual and methodological. The central argument of the conceptual section is that abstraction constitutes a fundamental form of inventive activity for creators of works of art. Hereto, various types of imaginative transformations of features abstracted from real objects are also presented. The methodological part, as indicated in the subtitle, evaluates various modifications of aspects and components in artistic designs that result from creative elaboration. It poses the question of whether the expression form to represent the content of a given artwork is aligned with widely accepted ethical principles, and to what extent the creation falls within the scope of semioethics – that is, the moral responsibility of its creators. Special attention is given to the intentionality and emotional resonance of the communication through works of art with a focus on social and political trends, as well as the sensitivity of certain audiences to taboo subjects or potential blasphemy perceived as offensive to the dignity of religious or cultural communities. The conceptual and methodological components form the foundation for the third, analytical part of the paper. The source material for detailed analysis consists of descriptions of selected art exhibitions displayed in public or private galleries, alongside audience reactions as described in various transmedial forms of journalistic discourses available on social media platforms.

KEYWORDS: abstraction, creativity, ethics, freedom, imagination

STRESZCZENIE

Abstrakcja jako źródło inwencji twórczej: granice wolności artystycznej widziane przez pryzmat semioetyki

Zapowiedziane w całym tytule ramy badawcze wskazują na dwojaki podział poniższego artykułu, konceptualny i metodologiczny. Głównym argumentem części konceptualnej jest to, że abstrakcja stanowi podstawową formę

działalności inwencyjnej twórców dzieł sztuki. W tym kontekście prezentowane są również różnego rodzaju wyobrażeniowe modyfikacje cech wyjętych z wyabstrahowanych obiektów rzeczywistości. Z kolei część metodologiczna, zapowiedziana podtytułem, oceniając różne modyfikacje aspektów i komponentów projektów artystycznych, będących pochodną twórczej elaboracji, stawia pytanie, czy forma ekspresji reprezentacji treści ocenianego obiektu jest zgodna z powszechnie dopuszczalnymi zasadami etyki lub w jakim stopniu realizacja analizowanego dzieła sztuki mieści się w normie moralnego postępowania jego twórców. Osobną uwagę zwraca się na intencjonalność i emocjonalność przekazu za pośrednictwem dzieł sztuki, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem trendów społecznych i politycznych, a także wrażliwości niektórych odbiorców na kwestie tabu czy na przykład bluźnierstwa uwłaczające godności przedstawicieli określonych społeczności, religijnych czy kulturowych. Konceptualne i metodologiczne części ramy stanowią podstawę trzeciej, analitycznej części pracy badawczej przedstawionej w niniejszym artykule. Źródłem materiału do szczegółowej analizy są opisy wybranych przykładów wystaw artystycznych prezentowanych w otwartych lub zamkniętych galeriach, a następnie reakcje publiczności, opisywane w odpowiednich transmedialnych formach dyskursów dziennikarskich dostępnych na różnego rodzaju portalach społecznościowych.

S Ł O W A   K L U C Z E : abstrakcja, etyka, kreatywność, wolność, wyobraźnia

Abstracting among human processes of concept formation

To clarify the subject matter of this paper, it should be noted that abstraction, imagination, and generalization encompass three fundamental processes involved in concept formation. When considering the essence of *conception*, proponents of logically inclined philosophical approaches may agree that all abstractions originate in perceptions closely tied to cognitive experience involving imaginative processes of recombination, refinement, and extrapolation of observed changes in reality.

Thus, enumerating ways and levels of abstractions with special reference to imaginative creativity, the methodological tools for research are drawn from the primary sources, beginning with Joseph Samuel Bois' book *The Art of Awareness* (1966, pp. 61–97) and continuing with terminological distinctions elaborated by Hubert Griggs Alexander in *The Language and Logic of Philosophy* (1971, pp. 107–128, and 202–229). Among Alexander's secondary sources, the position *Science and the Modern World*, authored by Alfred North Whitehead (1925) is additionally prized.

The author of *The Art of Awareness* devoted a special chapter to "The process of abstracting," in which he remarked that *abstract* in the adjectival

sense, *abstraction* in the nominal sense as an act, and *abstracting* in the verbal sense "belong to … everyday language." Therefore, it is necessary, "to divert these terms of their popular connotations" being interested "to use them as technical words in an epistemological system" (Bois, 1966, pp. 62–63).

In opposition to Bois' claim that abstraction-related terms "are not identical with the dictionary categories" (1999, p. 63), one has to observe that how many meanings are listed under the entry "abstract" depends on the choice of a given dictionary. To support this claim, it is worth citing and quoting one of the best-suited definitions found in *Random House Webster's College Dictionary*, edited by Robert B. Costello in 1992:

> Abstract. adjective (1) "thought of apart from concrete realities, specific objects, or actual instances: an abstract idea;" (2) "expressing a quality or characteristic apart from any specific object or instance: an abstract word like justice;" (3) "theoretical; not applied or practical;" (4) "difficult to understand; abstruse;" (5) "emphasizing line, color, and nonrepresentational form: abstract art;" noun (6). "a summary of a text, technical article, speech, etc.;" (7) "an abstract idea or term;" (8) "an abstract work of art;" (9) "something that concentrates in itself the essential qualities of anything more extensive or more general;" verb transitive (10) "to draw or take away; remove;" (11) "to divert or draw away the attention of;" (12) "to steal;" (13) "to consider as a general quality or characteristic apart from specific objects or instances;" (14) "to make an abstract of; summarize; idiom;" (15) "<in the abstract> without reference to a specific object or instance; in theory. [1400-50; late ME: withdrawn from worldly interests < ML abstractus, L: ptp. of abstrahere to drag away, divert = abs- ABS - + trahere to draw, pull; cf. TRACT 1]" (cf. Costello, ed., 1992).

Closest to the definitional *genus proximum*, recapitulated by Bois (1966) but elaborated more extensively by Alexander (1972), are transitive transitive verb senses no. 10 and 11. This is evident in the sense "to draw away mentally" of the verb "to abstract" suggesting that "there is something there to be drawn away and something from which to draw away," according to Alexander (1972, p. 107). Abstract, for him "is not something that floats mysteriously into the 'thoughts' of humans they 'know not from whence' but "it is something tied to experience" (Alexander, 1972, p. 107).

A representative usage of the verb *abstract* was made by Whitehead, saying: "Each mode of abstracting is directing attention to something which is in nature; and thereby is isolating it for … contemplation" (1925, p. 173, quoted by Alexander, 1972, p. 107). As Alexander further states, "In this sense, abstracting is not really removing anything at all. It is simply focusing our attention on some part or aspect of what we experience while neglecting to pay attention to other parts or aspects" (1972, p. 107).

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Apropos the Latin *abstrahere* "to draw away," abstracting a certain feature – i.e., a constituent or an aspect of a prominent or conspicuous part or characteristic of an object –

> implies the drawing away to a conceptual plane quite remote from the concrete level of experience … . It is a process of (1) *focusing attention upon some feature within experience*; (2) *holding this feature as the object of our immediate thought*, and (3) *possibly remembering it later* (Alexander, 1972, p. 108).

The process of abstraction is continuous. There are always some possibilities of making single abstractions from abstractions, where the leftover or – in other words, the residue – area of abstractables may shrink or vary constantly. "Thus, as long as one can find another part within a part or another aspect within an aspect, one can continue to abstract from abstractions" (Alexander, 1972, p. 109). Some features may become focused and some others may become eliminated from the attention of abstracting agents. When people "abstract," they "are normally conscious of focusing attention upon the abstracted feature" or they might be "conscious of that feature" (Alexander, 1972, p. 109). However, "of the neglected or residue areas," they "are not particularly aware" (Alexander, 1972, p. 109). Indeed, in Alexander's view, "this factor of awareness constitutes the major difference between the abstraction and the residue" (1972, p. 109).

> First, there is the obvious awareness of the item being abstracted. Second, there is the less obvious awareness of the residue item. Third, there is still less likely awareness of the fact that one is abstracting (Alexander, 1972, p. 110).

Performing the act of abstraction, human agents draw away a feature "from a given whole while focusing attention upon a part or aspect of that whole" (Alexander, 1972, p. 111). In Alexander's view, the word "*concrete*, … refers to the whole" of an object existing in reality before it becomes perceived, as far as it "is simply that from which nothing has been abstracted" (1972, p. 111). That is exactly the case where "concrete" is considered an object of ordinary experience (thing or event), which cannot be divided into smaller features or included in the features of larger objects before it has been recognized as a perceivable phenomenon.

Alexander noticed that observing agents might "distinguish two basic kinds of abstractions (1) *parts* as abstractions of features which could also be physically removed, and (2) *aspects*, or abstractions of features which cannot be removed physically, even if [they] wished" (1972, p. 113). Going further into the interpretation of this quote, one could say that the first

variety of abstractions encompasses constituents of coexistent parts or as separate elements isolated totally from the objects as wholes, and the second, its inherent or relational properties of cognized reality. The "primary sorts" of aspects make up, in Alexander's depiction, "(1) qualities, (2) relations, (3) functions or activities" (1972, p. 113).

Another approach to abstraction has been presented by Bois (1966, pp. 87–90), grouping such types as evaluative (honesty, goodness, attractiveness, repulsiveness, pleasure, threat, etc.), nominalistic (depicting, mapping, modeling, transforming, signification, description, etc.), classifying (interpretation, subsumption, etc.), self-reflexive (meta-designation, metalanguage, e.g., talking about talking, thinking about thinking, speaking in words about words), and relational (filing, systematizing; ordering, ranking).

The above categories applie to simple abstractions only. Hence, Alexander sees the necessity to introduce the notion of *imaginative altering of abstractions*, considering that "the human mind is also capable of imagining what objects or [their]aspects might be like if they were different from the way they appear" (1972, p. 108). In his opinion "this process of transforming objects and imagining them in different ways is also a perfectly natural process, which is not just simple abstracting but involves more mental activities than simple abstracting" (Alexander, 1972, p. 108).

The relationship between abstraction and inventive creativity, originating in imagination, is exposed by Alexander separately in "Chapter IX. Imagining" (1971, pp. 202–229). Cognizing is considered there as an experiential process of abstracting those aspects and constituents of objects in perceptible or inferred reality, which manifest to the external senses of a person as an observer and are transformed into internal representations of a subject as a knower.

Having categorized alteration changes into negation, creation, substitution, and variation Alexander (1972, p. 204–210), reviews such possibilities of imagining, as (1) immediate recollecting, (2) retrieving from remote memory, (3) filling in and completing the present from the previous experience, (4) adding reported historical never-witnessed facts to the just-experienced facts, (5) reduplication or multiplication of features, (6) recombining the features experienced in different domains of objects, (7) enlarging or diminishing the experienced features, (8) moving beyond the realm of picturable and experienceable (cf. Alexander, 1972, pp. 210–214).

Relevant to the research objectives is the issue of "recombining the features experienced in different domains of objects" in visual art. Its investigative perspective invites semioethical inquiries into the limits of inventive creativity

Seeing the use of artworks as semiotic-communicational means from the perspective of semioethics

The second part of this paper is devoted to the evaluative lens, through which the art-creating agents see the objects of culture or civilization as means and ways of communication. This investigative perspective falls within the domain of semioethics, concerned with their proper or improper use of artworks for semiotic-communicational purposes. Moree broadly, when taking into account the methodological dimensions of communication channels or variables of interaction networks, semioethics entails also technoethics (elaborated by Lorenzo Magnani, 2007, and discussed in a wider context of ethics and morality concerning technology-related freedom and intentionality of acting subjects by Peter-Paul Verbeek, 2011).

For the purposes of this paper, the key distinction lies between ethics questioning how to act and morality pondering the responsibility of intentional agents in their choice of acting behavior. Despite various critical reviews, worth pointing out from the perspective of ethical theory and morality philosophy, are selected issues of Magnani's discussion, e.g., the ethical quality of knowledge and moral duty of knowledge when he says in the "Preface" to his book *Morality in a Technological World: Knowledge as Duty* that: "preserving and improving the present aspects and characteristics of human beings depends on their own choices about knowledge and morality" (2007, p. xv).

Within the framework of duty theory, the concept of moral agency of human subjects holds a central position. Therefore, in support of this concept, worth quoting is the statement from Verbeck,

> An entity can be called a moral agent if it can be morally responsible for its actions, and to be morally responsible, it needs at least (1) intentionality – the ability to form intentions – and (2) the freedom to realize its intentions (2011, p. 54).

Accordingly, the position of Morten Tønnessen, the author of *The semioethics interviews I: John Deely: "Tell me, where is morality bred?"* (2009) should be acknowledged as a source of inspiration. For Tønnessen "semioethics first of all concerns the foundation of ethics, or of moral responsibility" (2009, p. 53) As he claims, contending the definitions of Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio (2003), John Dealy (2001), "semioethics is to understand it as a meta-ethical theory, a theory about the foundation of human moral responsibility" (Tønnessen, 2009, p. 55).

Assuming, however, that semioethics – together with technoethics – occupy a central place among disciplines that apply proper or improper semiotic-technical means of expression, in contrast to Petrilli–Ponzio and

Dealy's views interpreted by Tønnessen (2009), this paper proposes that semioethics is a right-and-good-oriented responsibility of moral agents who engage with the works of art as signs or sign-processes of inventive creativity in the personal sphere of imaginative altering of abstractions.

To differentiate ethics from morality in terms of related spheres of meaning-expressions (semiospheres), it is relevant to introduce a distinction between the two sign-of-value- and sign-of-action-oriented orders of human life. These orders encompass, among other things, ethics as a socially autonomized axiological semiosphere and morality as an individually realized praxeological semiosphere of culture, which depend upon their heteronomous realization in historically, and ideologically determined conditions of human civilizations.[1]

For terminological purposes, it is sufficient to refer to classical definitions of ethics, as outlined by Aristotle (384–322 BC), and morality, as developed by Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC–43 BC). Selected passages from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (presumably devoted to his father, or his son Nicomachus, or compiled and edited by the latter), are worth quoting here. As for the concept of morality, it is of primary importance to cite *De Oratore* (On the Orator) a dialogue, addressed in the first of three books to Cicero's brother Quintus. written by Cicero in 55 BC. For continuation of the concept is worthwhile to consider Cicero's *De Oficis* (On duty), dedicated to his son Marcus Tullius Cicero Minor. or Cicero the Younger (born in 64 or 65 BC; the date of his death is not recorded).

Two of the most frequently cited passages from *Nicomachean Ethics* are especially relevant. The first defines the concept of the good:

> Every art and every kind of inquiry, and likewise every act and purpose, seems to aim at some good: and so it has been well said that the good is that at which everything aims (Aristotle 1883 /1881/ [ca 347–330 B.C. or 349 B.C], Book I. End, chapter 1, section 1. In all he does, man seeks some good as ends or means, p. 1).

The second quote underscores the importance of human striving for goodness:

> the good of man is exercise of his faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue, or, if there be more than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue (Aristotle 1883 /1881/ [ca 347–330 B.C. or 349 B.C], Book I. End, chapter 7. The good is the final end, and happiness is this, section 16, p. 17).

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1   Respective views are based on the distinctions, introduced by the author in his essay "Ethics and morality as choice and act-oriented semiospheres of culture" (Wąsik, 2023).

The concept of morality can be traced to Cicero's reflections on the orator's conduct in terms of excellence. In *De Oratore*, he notes that: "the speaker will marshal instances of conduct, either active or passive, on the part of the subject of his praises; whereby he manifested wisdom, generosity, valour, righteousness, greatness of soul, sense of duty, gratitude, kindness or, in short, any moral excellence you please" (*De oratore*, II. xi. 46; p. 233). To continue with *De Oficis* (On Duty), Cicero further explores the tension between the individual's pursuit of private happiness and the demands of public good, depending on whether such aims are honorable or selfish. As he states: "The discussion of duty is twofold. One division relates to the supreme good in itself considered. The other to the rules by which the conduct of life may in all its parts be brought into conformity with the supreme good" (Cicero, 1879 [44 BC], p. 6).

However, in further explanation of Cicero: "what is right in itself is perfect duty; that for the doing of which a satisfactory reason can be given is a contingent duty (1879, p. 6). In the latter case:

> It is first to be determined whether the contemplated act is right or wrong, (…) whether the act under discussion is conducisive to convenience and pleasure, to affluence, and free command of outward goods, to wealth to power, in fine, to the means by which one can benefit himself and those dependent on him (Cicero, 1879, pp. 6–7).

As a final point, Cicero speaks in favor of principles in life, stating

> that the interest of each individual and that of the entire body of citizens are identical, which interest if anyone appropriate to himself alone, he does it to sundering of all human intercourse. (…) that man shall desire the promotion of man's good for the very reason that he is man, it follows in accordance with that same nature that there are interests common to all (1887, pp. 183–184).

Alluding to the phenomenological notion of "right" and "wrong," this paper draws attention to permissible *versus* unacceptable patterns of ethicality and admissible or inadmissible practices of morality in the realm of group interactions and individual experiences. in this context, the term *ethics* refers to the knowledge about the comportment of the public agent as a participant of group decision-making and the term *morality* to the behavioral conduct of the private agent as an executor of individual decision-making. What is, therefore, brought to light is the detachment of public ethics, governing the virtue-and-duty-oriented trajectories of choice, from private morality, determining the utility- and interest-oriented conduct.

Moreover, the distinction between the competence of public agents and the performance of private agents is articulated in terms of foreseeable dispositional properties which enable signifying individuals to effectively communicate with other individuals in task- and role-oriented communicative acts under the pressure of collective sanctions. In keeping with a transdisciplinary approach to the public domain of ethics and the private domain of morality, the author has aimed to construe an axiological and praxeological model that exhibits the role of communicating agents as mental subjects and physical persons. Defined in terms of public gents and private agents, these signifying subjects and communicating persons are treated as engaged, on the one hand, in the evaluation of their choices of cultural goods and, on the other, in the execution of their acts as civilizational tools, which become significant regarding the virtue-related fulfillment of their public duties or utility-related satisfaction of their private interests.

With the aim-in-view of employing the terminological apparatus of ethical and moral dimensions of culture, this paper distinguishes between ethics and morality as follows: the term *ethics* to the communicative competence (i.e., knowledge of permissible comportment) of a public epistemic agent as a participant of the group decision-making. In contrast, *morality* pertains to the communicative performance (i.e., behavioral conduct in terms of reliability and accountability) of a private epistemic agent of the individual decision-making. Accordingly, it has been assumed that ethics, which governs the choice of socially permissible virtue- and-duty-oriented competence, belongs to the axiological sphere of culture, and morality, which admits the applicable utility- and interest-oriented performance, belongs to the praxeological spheres of the civilizational realization of culture.

Respectively, the notion of the agent pertains both to a mental subject and a physical person, operating in the public and private spheres of human life, as a citizen of a given society or state. The present discussion is grounded in the assumption that ethics, governing the choice of socially permissible virtue-and-duty-oriented competence, belongs to the axiological sphere of culture. In contrast, morality, admitting the applicable utility- and interest-oriented performance, belongs to the praxeological spheres of the civilizational realization of culture.

What is important in human-centered linguistic semiotics is the role of a signifying subject as a "public agent/private agent" who is engaged in the activity of evaluating his/her choices as goods and executing his/her acts as tools, which gain cultural for virtue-oriented (axiological), or utility-related (praxeological) significance for the fulfillment of his/her duties, or the realization of his/her interests. In this context, Aristotle's observation is especially pertinent:

For he who loves truth. and is truthful where nothing depends upon it, will still more surely tell the truth where serious interests are involved; he will shun falsehood as a base thing here, seeing that he shunned it elsewhere, apart from any consequences: but such a man merits praise (Book IV, chapter 7. Of truthfulness, section 8, p. 129).

By detaching the axiological semiospheres of public ethics, governing the virtue-and-duty-oriented trajectories of choice, from the praxeological semiospheres of private morality, determining the admissible or inadmissible utility-and-interest-oriented conduct, this paper proposes a distinction between the autonomous status of culture and its heteronomous manifestation in human civilization. The distinction between ethical choices in the competence of public agents being aware of their duties and moral acts performed by private agents realizing their interests as instrumental ends, might be regarded as useful in the context of the semiotics of art.

Surrealistic strangenesses or controversies in artistic freedom of expression

As analytical material for interpretation, this paper introduces five selected thematic groups, which readers may explore individually by following the links provided in the Reference List 2. These themes encompass:

1. *The Garden of Earthly Delights* Triptych of Hieronymus Bosch, 1490–1500. This intentionally secular painting imitates a tripartite altarpiece, persenting a narrative of the creation of the world and a condemnation of human vices and weaknesses through depictions of hellish torment. The paradisiacal garden, with God, humans, and other creatures, is contrasted with a vision of hell, populated by symbolic allegorical executioners and their instruments of torture. The inclusion of sexually engaged nude figures, fantastical animals, oversized fruit, and hybrid stone formations in an altarpiece-like format, might evoke moral condemnation among observers, particularly in the context of its exhibition. However, the intricacy of its symbolism filled with a mind-altering aura of radical freedom was intended by the creator to express criticism of the history of believers or mere churchgoers. This triptych was undoubtedly not designed to be displayed in a church or monastery. The painting might be also interpreted as a didactic warning on the perils of earthly temptations. See Museo del Prado, 2015; Hickson, 2024.
2. *Via Crucis* by Fernando Botero (1932–2023). Considering the sophisticated style of Botero's artworks, this piece might have hurt the

of some believers. The so-called "Boterism" is characterized by the portrayal of figures with exaggerated shapes, proportions, and volumes. It was likely influenced by church decorations of colonial times and popular murals in the streets of Colombia. Remarkably, this style has been acknowledged by Church authorities. According to the artist's own explanations, one can conclude that the creator follows an intuitive, personal way of seeing reality – without rationalizing it. *See Inside the Vatican Digital Magazine*, 2019); Museo Botero, 2024.

3. Je Suis Charlie" Slogan. This solidarity slogan emerged in the aftermath of debates on freedom of artistic expression versus blasphemy--related fundamentalism, sparked by the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed in the French journal *Charlie Hebdo*. These events culminaed in a terrorist attack at the headquarters of the satirical magazine in Paris. This moral dilemma has been examined by several scholars, including Nathan Walter, Stefanie Z. Demetriades, Ruthie Kelly, and Traci K. Gillig, in their article "Je Suis Charlie? The Framing of In-group Transgression and the Attribution of Responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo Attack" published in the *Journal of Communication*, 10 (2016), 3956–3974. See Devichand, 2016; Walter, Demetriades, Kelly & Gillig, 2016.

4. *Pyramid of Animals* by Katarzyna Kozyra. Inspired by the Brothers Grimm tale *The Musicians of Bremen*, the installation consists of four taxidermied animals stacked one on the other. Katarzyna Kozyra, a sculpture student at Warsaw's Academy of Fine Arts, crafted her work to get the master's thesis from the bodies of killed animals. For the diploma sculpture, a horse, a rooster, a dog, and a cat were placed on top of each other forming a kind of pyramid. The work, which broke social taboos, triggered a wave of media criticism and was accused of transgressing moral-right principles. See Culture–pl, 1993; Kozyra, 1993.

5. *Iron Man* by Paweł Jach and Krystian Truth Czaplicki. Alluding to the multicultural style of recent times, the oil paintings series depicted silhouettes of *inter alia* nude persons, an old man with a child, and a boy with a girl, through which Paweł Jach expressed approval of naturism, civil unions, the idea of free love, or different gender identities. The other pole of the exhibition was a presentation of sculpture by Krystian Truth Czaplicki, whose art dealt with power structures, questioning social norms, and visualized current political unrest. This street installation on Szewska Street in Wroclaw caused controversy and a storm on social media. The provocative naturist images in the showcases proved so shocking that they were

destroyed after just four days. See Biały, 2024; Jach & Czaplicki, 2024a; Jach & Czaplicki 2024b.

Conclusion

In final remarks, observing social aspects of ethics in culture and personal features of morality in civilization might be relevant to the investigative domain of axiological semiotics and praxeological semiotics (axiosemiotics and praxeosemiotics). Within the framework of communication sciences, a model of ethical standards and moral conduct might be suggested for discussing the competence of public signifying and the performance of private communicating citizens of a given state or country. Regarding its conceptual content, the issue of semioethic competence could be specified in terms of foreseeable dispositional properties of communicating agents in the interest-oriented acts of speech under the pressure of collective sanctions of acceptance or rejection.

By way of investigative postulates, such attributes of communication participants as permissibility, acceptability, tolerability, adequacy, appropriateness, and suitability, along with their negative counterparts might be related to the modeling processes of personality traits in the not-yet-becoming of their multi-discursive and inter-discursive competencies, governed by the rules of generationally transmitted traditions and socially construed norms.

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