

Beáta Varga

ORCID: 0000-0001-7244-0783

University of Szeged

The Effects of the “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War” (1654–1686) on the Ukrainian regions

Skutki „wschodnioeuropejskiej wojny trzydziestoletniej” (1654–1686) na terenach ukraińskich

Abstract

According to the decision of the Pereiaslav Rada of 1654, Ukraine voluntarily entered into union with Russia, which triggered the outbreak of the “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War” (1654–1686) between Russia and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth for control over Ukrainian territory. From 1657 onward, following the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ukrainian hetmans struggled for power, often supported by Polish, Ottoman, and Russian intervention. In Ukrainian historiography, this tragic period is known as the “Ruin.” The Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667 officially divided the Ukrainian lands along the Dnieper: Left-Bank Ukraine remained under Romanov rule, while Right-Bank returned to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. News of division shocked the Cossack *starshyna*, and the Russian government was accused of a grave betrayal of the Pereiaslav Agreement. The Treaty of Andrusovo, later reaffirmed as the “Eternal Peace” in 1686, restored Right-Bank Ukraine – except for Kyiv – to Poland, where it remained – though not without conflict or dispute – until the Second

Partition of Poland in 1793. The incorporation of Ukrainian regions into different political states and cultural spheres contributed to long-term divergences in their historical development.

Keywords: Eastern European "Thirty Years' War", Pereiaslav Agreement (1654), Zaporozhian Host; Treaty of Andrusovo (1667), Eternal Peace of 1686.

Abstrakt

Zgodnie z decyzją Rady Perejaławskiej z 1654 roku, Ukraina dobrowolnie weszła w unię z Rosją, co zapoczątkowało wybuch „wschodnioeuropejskiej trzydziestoletniej wojny” (1654–1686) między Rosją a Rzecząpospolitą Obojga Narodów o kontrolę nad ziemiami ukraińskimi. Od 1657 roku, po śmierci Bohdana Chmielnickiego, ukraińscy hetmani toczyli walkę o władzę, często przy wsparciu polskiej, osmańskiej lub rosyjskiej interwencji. W historiografii ukraińskiej ten tragiczny okres określany jest mianem „Ruiny”. Traktat andruszowski z 1667 roku oficjalnie podzielił ziemie ukraińskie wzdłuż Dniepru: Lewobrzeżna Ukraina pozostała pod panowaniem Romanowów, natomiast Prawobrzeżna wróciła do Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów. Wiadomość o podziale wstrząsnęła kozacką starszyną, a rząd rosyjski oskarżono o poważną zdradę ugody perejaławskiej. Traktat andruszowski, później potwierdzony jako „pokój wieczysty” w 1686 roku, zwrócił Prawobrzeżną Ukrainę – z wyjątkiem Kijowa – Polsce, gdzie pozostała, choć nie bez konfliktów i sporów, aż do II rozbioru w 1793 roku. Włączenie poszczególnych regionów Ukrainy do odmiennych organizmów politycznych i stref kulturowych doprowadziło do długotrwałych różnic w ich rozwoju historycznym.

Słowa klucze: wojna trzydziestoletnia we wschodniej Europie, ugoda perejaławska z 1654 roku, wojsko zaporoskie, traktat andruszowski z 1667 roku, „pokój wieczysty” z 1686 roku.

Events leading to the "Eastern European Thirty Years' War"

The beginning of Ukraine's history dates back to the Kievan Rus', a state that played an important role in the ethnogenesis of all three East Slavic ethnic groups (Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian).¹ When the Mongols conquered Kyiv in 1240, the Kievan Rus' already divided into

1 Csilla Fedinec, Márta Font, Imre Szakál and Beáta Varga, *Ukrajna története: régiók, identitás, államiság* (Budapest, Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, 2021), 7.

principalities, came to an end, gradually becoming part of the Golden Horde. During the 1340s, Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania started competing to control the south-western territories of the former Kievan Rus'. By 1349, Poland had taken control over Galicia and Western Volhynia, while the Eastern Ukrainian territories (except for Western Volhynia) had become part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In Latin historical sources from the fourteenth century,² East Slavic people living in the south-western territories of the former Kievan Rus' were referred to as “Ruthenians” and their lands as “Ukrainian territory.” The name “Ukraine” comes from the Slavic word “kraj,” which, according to contemporary usage, meant “borderland.”³ Starting with Gediminas (1316–1341), the Grand Dukes of Lithuania firmly claimed that the territories of the former Kievan Rus' belonged to them. The population living in the south-western regions of the former East Slavic state put up no resistance against the expansionist efforts of the Grand Dukes; instead, these territories joined the Grand Duchy of Lithuania “voluntarily.” The Union of Krewo of 1385, establishing a personal union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,⁴ ended the privileged status granted by the Lithuanian rule in the Ukrainian regions. After this agreement, the name “Ruthenian” was used to refer to Orthodox subjects who had no rights. Polish became the official language in both states. In accordance with the Union of Lublin of 1569,⁵ the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were unified under a single state called the “Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów” (Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth). As a result of the real union, Lithuania lost its direct control over nearly all the Ukrainian territories,⁶ which were taken over by the Poles. The tolerant religious and social policies characteristic of Lithuanian rulers were replaced by the Polish rulers’ integration plans.

The Union of Lublin accelerated the integration of the Ukrainian nobility into the Polish–Lithuanian *szlachta*, leaving the East Slavic people living in these territories without their cultural and social elite

2 Źródła Dziejowe. T. X. Sprawy wołoskie za Jagiellonów, ed. Aleksander Jabłonowski (Warszawa: Gebethner i Wolff 1878), 34.

3 *Акты Литовско-Русского государства*, Вып. 1. (1390–1529) Изд. М. Довнар-Запольским (Москва: Университетская типография, 1899), 229.

4 *Acta unii Polski z Litwą, 1385–1791*, ed. Stanisław Kutrzeba, Władysław Semkowicz (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Towarzystwo naukowe warszawskie, 1932), 1–3.

5 *Ibidem*, 414.

6 The Polish crown, which acquired Halich and Western Volhynia in 1387 and Western Podolia in 1430, extended its authority to all of Podolia, Volhynia and Kyiv after 1569.

class.⁷ After this process, the Cossacks,⁸ an “intermediate social class” and a significant military force in the Polish-Lithuanian state during the late sixteenth century, became the leaders of the East Slavs. At the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the term ‘Ukraine’ acquired a narrower meaning: it did not mean borderlands in general anymore; but it stood for a specific geographic unit, lying along the middle course of the Dnieper River, that is, the central regions of present-day Ukraine.⁹ By this time, in Polish written sources, the word ‘Ukraine’ had been used as a proper noun: e. g. “villages and towns in Ukraine,” “Kievan Ukraine,” etc. The population living in this area was referred to as ‘Ukrainians’; however, this did not make reference to an ethnic group, but it was a geographic and administrative designation.¹⁰

In June 1596, Sigismund III (1586–1632), in order to preserve the religious unity of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, signed the Union of Brest,¹¹ leading to the foundation of the Greek Catholic Church. From 1596, the king outlawed the Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lithuanian state, intensifying the already existing religious conflicts in the Ukrainian territories. With this decision, Sigismund III contributed to regular Cossack uprisings, aiming to defend the Orthodox religion.

The Union of Brest and the ban of the Orthodox Church had catastrophic consequences for the Polish government: the protection of the Orthodox religion justified the Cossack uprisings and made the Ukrainian population more unified than ever. From 1596, minor Cossack uprisings became common. The revolts culminated between 1648 and 1654 and were led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Seeing the initial overwhelming victories, nearly the entire Ukrainian Orthodox population joined the Cossacks, whose uprisings turned into a popular movement that aimed to defend their religion and began to contemplate the

7 Віталій Щербак, *Українське козацтво: формування соціального стану: Друга половина XV – середина XVII ст.* (Київ: Видавничий дім «Києво-Могилянська академія», 2006), 167.

8 Three types of Ukrainian Cossacks can be distinguished: private, registered and “free” Cossacks. Most of the Cossacks belonged in the latter group. They lived near the rapids along the Dnieper River and, in the 1540s, established their own “military state,” the Zaporozhian Sich.

9 АРХИВ ЮЗР 1863 (*Архив Юго-Западной России, издаваемый Временной комиссией для разбора древних актов, высочайше учрежденной при Киевском военном, Подольском и Волынском генерал-губернаторе*), 4, 196, 201.

10 АРХИВ ЮЗР 1861, 142.

11 Julian Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union der rutenischen Kirche mit Rom.* Band II. (Wien: Mechithariste Buchdruckerei (W. Heinrich), 1881), 23; АРХИВ ЮЗР 1859, 501–504.

possibility of liberating themselves from the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

From 1648, the Cossacks obtained significant influence over the Ukrainian territories. They stopped being an intermediate social class –between the nobility and the peasantry–, as they formed a separate social group, known as the “Cossack aristocracy,” which took control over the region. The most significant success achieved by the rebels was the signing of the Treaty of Zboriv¹² in 1649, according to which, the Polish government recognised the autonomous status of “Cossack Ukraine,” comprising the Kyiv Voivodeship, the Bratslav Voivodeship, and the Chernihiv Voivodeship, within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. According to the Treaty of Bila Tserkva,¹³ signed on 18 September 1651, only the Kyiv Voivodeship could maintain its autonomy, which meant a significant setback compared to the Treaty of Zboriv, indicating the decline of Khmelnytsky’s movement. In late September 1653, the united Cossack-Tartar troops attacked the Polish army near Zhvanets. Even though the Cossacks were on the edge of victory, their allies, the Crimean Tartars, forced them to negotiate with the Poles, jeopardising the very existence of the movement.

Russia was the most reliable ally of the rebels, but until 1653 Alexei Mikhailovich chose not to intervene in the conflict. After they learned about the Cossack army’s defeat near Zhvanets, Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s letters – seeking the Tsar’s diplomatic, financial, and military support¹⁴ – finally convinced the Russian leadership. The hetman sent the first letter to Alexis I on 8 June 1648, informing him about Ladislaus IV’s death and expressing his desire to “appoint a common Orthodox ruler for Poland and Ukraine.”¹⁵ In other words, the Cossack leader suggested to the Russians that, with their help, the tsar could occupy the Polish throne. However, from the beginning, the tsar opted for neutrality regarding the Ukrainian territories; Alexis I did not provide the military support the Cossacks hoped to receive. Eventually, due to various circumstances, the Russian ruler decided to get involved in the conflict. On the one hand, conquering the south-western – Ukrainian – territories of the former Kievan Rus’, the first significant Eastern European state, would have

12 *Воссоединение 1953/1. (Воссоединение Украины с Россией – Документы и материалы в трёх томах)*, 299–306.

13 *Источники Малороссийской истории, собранные Д. Н. Бантыши-Каменским, и изданные О. Бодянским. Т. 1. (Москва: Университетская типография, 1858)*, 29–31

14 *Воссоединение 1953/2*, 34–37, 127–131, 132–133.

15 *Ibidem*, 32–33.

completed the process of the “reunification of the Russian lands,” one of the main goals of Russian rulers. On the other hand, the idea of protecting the “co-religionists” living outside Russia provided the moral base for supporting the Ukrainian movement and “liberating” the Orthodox Ruthenians from Catholic oppression. The tsar decided to get involved in the fights when he considered Russia strong enough to confront the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and saw the decline of the Ukrainian movement due to the lack of unity and a strong and reliable ally. At this point, the possibility of conquering the Ukrainian territories and annexing the former Kievan Rus’ to Russia was in danger.¹⁶

On 1 October 1653, on the tsar’s suggestion, the Zemsky Sobor approved Khmelnytsky’s request – repeated on various occasions – according to which the “Zaporozhian Host was accepted under the auspices of the Russian tsar”.¹⁷ After the Zemsky Sobor adopted the decision, the Russian ruler sent a delegation led by boyar Vasiliy Buturlin to the hetman to negotiate the conditions for joining their forces. On 8 January 1654, Bohdan Khmelnytsky summoned a military Rada in Pereiaslav, where he outlined four possibilities: to remain under the authority of the Roman Catholic king of Poland, to join the Muslim Ottoman sultan, to join the Crimean khan, or to join the Orthodox Russian tsar. The participants – following the hetman’s recommendation – chose the last option, that is, to place themselves under the authority of the Russian tsar.¹⁸

In accordance with the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654,¹⁹ which ended the anti-Polish movement led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648–1654), the Ukrainians “voluntarily” joined Russia. In practice, this meant that the Polish-Lithuanian rule was replaced by Russian governance. Under the Russian rule, the official name of the Ukrainian territories became the Hetmanate or the Zaporozhian Host.²⁰ The March Articles of 1654,²¹ declaring the annexation of Ukraine, did not determine the legal status of the Hetmanate within Russia; therefore, both parties could interpret the nature of this new relationship according to their own interests.

16 Dimitri Strémooukhof, “Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine,” *Speculum* 28/1 (1953): 100.

17 *Воссоединение* 1953/3, 411.

18 *Ibidem*, 460.

19 *Ibidem*, 516.

20 The name “Zaporozhian Host” referred at the same time to the Cossack army, comprising 60,000 soldiers and serving the Romanovs, as well as the Ukrainian administrative system, having the Cossack regiments as their administrative unit.

21 *Воссоединение* 1953/3, 567–570.

The “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War”

During the second half of the seventeenth century, a rivalry began between Central and Eastern European powers (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and the emerging Russia) to gain control over the Ukrainian territories, excellent for agricultural production, and to control the Zaporozhian Host – an armed force comprising several tens of thousands of soldiers – which could be a crucial weapon at the disposal of any ruler. Among other factors, the formation and the survival of an independent Ukrainian state were impossible due to the rivalry of neighbouring superpowers.

The “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War” (1654–1686)²² broke out between Russia and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth over the possession of Ukraine and marked the beginning of Russia’s successful westward expansion. The tsarist government justified its claims to the Ukrainian territories by invoking the idea of “Moscow, the Third Rome”,²³ according to which Russia’s mission was to unify every Slavic and Orthodox peoples within a single empire – as a kind of Third Roman Empire. In the official explanation offered for the attack on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1654, this conflict was described as a “war fought on new principles”,²⁴ since the Russian army did not invade enemy territory but instead attacked the Polish-Lithuanian troops that, it claimed, were killing their Orthodox brethren.

After Ukraine was annexed by Russia, a Polish–Russian war was inevitable. In spring 1654, the Russian army, and approximately 20,000 Cossacks managed to conquer strategically important Belarusian cities. In late autumn 1654, even with the support of the Crimean khan, the Polish army failed to recapture the city of Mogilev, which meant that the

22 Sándor Gebei, “Nagyhatalmak vetélkedése Ukrajnáért a XVII. század második felében,” in “Emberek és eszmék” – *Tanulmánykötet Vadász Sándor 70. évfordulójára*, ed. Gebei Sándor (Eger: Eszterházy Tanárképző Főiskola, 2001), 203.

23 Анна Николаевна Клименко, “Идея «Москва-Третий Рим» и её интерпретация в современных геополитических интерпретациях,” Под. ред. А. Г. Дугина; Ред.-сост. Савин Л. В., *Левиафан. 3. Материалы международной научной конференции «Геополитика многополярного мира»*. (Москва: Евразийское Движение, 2012), 105–107; Андрей Сергеевич Усачев, “Третий Рим или Третий Киев? (Московское царство XVI в. в восприятии современников),” *Общественные науки и современность* 1 (2012): 82–83.

24 Sándor Gebei, *Az erdélyi fejedelmek és a lengyel királyválasztások* (Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 2007), 149.

Russian ruler could hold on to the title of “Autocrat of White Russia”,²⁵ added to his name after the successful siege of the city. After the capture of Vilnius (Wilno in Polish) that took place between 29 July and 8 August 1655, Alexei Mikhailovich became the “Autocrat of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Volhynia and Podolia.”²⁶

Meanwhile, in Podolia, the main Cossack army suffered various defeats, creating tension between the tsar and the hetman. Both sides carried out individual military manoeuvres in pursuit of their own expansionist ambitions. To compensate for the lack of Russian support, Bohdan Khmelnytsky tried to seek external allies. From the outset, the hetman exceeded the powers granted to him by the March Articles of 1654 and repeatedly demonstrated that he considered his agreement with Moscow as a vassal relationship based on mutual military alliance; therefore, he believed he had the right to express his views on foreign affairs affecting both states.

The hetman’s strongest ally in this matter was Charles X Gustav, the king of Sweden, a member of the Zweibrücken dynasty, who saw the Russo-Polish war an opportunity to implement the Oxenstierna plan,²⁷ which aimed at establishing complete control over the Baltic region (*dominium maris Baltici*). Since the Swedish government could not come to an agreement with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to join their forces to stop Russia, it seemed promising to establish a diplomatic relationship with Bohdan Khmelnytsky: forging an alliance with the anti-Polish Zaporozhian Host and putting an end to the Russian expansion would have been beneficial for Sweden. Since 1599, the Swedish government had been engaged in an ongoing dispute with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth over the succession to the Swedish throne. In response to the significant financial compensation John II Casimir Vasa demanded in exchange for renouncing the Swedish throne, Charles X Gustav launched an attack on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The war against Poland initiated by Charles X Gustav, the king of Sweden, between 1655 and 1660, is known as the “Deluge” (*Potop* in Polish). Actually, the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the second

25 *Летопись Самовидца о войнах Богдана Хмельницкого и междуусобиях, бывших в Малой России по его смерти: Доведена продолжателями до 1734 года* (Москва: Университетская типография, 1846), 69.

26 Gebei, *Az erdélyi fejedelmek és a lengyel királyválasztások*, 153.

27 Władysław Konopczyński, *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej*, T. 2. 1648–1795 (Warszawa: Skład główny u Gebethnera i Wolffa, 1936), 24.

largest state in Europe, began in the mid-seventeenth century,²⁸ when the Khmelnytsky Uprising, taking place between 1648 and 1654,²⁹ shook the very foundations of the state.³⁰

The Swedish Deluge began on 10 July 1655, and after the surrender of the Polish troops on 25 July 1655, Greater Poland pledged allegiance to the Swedish king.³¹ Even though the Russian army had occupied Vilnius and most parts of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by 29 July, the Swedish ruler declared his intention to conquer the Lithuanian territories. With the support of the Swedish king, the most powerful magnates in Lithuania—members of the Radziwiłł family—repudiated the Union of Lublin of 1569 and pledged allegiance to Charles X Gustav,³² thereby undermining the foundations of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Russian and Swedish expansionist ambitions in Lithuania led to a war between the two states.

By October 1655, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth had been surrounded by its enemies: the Russian army was advancing through Lithuanian and Belarusian territories, Greater Poland had come under Swedish control, while the Cossacks were besieging Lvov. After John II Casimir fled Poland, Charles X Gustav ceremoniously entered Kraków on horseback on 19 October 1655, convinced that the establishment of a Swedish Empire dominating much of the European continent was within reach.³³ Since the Sejm refused to recognize him as King of Poland, he began to develop a plan to divide the territories of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In mid-August 1655, Sweden’s successful advances in the territories of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth encouraged Bohdan Khmelnytsky to accept the treaty of amity and cooperation proposed by Charles X Gustav.³⁴ Seeing the destruction of the Commonwealth, the hetman wanted to take control over the Lublin, the Volyn, the Belz and the Lvov Voivodeships. However, at the end of October, these ter-

28 Robert I. Frost, *After the Deluge – Poland–Lithuania and the Second Northern War 1655–1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.

29 The Khmelnytsky Uprising is also considered in historiography as part of the so-called First Great Northern War (1648–1667). Stewart P. Oakley, *War and Peace in the Baltic 1560–1790* (London–New York: Routledge, 1993), 74.

30 Edward Opaliński, “Kryzys, rozpad i odrodzenie I Rzeczypospolitej w okresie II wojny północnej (1655–1660),” *Kwartalnik Historyczny Rocznik CXXV/ 2* (2018): 337–363.

31 Frost, *After the Deluge*, 34.

32 Gebei, *Az erdélyi fejedelmek és a lengyel királyválasztások*, 158.

33 *Ibidem*, 160.

34 Архив ЮЗР 1908, 76.

ritories requested the protection of the Swedish state. In November 1655, Khmelnytsky sent a letter to Charles X Gustav, in which he referred to himself as the “devoted servant” of the Swedish ruler and suggested continuing the negotiations with the Swedish government.³⁵ However, the Swedish and Ukrainian expansionist interests clashed, and Charles X Gustav ordered the Zaporozhian Host to lift the siege of Lvov, as it already belonged to Sweden.

The news of the Swedish-Ukrainian negotiations also reached Moscow and, for “self-defence purposes,” the tsarist government proposed a ceasefire to Warsaw without consulting Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In this tense international situation, Moscow had three options to consider regarding their long-term strategy for a Russo-Polish peace treaty: 1) Alexei Mikhailovich was in favour of a Baltic expansion, and, in case of a successful war against Sweden, he was ready to transfer the Ukrainian lands back to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; 2) taking advantage of John II Casimir’s complicated situation, he could insist on retaining his new possessions in Poland;³⁶ 3) he could divide Ukraine between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Khmelnytsky was also aware of these possibilities, and he felt betrayed by Alexei Mikhailovich because, as he declared, “he proved his viciousness to the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Host when he made peace with the Poles and wanted to hand over the Cossacks to them.”³⁷

When Warsaw learned about the deterioration of the relationship between Ukraine and Sweden, at the end of 1655 they sent a delegation to Chyhyryn to convince the hetman to return to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They promised full autonomy to the Zaporozhian Host in exchange for an army of 10,000 Cossack soldiers to support the Poles in the war against Sweden.³⁸ The hetman did not respond immediately; the Cossacks seriously considered making peace with the Poles. Still, they did not end the negotiations with Charles X Gustav either, who sent a letter to the hetman asking him not to fall for the Poles’ promises and to forge an alliance with him against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth instead.³⁹

³⁵ Архив ЮЗР 1908, 89–92.

³⁶ Sándor Gebei, *Az Erdélyi fejedelemség és a Zaporozsjei Had politikai kapcsolatrendszerének vizsgálata 1648–1660 között* (Kandidátusi Értekezés, 1985), 180.

³⁷ Акты ЮЗР 1861 (Акты, относящиеся к истории Южной и Западной России, собранные и изданные Археографической комиссией), 575.

³⁸ Источники Малороссийской истории, собранные Д. Н. Бантыши-Каменским, 89.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, 129–131.

On 17 May 1656, the Russian ruler declared war on Sweden, marking the beginning of an armed conflict between the two states. During this time, the Russian government gave lower priority to the “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War,” fought over the Ukrainian territories. As the tsarist army advanced towards Riga after the successful siege of Daugavpils, the negotiations between Russia and Poland, preparing a possible ceasefire, accelerated.

The conference of Vilna started in August 1656. The last meeting was held on 3 November, when the Polish and Russian rulers mutually acknowledged each other’s titles.⁴⁰ Alexei Mikhailovich could bear the title of “Tsar of Little and White Russia,” while John II Casimir could maintain the title of “Grand Duke of Lithuania.” Further negotiations were postponed until the next session of the Sejm, but the two parties agreed on ceasing hostilities, bringing about a temporary pause in the “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War.” The delegations left Vilna without achieving significant progress, as important matters remained pending until the next session of the Polish parliament. However, they concluded a truce, which was crucial for both sides. Even though it was temporary, the fighting of the “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War” ceased for a while. The Treaty of Vilna did not cause notable changes in the Russo-Polish relationships. Their only common goal was to take joint actions against Sweden, but they never agreed on a military collaboration.⁴¹ Learning about the truce negotiated by the Russians and the Poles, in September 1656 Charles X Gustav proposed the establishment of a completely independent Cossack state under his loose protectorate (*protectitium foedus*) in exchange for the Cossacks’ military support either against the Poles or the Russians, depending on the international situation.⁴²

It is worth emphasising that although the hetman established diplomatic relations with other states independently of the Moscow government, he never broke his alliance with the tsarist court. Even though he considered himself the tsar’s vassal, he led the Zaporozhian Host as a sovereign ruler. Establishing diplomatic relationships on his own, without Russia’s help, is compelling evidence of his sovereignty, as it infringed on the regulations imposed by the March Articles. Even during the alliance with Russia, Bohdan Khmelnytsky never renounced his intention to establish a sovereign state, for which the creation of a monarchical

40 Акты ЮЗР 1861, 192.

41 Frost, *After the Deluge*, 34.

42 Архив ЮЗР 1908, 156–163.

form of government based on hereditary hetmanic power was crucial. During Bohdan Khmelnytsky's rule (1654–1657), the Russian tsar did not exercise his power in the Hetmanate directly, since the Zaporozhian Host functioned as an autonomous administrative unit within Russia. However, it had only an "apparent independence" in practice.

The Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667 – the division of Ukraine between Russia and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth

From 1654, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his successors did not consider the Russian bond a definite and viable solution. The majority of Cossacks openly supported one of the neighbouring great powers: there were large groups who favoured the Polish⁴³ and the Russian empires,⁴⁴ as well as substantial numbers who supported the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵ By 1660, the Zaporozhian Host had become greatly divided: the territories on the left bank of the Dnieper River remained loyal to the tsar, while Right-Bank Ukraine rejoined the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The primary goal of Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine's hetmans, however, was to reunify the Ukrainian territories, even though the two banks would ultimately follow different paths.

The Treaty of Oliva,⁴⁶ signed in April 1660 by Poland and Sweden, put an end to the war that had broken out between the two countries sixty

43 After Bohdan Khmelnytsky's death, Yurii Khmelnytsky was elected hetman. Since he was still underage, Ivan Vyhovsky led the Cossacks as a regent (1657–1659). In 1658, Vyhovsky signed the Treaty of Hadiach with the Polish government: the Grand Principality of Ruthenia, comprising the Voivodeships of Chernihiv, Bratslav and Kyiv, joined the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, elevating the Ruthenian territories to the same rank as the Polish and Lithuanian regions. *Prawa, Konstytucye y Przywileje Królestwa Polskiego, y Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, y wszystkich Prowincji należących: Na Walnych Seymiech Koronnych od Seymu Wiślickiego Roku Państwego 1347 Aż do Ostatniego Seymu uchwalone*, vol. 4. ed. 2 (1641–1668) (Warszawa: Drukarnia Piarów, 1786), 637–644.

44 In summer 1665, the hetman of Left-Bank Ukraine travelled to Moscow to visit the Russian tsar and was forced to sign the *Moscow Articles*, which further limited the autonomy of the Hetmanate. *Источники Малороссийской истории, собранные Д. Н. Бантыши-Каменским*, 5–7.

45 In 1665, pro-Polish troops, summoned in Chyhyryn, in Right-Bank Ukraine, elected Petro Doroshenko (1665–1676) their leader, who recognised the Sultan's authority. Микола Крикун, *Між війною і радою. Козацтво Правобережної України в другій половині XVII – на початку XVIII століття* (Київ: Критика, 2006), 252.

46 *Российский государственный архив древних актов. фонд 79. опись 5. дело 2. Сношния Польши с Россией.*

years earlier. John II Casimir, on his and his successors’ behalf, definitively renounced his claim to the Swedish throne and lost possession of the region of Livonia. As a result, the Western Dvina became the border between Poland and Sweden. Since the Poles did not have to worry about a two-front war anymore, the Polish ruler launched an attack on the Russian army in Lithuania, re-escalating the “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War.” In 1666, the Polish–Lithuanian and Russian rulers found themselves in a challenging position: both countries had run out of their human and material resources. From 1654, the forces gradually became balanced, and both rulers realised that neither Warsaw nor Moscow could gain exclusive possession of the entire Ukrainian region. The hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine, Petro Doroshenko⁴⁷ approach to the Ottoman and Tatar states contributed to the acceleration of the peace negotiations, as it threatened both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s and Russia’s interests.

The Russo–Polish peace negotiations, suspended several times, resumed in February 1666. The delegation representing the Polish government was led by designated Ambassador Jerzy Karol Chlebowicz, while the Russian delegation was headed by Afanasy Lavrentievich Ordin-Nashchokin. Disagreements arose between the tsar and Ordin-Nashchokin, which complicated the negotiations with the other party. The leader of the Russian delegation was willing to renounce Kyiv in order to reach an agreement with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth because he believed that the Ottoman and Tartar expansion in Ukraine was much more dangerous. On the other hand, Tsar Alexei I insisted on retaining possession of the “ancient” capital – Kyiv – and proposed to renounce other cities along the Dvina River instead.

At the end of 1666, news that the sultan planned to launch a large-scale attack on the Polish-Lithuanian territories in the spring spread quickly. As a result, it became vital for the government in Warsaw to reach an agreement with the tsar as soon as possible. It became even more urgent when they saw that Moscow was willing to grant significant concessions. Despite these circumstances, the negotiations at Andrusovo reached a successful conclusion only at the thirty-first meeting, when John II Casimir – by the grace of God, the King of Poland and Sweden and the Grand Duke of Lithuania and Rus’ – and Tsar and Grand Duke

47 Акты ЮЗР 1869, 58.

Alexei Mikhailovich, the Autocrat of Great, Little and White Russia, signed the Truce of Andrusovo for thirteen and a half years.⁴⁸

According to the treaty containing thirty four articles, Russia recovered Smolensk. At the same time, the Ukrainian regions were officially divided into two parts along the Dnieper River: the Romanovs retained the possession of Left-Bank Ukraine, while Western Ukraine became part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth again. Kyiv fell under Russian rule, but after two years, they would have had to hand it over to the Polish government, but it never happened. Both states received the right to dispose of the military power of the Zaporozhian Sich; however, the Sich Cossacks never acknowledged the authority of either country. On 6 May 1686, the “Eternal Peace”⁴⁹ was concluded in Moscow between Russia and Poland, reaffirming the provisions of 1667 and ending the “Eastern European Thirty Years’ War.”

Conclusion

Despite the divisions within the Zaporozhian Host, the Russian government feared that Ukraine – whose annexation the tsar actively pursued – might become powerful enough to establish an autonomous state independent from Russia. This helps explain why Alexei Mikhailovich considered the Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667 a great success, even though he had to share, for the moment, Ukraine with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a result of the Polish-Russian agreement, Ukraine became the “loot” of two foreign rulers, and hopes of establishing an independent Ukrainian state steadily faded. The Dnieper River now divided Ukraine not only geographically but also administratively.

The Truce of Andrusovo marked a turning point in the power relations in seventeenth-century Eastern Europe. Previously, Poland, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire shaped the destiny of the region. From this point onward, the expansionist ambitions of Russia could not be ignored anymore. By 1667, the tsar had consolidated the country’s position in the region as a major power. However, it was uncertain whether the agreement concluded by Russia and Poland would bring a long-lasting

48 Полное собрание законовъ Российской Империи, повелениемъ государя императора Николая Павловича составленное – Собрание Первое. С 1649 по 12 декабря 1825. Т. 1. с 1649 по 1675 (Санктпетербург: Печатано в Типографии Отделения Собственной Его Императорского Величества Канцелярии, 1830), 656–669.

49 Источники Малороссийской истории, собранные Д. Н. Бантыши-Каменским, 289–296.

peaceful period and whether the Hetmanate would accept the terms and conditions included in the treaty. The fact that the representatives of the Zaporozhian Host were not invited to Andrusovo – and that Hetman Ivan Briukhovetsky was informed about the details of the truce only at the end of February – clearly demonstrates that Russia did not treat the Cossacks as equal parties. The agreement between the tsar and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the division of Ukraine shocked the Cossack *starshyna*, who accused the Russian ruler of violating the Pereiaslav Agreement. Henceforward, the leaders of the Hetmanate could no longer hope for a privileged position within the Russian state.

Bibliography

Manuscripts

Архив ЮЗР 1859 = *Архив Юго-Западной России, издаваемый Временной комиссией для разбора древних актов, высочайше учрежденной при Киевском военном, Подольском и Волынском генерал-губернаторе. Ч. 1, Т. 1: Акты, относящиеся к истории православной церкви в Юго-Западной России* (Киев: Университетская типография, 1859).

Акты ЮЗР 1861 = *Акты, относящиеся к истории Южной и Западной России, собранные и изданные Археографической комиссией. Т. 3: 1638–1657*, под ред. Н. Костомарова (Санкт-Петербург: Въ типографії П. А. Кулиша, 1861).

Архив ЮЗР 1861 = *Архив Юго-Западной России, издаваемый Временной комиссией для разбора древних актов, высочайше учрежденной при Киевском военном, Подольском и Волынском генерал-губернаторе. Ч. 2. Т. I. Постановления дворянских провинциальных сеймов в Юго-Западной России* (Киев: Университетская типография, 1861).

Архив ЮЗР 1863 = *Архив Юго-Западной России, издаваемый Временной комиссией для разбора древних актов, высочайше учрежденной при Киевском военном, Подольском и Волынском генерал-губернаторе. Ч. 3. Т. 1. Акты о козаках (1500 – 1648)* (Киев: Типография А. Давиденко, 1863).

Акты ЮЗР 1869 = *Акты, относящиеся к истории Южной и Западной России, собранные и изданные Археографической комиссией. Т. 6: 1665–1668*, под ред. Н. Костомарова (Санкт-Петербург: Въ типографії Эдуарда, Праца, 1869).

Архив ЮЗР 1908 = *Архив Юго-Западной России, издаваемый Временной комиссией для разбора древних актов, высочайше учрежденной при Киевском военном, Подольском и Волынском генерал-губернаторе. Ч. 3. Т. 6.: Акты Шведского государственного архива, относящиеся*

к истории Малороссии (1649–1660 г.) (Киев: Типографія Імператорського Університета Св. Владимира, 1908).

Российский государственный архив древних актов. фонд 79. опись 5. дело 2. Сношния Польши с Россией.

Printed sources

Акты Литовско-Русского государства, Вып. 1. (1390–1529) Изд. М. Довнар-Запольским (Москва: Университетская типография, 1899).

Akta unijji Polski z Litwą, 1385–1791, ed. Stanisław Kutrzeba, Władysław Semkowicz (Krakow: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Towarzystwo naukowe warszawskie, 1932).

Воссоединение 1953/1 = Воссоединение Украины с Россией – Документы и материалы в трёх томах, Т. I. (Москва: Издательство Академии Наук, СССР, 1953).

Воссоединение 1953/2 = Воссоединение Украины с Россией – Документы и материалы в трёх томах, Т. II. (Москва: Издательство Академии Наук, СССР, 1953).

Воссоединение 1953/3 = Воссоединение Украины с Россией – Документы и материалы в трёх томах, Т. III. (Москва: Издательство Академии Наук, СССР, 1953).

Источники 1858 = Источники Малороссийской истории, собранные Д. Н. Бантыш-Каменским, и изданные О. Бодянским. Т. 1. (Москва: Университетская типография, 1858).

Летопись Самовидца 1846 = Летопись Самовидца о войнах Богдана Хмельницкого и междуусобиях, бывших в Малой России по его смерти: Доведена продолжателями до 1734 года (Москва: Университетская типография, 1846).

Полное собрание законовъ Российской Имперіи, повеленіемъ государя императора Николая Павловича составленное – Собрание Первое. С 1649 по 12 декабря 1825. Т. 1. с 1649 по 1675 (Санктпетербург: Печатано в Типографії Отделения Собственной Его Императорского Величества Канцелярии, 1830).

Prawa, Konstytucye y Przywileie Krolestwa Polskiego, y Wielkiego Xięstwa Litewskiego, y wszystkich Prowincyi należących: Na Walnych Seymiech Koronnych od Seymu Wiślickiego Roku Pańskiego 1347 Aż do Ostatniego Seymu uchwalone, vol. 4. ed. 2. (1641–1668) (Warszawa: Drukarnia Piarów, 1786).

Źródła Dziejowe. Т. X. Sprawy wołoskie za Jagiellonów, ed. Aleksander Jabłonowski (Warszawa: Gebethner i Wolff, 1878).

Books and monographs

Fedinec Csilla, Font Márta, Szakál Imre and Varga Beáta, *Ukrajna története: régiók, identitás, államiság* (Budapest: Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, 2021).

Frost Robert I., *After the Deluge – Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War 1655–1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Gebei Sándor, *Az Erdélyi fejedelemség és a Zaporozsjei Had politikai kapcsolatrendszerének vizsgálata 1648–1660 között* (Kandidátusi Értekezés, 1985).

Gebei Sándor, *Az erdélyi fejedelmek és a lengyel királyválasztások* (Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 2007).

Konopczyński Władysław, *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej*, T. 2. 1648–1795 (Warszawa: Skład główny u Gebethnera i Wolffa, 1936).

Крикун Микола, *Між війною і радою. Козацтво Правобережної України в другій половині XVII – на початку XVIII століття* (Київ: Критика, 2006).

Oakley Stewart P., *War and Peace in the Baltic 1560–1790* (London – New York: Routledge, 1993).

Pelesz Julian, *Geschichte der Union der rutenischen Kirche mit Rom. Band II.* (Wien: Mechithariste Buchdruckerei (W. Heinrich), 1881).

Щербак Віталій Олексійович, *Українське козацтво: формування соціально-ного стану: Друга половина XV – середина XVII ст* (Київ: Видавничий дім «Києво-Могилянська академія», 2006).

Journals

Opalinski Edward, „Kryzys, rozpad i odrodzenie I Rzeczypospolitej w okresie II wojny północnej (1655–1660),” *Kwartalnik Historyczny Rocznik CXXV/2* (2018): 337–363.

Strémooukhof Dimitri, „Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine,” *Speculum* 28/1 (1953): 84–101.

Усачев Андрей Сергеевич, „Третий Рим или Третий Киев? (Московское царство XVI в. в восприятии современников),” *Общественные науки и современность* 1 (2012): 69–87.

Chapters in monographs

Клименко Анна Николаевна, „Идея «Москва-Третий Рим» и её интерпретация в современных геополитических интерпретациях,” Под. ред. А. Г. Дугина; Ред.-сост. Савин Л. В., *Левиафан. 3. Материалы международной научной конференции «Геополитика многополярного мира». Евразийское Движение* (Москва: Евразийское Движение, 2012). 105–116.

Gebei Sándor, „Nagyhatalmak vetélkedése Ukrajnáért a XVII. század második felében,” in „*Emberek és eszmék*” – *Tanulmánykötet Vadász Sándor 70. évfordulójára*, ed. Gebei Sándor (Eger: Eszterházy Tanárképző Főiskola, 2001), 193–204.

