

Dorota Gregorowicz

ORCID: 0000-0002-7443-7737

Uniwersytet Śląski

The State of the Church – Great Diplomacy of a Small State

**Państwo Kościelne – wielka dyplomacja
małego państwa**

Abstract

The paper presents the historiographical considerations about if and why one could insert the early modern State of the Church into the concept of a “small state” and, at the same time, what were the reasons for the great diplomatic success of Rome during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The activity of papal diplomacy is shown as primarily focused on affirming the dualistic authority of the early modern Holy See (both as of a secular territorial state and a universal monarchy of religious character). The analysis also concerns the papal attitude of “active neutrality” as a political and diplomatic strategy focused on achieving the papacy’s “international” position. The profile of the paper is historiographical, as it takes from the legacies of Polish, French, German, English and Italian historical science. The enquiry aims to systematise and synthesise the former judgments of historians regarding the nature of the Papal State’s statehood in the context of the pope’s exercise of universal ecclesiastical authority. The permanent apostolic nunciatures, operating since the end of the fifteenth century, have become the core of early modern European diplomacy, guaranteeing Rome its political expansion after the Avignon crisis, despite the economic and military weakness of its territorial basis:

the State of the Church. In this sense, the Papal State ceased to be a “small state” and became a universalistic entity of both political and ecclesiastical character. The Roman Curia no longer only played a passive role in “international” relations; on the contrary, thanks to the new system of permanent diplomatic representations at Catholic courts, it had the opportunity to undertake its own political initiative, act as a mediator and arbitrator, as well as strengthen the control over the religious life of European states.

Keywords: papacy, the State of the Church, diplomacy, apostolic nunciature, early modern statehood, universalism, neutrality

Abstrakt

Artykuł przedstawia rozważania historiograficzne wokół pytania, czy można wpisać nowożytne Państwo Kościelne w pojęcie „małego państwa”, a jednocześnie jakie były przyczyny wielkiego sukcesu dyplomatycznego Rzymu w XVI i XVII stuleciu. Działalność dyplomacji papieskiej została przedstawiona jako skupiona przede wszystkim na afirmacji dualistycznego autorytetu nowożytnej Stolicy Apostolskiej (zarówno jako świeckiego państwa terytorialnego, jak i uniwersalnej monarchii o charakterze religijnym). Niniejsza analiza dotyczy również papieskiej postawy „aktywnej neutralności” jako strategii politycznej i dyplomatycznej ukierunkowanej na osiągnięcie „międzynarodowej” pozycji papieżstwa. Profil pracy ma charakter historiograficzny, czerpie ze spuścizny polskiej, francuskiej, niemieckiej, angielskiej i włoskiej nauki historycznej. Badanie ma na celu usystematyzowanie i syntezę dotychczasowych sądów historyków dotyczących natury państwowości Państwa Kościelnego w kontekście sprawowania przez papieża powszechnej władzy kościelnej. Działające od końca XV w. stałe nuncjatury apostolskie stały się rdzeniem nowożytnej dyplomacji europejskiej, gwarantując Rzymowi ekspansję polityczną po kryzysie awiniońskim, pomimo słabości gospodarczej i militarnej papieskiej bazy terytorialnej: Państwa Kościelnego. W tym sensie Państwo Kościelne przestało być „małym państwem” i stało się podmiotem o charakterze uniwersalistycznym, zarówno politycznym, jak i kościelnym. Kuria Rzymska nie odgrywała już jedynie roli biernego obserwatora w stosunkach „międzynarodowych”; przeciwnie, dzięki nowemu systemowi stałych przedstawicielstw dyplomatycznych przy katolickich dworach uzyskała ona możliwość podejmowania własnej inicjatywy politycznej, pełnienia funkcji mediatora i arbitra, a także wzmocnienia kontroli nad życiem religijnym europejskich państw.

Słowa kluczowe: papieżstwo, Państwo Kościelne, dyplomacja, nuncjatura apostolska, nowożytne państwo, uniwersalizm, neutralność

Was the State of the Church a “small state”?

From the geographical, demographic, military, and economic point of view, the early modern State of the Church has to be considered a relatively small state, or at best, a middle-sized part of a shredded Apennine Peninsula. However, we can hardly define it as such when talking about its diplomacy. In this article, I would like to try to answer the question of if and why one could insert the Papal State and its policy into the concept of a “small state” and, at the same time, what were the reasons for its great diplomatic success in the early modern era.¹ Also, I would like to show the activity of papal diplomacy as focused on affirming the dualistic authority of the early modern Holy See (both as of a secular territorial state and a universal monarchy of religious character).² I would especially like to analyse the papal attitude of “active neutrality” as a political and diplomatic strategy focused on achieving the papacy’s “international”³ position.

As Blythe Alice Raviola noted in her inspiring work about the “small states,”⁴ the view on this topic depends on what we, as historians, consider to be “small” in the context of the creative processes of the so-called “early modern state.” From the European perspective, the State of the Church can undoubtedly be regarded as small or, at best, medium-sized. But, when we take the Apennine Peninsula region as a reference point, we are suddenly dealing with a state organisation of considerable dimensions. And looking at central Italy – even dominating – both politically and territorially. In fact, in Italian historiography, the Papal State has

1 The paper was created as a result of research carried out under the Sonatina 2 project entitled *The Holy See and the crisis of sovereignty of John II Casimir Vasa and Michael Korybut Wiśniowiecki's election (1660–1669)* (Polish: *Stolica Apostolska wobec kryzysu władzy królewskiej Jana Kazimierza Wazy oraz elekcji Michała Korybuta Wiśniowieckiego (1660–1669)*, project no. 2018/28/C/HS3/00176, financed by the National Science Centre, Poland (Narodowe Centrum Nauki). Supported by the Foundation for Polish Science (FNP).

A similar problem could be interestingly presented on the subject of the Republic of Venice; however, a comparative view is not the aim of this article, as it focuses on the confessional specificity of the Papal State as a factor determining its great diplomatic success.

2 Paolo Prodi, *Il sovrano pontefice: un corpo e due anime. La monarchia papale nella prima età moderna* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013) (first edition – 1982).

3 I put the word “international” in quotation marks, considering the imperfection of this concept concerning political relations in early modern Europe. Cfr. Tracey Sowerby, “Early Modern Diplomatic History”, *History Compass* 14/9 (2016): 444.

4 Blythe Alice Raviola, *L'Europa dei piccoli stati: dalla prima età moderna al declino dell'antico regime* (Roma: Carocci, 2008).

functioned for years as a third force present on the Peninsula in the early modern era, next to the political units dominated by the Empire and the Spanish Monarchy.⁵ Doubts about its “littleness” also arise from the role played by Rome and its diplomatic apparatus in general early modern European politics, as well as from its universalistic aspirations.⁶

The end of the Avignon Papacy in 1377 spurred the territorial development of the Papal State at the turn of the fifteenth century. Pope Martin V (1417–1431) initiated the consolidation of *Patrimonium Sancti Petri* by cooperating with the most influential Italian families at that time (Colonna, Caetani, Orsini and Farnese in Rome, Montefeltro and Malatesta in the March of Ancona, Este in Ferrara and Bentivoglio in Bologna), skilfully building papal parishes and dispensing papal vicariate. Then, the Renaissance popes Alexander VI (1492–1503), Julius II (1503–1513), and Clement VII (1523–1534) began the armed conquest of certain territories, taking advantage of the political situation in Italy at that time – the Italian Wars. As a result of these processes, which jeopardised the moral authority and credibility of the papacy and provided fodder for the parallel development of the Reformation movement, in the middle of the sixteenth century, the Papal State *de facto* included its Roman centre, Avignon, Benevento, March of Ancona, Parma, Piacenza, Perugia, Romagna, Bologna, Modena, Ferrara, Urbino, and Camerino.⁷ In this context, while characterising the territoriality of the early modern Papal State, its polycentrism should be emphasised. In fact, it was not a geographically compact area, as it had enclaves far from the centre or dependencies such as Parma, Piacenza, French territories, or Benevento in Southern Italy.

The discussion about the territoriality of the State of the Church presents a very curious problem. Suppose we accept that the statehood of a territorial organisation is closely linked to its existing institutional and legal system.⁸ In that case, the early modern Papal State displayed a dual image: a regional, small or middle-sized secular state on the one hand, and on the other – an aspiring universalist monarchy, maintaining ecclesiastical jurisdiction in all the Catholic corners of the early modern world. One can easily observe that the State of the Church resulted in

5 *Ibidem*, 42. Cfr. Marcello Verga, “L’Impero in Italia. Alcune considerazioni introdotte”, in: *L’Impero e l’Italia nella prima età moderna / Das Reich und Italien in der Frühen Neuzeit*, a cura di Matthias Schnettger, Marcello Verga (Bologna–Berlin: Il Mulino–Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 11–24.

6 Cfr. Raviola, *L’Europa dei piccoli stati*, 52–53.

7 *Ibidem*, 41–43.

8 *Ibidem*, 25.

a very particular case of statehood due to its truly dual (secular and religious) character. It established a characteristic form of an elective monarchy, adopting ambitious political and military strategies, creating a sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus, and, last but not least – early modern diplomatic institutions, such as the permanent apostolic nunciatures and concordates. Nowadays, historiography treats this almost as an axiom; still, it is worth recalling that only Paolo Prodi's discoveries of the 1970s and 1980s made it possible to thoroughly understand the “double-soul” of the early modern papacy, which remains inseparable from the study of the statehood of the Papal State.⁹

How was great diplomacy born in the small states?

The emergence of the early modern state organisations required an effective system of mutual contact and control, adapted to the increasingly dynamic geopolitical situation of Europe. It was a process only seemingly independent of the size of the state, as we can see its apparent intensification in the case of “small states,” often desperate to maintain their position and autonomy among their larger neighbours or with their protectors. On the contrary, the major European courts were initially reluctant to send their representatives to smaller countries, seeing no need to do so or even considering it detrimental to their authority.¹⁰ Therefore, it is not without reason that the early modern diplomatic practice developed in Renaissance Italy. This land was particularly polycentric and dominated by “small states,” with different, often multi-level degrees of mutual and external dependencies. What needs to be added is that at the turn of the fifteenth century, that territory went through a period of intensive development, which promoted a lively exchange of information and contacts, not only of a political or economic nature but also cultural, educational and social.¹¹ Noticing the regularity concerning the “small states,” Matthew Smith Anderson summarised this process:

These competed with one another intensely for power, for territory, in the last analysis for survival. It was therefore essential for their rulers to

9 Prodi, *Il sovrano pontefice*.

10 Giuseppe Galasso, “Le relazioni internazionali nell'età moderna (secoli XV–XVIII)”, *Rivista Storica Italiana* CXI/1 (1999), 10; Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919* (London–New York: Longman, 1993), 5.

11 Iginio Cardinale, *Le Saint-Siège et la diplomatie: aperçu historique, juridique et pratique de la diplomatie pontificale* (Paris: Desclée, 1962), 22, 29.

watch closely each other's policies and ambitions. Moreover, these states were geographically small compared to the great European monarchies, and they had at their disposal relatively large numbers of highly educated men.¹²

Therefore, historiography is consistent with the fact that early modern diplomacy's origins should be seen precisely on the Apennine Peninsula, particularly in Milan, Florence, Venice, and Rome.¹³ In Italy, a state of necessity for maintaining mutual relations developed, and political communication in the form of diplomacy became the most effective instrument for reciprocal control.¹⁴ As Michael Edward Mallet observed,

it was a situation which called for incessant alertness, a need to be constantly informed about the military strengths and intentions of rival powers, a determination to be prepared both to seize opportunities for minor gains and to counter such opportunistic moves by others. It was also a situation which was both fostered by, and itself encouraged, the growth of performance, in regimes, bureaucracies, diplomatic activity, and military establishments.¹⁵

This is why the Apennine Peninsula is called a “diplomatic laboratory,”¹⁶ an experiment in political practice which was nourished by all the above-mentioned elements (early modern Rome is even referred to as an “international gossip shop”¹⁷).

The shaping diplomacy of the Holy See (remembering that it already had its rich medieval traditions and institutional foundations) had a unique character. It was not merely a representation of an early modern secular state, as it was also referring, or perhaps above all, to the medieval model of united Europe as a Christian republic.¹⁸ The hybrid,

12 Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 3.

13 *Ibidem*, 2–11.

14 Stefano Andretta, *L'arte della prudenza. Teorie e prassi della diplomazia nell'Italia del XVI e XVII secolo* (Roma: Biblink, 2006), 14.

15 Michael Edward Mallet, *Diplomacy and War in Late Fifteenth-Century Italy* (London: British Academy, 1981), 268–269.

16 Andretta, *L'arte della prudenza*, 14.

17 Catherine Fletcher, *Diplomacy in Renaissance Rome: The Rise of the Resident Ambassador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 101–105. Cfr. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 13.

18 Henryk Damian Wojtyśka emphasised that “the medieval contacts between the papacy and states cannot be called diplomatic, as the blend of the sacred and the profane in the

lay-religious character of the early modern Papal State had to force the creation of a new system of institutions guaranteeing and controlling the centrality of Rome in both the religious and political life of Europe. Maria Antonietta Visceglia emphasised that after the impasse related to the Reformation and the problematic deliberations of the Council of Trent, during the Catholic Reform, the papacy regained much of its former authority and prestige from the Middle Ages. Thus, to some extent, the universalistic symbolism of Rome and the pope was reborn in its new, early modern dimension.¹⁹ Heinz Schilling stressed that “the Early Modern Papacy displayed a remarkable capacity to adapt itself and its system to the new situation without renouncing its ‘two-souls’ status.”²⁰

Papal diplomacy as a pursuit of the early modern universalism

Reintroducing the idea of papal universalism in the early modern era became possible by the dynamically developing diplomacy network.²¹ Thanks to it, after the Holy See emerged from the Avignon crisis, the Roman Curia no longer only played a passive role in “international” relations. On the contrary, thanks to the new system of permanent diplomatic representations at Catholic courts, it had the opportunity to undertake its political initiative, apart from strengthening the control over the ecclesiastical life of European states.²²

The adaptation of regular diplomatic practice to the new political needs of the early modern State of the Church, on the one hand, and

concept of the Christian Republic completely blurred the differences between politics and religion, between the state and the Church.” Only the collapse of medieval political structures gave rise to early modern papal diplomacy. See Henryk Damian Wojtyska, *Papiestwo – Polska 1548–1563* (Lublin: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 1977), 19; Stefano Andretta, “Cerimoniale e diplomazia pontificia nel XVII secolo”, in: *Cérémonial et rituel à Rome: (16.^o–19.^o siècle)*, éd. Maria Antonietta Visceglia, Catherine Brice (Roma: Ecole française de Rome, 1997, 203; Heinz Schilling, “The Two Papal Souls and the Rise of an Early Modern State System”, in: *Papato e politica internazionale nella prima età moderna*, a cura di Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Roma: Viella, 2013), 105.

19 Maria Antonietta Visceglia, “Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico”, in: *Cérémonial et rituel*, 120.

20 Schilling, “The Two Papal Souls”, 105.

21 Cfr. Michael Frank Feldkamp, *La diplomazia pontificia. Da Silvestro I a Giovanni Paolo II: un profilo* (Milano: Jaca Book, 1998), 14; Lucien Bély, *L'art de la paix en Europe. Naissance de la diplomatie moderne. XVIe–XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: PUF, 2007), 21.

22 Maria Teresa Fattori, “Per una storia della curia romana dalla riforma sistina, secoli XVI–XVIII”, *Storia del cristianesimo* 35 (2014), 51.

of the counter-reformation papacy, on the other, was a relatively slow process since the Holy See already had a centuries-old European network of legates who used to perform *ad hoc* political functions. As a decisive moment in the development of early modern papal diplomacy, historians point to the role of *sacco di Roma*, in 1527. That event showed the weakness of the State of the Church against European powers and thus a clear barrier to its further political expansion. In the face of the Italian Wars, the lack of real military and economic potential made the local *Stati*, including the Papal State, attempt to emphasise their “international” position by strengthening reciprocal contacts and employing the art of diplomacy.²³ Garret Mattingly aptly referred to this tactic as “desperate improvisation.”²⁴

Finally, an additional element leading to the development and stabilisation of permanent apostolic nunciatures was the growing reluctance of local Churches to traditional *ad hoc* visits by the papal legates, especially during the crisis of centralism in the Roman Church. The legates *missi* and *a latere* were widely accused of trying to ruthlessly impose the pope’s will on the local level, which was further aggravated by the parallel successes of the Reformation movements. This aspect led to the final strengthening of the office of permanent apostolic nuncio, which local hierarchs were less afraid of due to the continuity of its mission and, consequently, a certain dependence on the ecclesiastical context of the place where the mission was held.²⁵

No institutional document establishing the office of the apostolic nunciature has survived, as it probably has never existed. In fact, the development of permanent diplomatic posts of the Holy See took place *via facti*, through the long-term evolution of various types of medieval legations, primarily papal legates *apostolici*, *missi* and *a latere*, as well as Peter’s Pence collectors. The terms *nuntii Sancti Petri* or *nuntii sedis apostolicae* also functioned in the vocabulary of the Roman Curia already since the times of Gregory VII (1073–1085). Still, the real flourishing of papal diplomacy has to be associated with the development of the early modern structures of the bureaucratic apparatus. The body responsible for the functioning of the papal diplomacy network became the Secretariat of State, whose roots go back to the pontificates of Martin V (1417–1431) and

23 Andretta, “Cerimoniale e diplomazia”, 202–203.

24 Garret Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London: Penguin Books, 1965), 155.

25 Prodi, *Il sovrano pontefice*, 309–310. See also Paolo Carta, Dorota Gregorowicz, “Nunziature e politica nel ‘500. L’istituto e i suoi aspetti critici”, in: *Ambassades et ambassadeurs en Europe (XVe-XVIIe siècles)*, éd. Jean Louis Fournel, Matteo Residori (Genève: Droz, 2020), 447.

Innocent VIII (1484–1492). The Secretariat of State was created to enable the pope to act and make decisions quickly, independently of the papal chancellery. It turned out to be necessary to coordinate the increasingly intense flow of information from diplomatic missions and the preparation of instructions for diplomats of the Holy See.²⁶

At the end of the pontificate of Clement VII (1523–1534), the Holy See was already represented by apostolic nuncios at several European courts: imperial, Spanish, French, and Venetian.²⁷ Despite that, the first legal rules governing the permanent papal diplomatic representations were sanctioned only in 1562, during the deliberations of the Council of Trent. Finally, the pivotal moment for stabilising the apostolic nunciature as a diplomatic institution of a continuous nature and its most dynamic development fell on the pontificate of Gregory XIII (1572–1585). The reforms introduced by Pope Buoncompagni were a part of the post-Tridentine movement of the renewal of the Church, both in a dogmatic-confessional and organisational sense. Besides the already existing diplomatic offices (the so-called pre-Tridentine nunciatures) in Spain, Portugal, Naples, Venice, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and at the German Imperial court, Gregory XIII established new diplomatic missions in Piedmont, Florence, Graz, Cologne, Lucerne, and the Netherlands.²⁸ The apostolic nuncios were then given new and expanded powers, among which we can distinguish three primary fields. The first was political activity at the court, which entailed information activities, both in matters of the internal and foreign policy of the state in which the mission was carried out; then, a competence in religious and ecclesiastical matters and contacts with the local episcopate; and finally,

26 Carta, Gregorowicz, “Nunziature e politica nel ‘500”, 449.

27 On the formation of diplomatic structures of the Holy See within the papal Secretariat of State, see Anton Pieper, *Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ständigen Nuntiaturen* (Freiburg: Herder, 1894), 1–24; Cardinale, *Le Saint-Siège et la diplomatie*, 85; Pierre Blet, *Historie de la Représentation Diplomatique du Saint Siège des origines à l’aube du XIX siècle* (Città del Vaticano: Archivio Vaticano, 1990), 219; Luca Riccardi, “An Outline of Vatican Diplomacy in the Early Modern Age”, in: *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy. The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450–1800*, ed. by Daniela Frigo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 103–104.

28 Ludwig von Pastor, *Storia dei papi dalla fine del Medio Evo compilata con sussidio dell’Archivio segreto pontificio e di molti altri Archivi. Vol. IX, Storia dei papi nel periodo della Riforma e restaurazione cattolica. Gregorio XIII (1572–1585)* (Roma: Desclée, 1925), 47–49; Wojtyńska, *Papiestwo – Polska*, 13; Mario Caravale, Alberto Caracciolo, *Lo Stato Pontificio da Martino V a Pio IX* (Torino: UTET, 1978), 336–337; Blet, *Historie de la Représentation Diplomatique*, 276–277; Silvano Giordano, “Uomini e apparati della politica internazionale del papato”, in: *Papato e politica internazionale*, 132.

in certain financial issues related to the collection of church benefits, including Peter's Pence.²⁹

It should be emphasised that an essential element distinguishing papal diplomacy against other early modern diplomatic services, apart from its ecclesiastical functions, was the pope's image as *padre comune* of all Christians, drawn straight from medieval universalism.³⁰ Piero Bellini defined the position of the early modern papacy as follows:

In the context of the political society of this period, the pope has achieved an authority that we would call today supranational; close to the function of *dominus totius mundi* performed by the emperor, but less controversial and causing less opposition while having the instruments needed for a more flexible and effectively operating.³¹

According to the interpretation of Bernard Barbiche, the pope was described as the head of the Catholic Church but also as "the vicar of Christ, *souverain pontife*, successor of Saint Peter, the first of the apostles, spiritual leader of Catholics from the Roman capital, no matter what place they came from."³² Although the functioning of all early modern states was being subordinated more and more to the interests of *ragione di stato*, the new political order of Europe has not yet been entirely devoid of religious and ideological elements, which have been its bond

29 Giovanni Pizzorusso, "Appunti sulle edizioni documentarie delle «Nunziature d'Italia»", in: *Gli archivi della Santa Sede come fonte per la storia moderna e contemporanea*, a cura di Matteo Sanfilippo, Giovanni Pizzorusso (Viterbo: Sette città, 2001), 41; Carta, Gregorowicz, "Nunziature e politica nel '500", 454.

30 Henryk Damian Wojtyńska, "Prymasostwo – nuncjatura. Dzieje relacji instytucjonalnych", in: *Prymasi i prymasostwo w dziejach państwa i narodu polskiego*, red. Wiesław Jan Wysocki (Warszawa: Pax, 2002), 84.

31 Piero Bellini, *Sede Apostolica e realtà politiche fra l'Evo Medio e l'Epoca Moderna* (Torino: G. Giappichelli Editore, 2015), 68: "Nel contesto della società politica del tempo, la persona del Pontefice veniva a collocarsi nella posizione d'una autorità che oggi chiameremmo sopranazionale, titolare d'una funzione vicina a quella commessa nel sistema all'Imperatore dominus totius mundi, ma soggetta a minori contestazioni e opposizioni di fondo e in grado di disporre di strumenti d'intervento più duttili e efficienti." On the origin of the idea of papal neutrality from the legal point of view, see Dante Fedele, *Naissance de la diplomatie moderne (XIIIe–XVIIe siècles): l'ambassadeur au croisement du droit, de l'éthique et de la politique* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, Dike, 2017), 568–570.

32 Bernard Barbiche, "La diplomatie pontificale au XVII siècle", in: *Armées et diplomatie dans l'Europe du XVIIe siècle. Actes du Colloque de 1996. Bulletin nr 16* (Paris, 1992), 109: "Vicaire du Christ, souverain pontife, successeur de saint Pierre chef de apôtres, il est le che spirituel de tous les catholiques en union avec le siège de Rome dans quelque pays qu'ils se trouvent."

and basis since the Middle Ages.³³ As Marian Banaszak emphasised, the aim was not the medieval supremacy of the papacy over Catholic states anymore but their political unity, which was revealed in the close connection of each Catholic prince with the Holy See.³⁴ Supporting and heading a supranational ideological community added prestige to the early modern papacy and conditioned its continuous universalist aspirations to establish moral authority for the entire Christian world (Europe and not only). The primary political bond of this community promoted by Rome, in addition to the religious factor, was to be the war against Islam.³⁵ The idea of establishing such a community was connected to the need to maintain the Holy See's universal authority, which could only be guaranteed by the politically neutral papacy keeping the *super partes* position about any disputes between its members. This was the origin of developing the seemingly apolitical idea of papal primacy in the new early modern sense.³⁶ The ideological image of the pope as a *padre comune* was based not only on the echo of the medieval spirit of universalism but also on the early modern system of apostolic nunciatures and concordats.³⁷ Significantly, during the Catholic Reform and the most vigorous development of the Roman diplomatic network, papal aspirations for universal fatherhood grew, not only in terms of morality but also in politics.

Mediation and arbitration as a core of the papal diplomatic strategy

33 Heinz Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung. Kościół i państwo w Europie doby przednowoczesnej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2010), 460. See also *idem*, "Konfessionalisierung und Formierung eines internationalen Systems während der frühen Neuzeit", in: *Die Reformation in Deutschland und Europa. Interpretationen und Debatten*, ed. by Hans R. Guggisberg and Gottfried G. Krodel (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993), 591–613; *idem*, "Die konfessionellen Glaubenskriege und die Formierung des frühmodernen Europa", in: *Glaubenskriege in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, ed. by Peter Herrmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 123–137.

34 Marian Banaszak, *Z dziejów dyplomacji watykańskiej: poselstwa obediencyjne w latach 1534–1605. Cz. 3. Poselstwa monarchów i republik* (Warszawa: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1975), 198.

35 Cfr. Wojtyska, *Papięstwo – Polska*, 22; Georges Livet, *L'équilibre européen de la fin du XVe à la fin du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: PUF, 1976), 37.

36 Maria Antonietta Visceglia, "The International Policy of the Papacy: Critical Approaches to the Concepts of Universalism and Italianità: Peace and War", in: *Papato e politica internazionale nella prima età moderna*, a cura di Visceglia (Roma: Viella, 2013), 23, 39.

37 *Ibidem*, 31–32.

The most important elements of the papal policy of neutrality in the early modern era were mediation and arbitration. Papal mediation meant the intervention of the Holy See's diplomacy in a conflict in which it did not participate directly, to facilitate negotiations between the conflicting parties. At the same time, papal arbitration was meant to settle disputes between states by issuing a binding decision on a particular case (which, of course, was extremely rare). The effectiveness of mediation was usually guaranteed through political arguments, primarily military power. In the case of the papacy, however, it was based on the medieval universalist tradition, as well as moral and religious elements.³⁸ Already Leopold von Ranke emphasised that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the pope's authority was high enough to guarantee him the position of an "international" arbitrator, accepted and honoured by Christian Europe.³⁹ Indeed, in the seventeenth-century political writings, the concept of mediation as a third party's intervention in a conflict still referred almost exclusively to the authority of the Holy See.⁴⁰ The pope had the opportunity to act as a mediator, e.g., at the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, at Vervins in 1598, or Cherasco in 1631. Similar (but unsuccessful) attempts were also made during the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster in 1648. Alain Tallon defined this papal political attitude as "active neutrality," clever use of confessional elements as a political and diplomatic strategy. In his opinion, it allowed the Holy See to occupy such a unique place in the early modern system of "international" relations. It turned out to be an excellent way for the papacy to find its own place in the newly emerging early modern system of dependencies between states, regardless of the low military and economic potential of the State of the Church.⁴¹ A similar position was adopted by Heinz Schilling, who wrote:

the *padre-comune* policy of the popes became a diplomatic instrument to exercise a certain influence within Catholic Europe, as may be seen from its success in 1598, bringing about the Peace of Vervins between Spain and France, [...] the papal prince never regained a prominence in European peace policy comparable to the arbitration of Tordesillas (1494).⁴²

38 Dorota Gregorowicz, *Tiara w grze o koronę. Stolica Apostolska wobec wolnych elekcji w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów w drugiej połowie XVI w.* (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 2019), 97.

39 Ludwig von Ranke, *Storia dei papi* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1965), 630.

40 Fedele, *Naissance de la diplomatie*, 574.

41 Alain Tallon, *L'Europa del Cinquecento. Stati e relazioni internazionali* (Roma: Carocci, 2013), 249.

42 Schilling, "The Two Papal Souls", 114.

On the other hand, historians like Maria Antonietta Visceglia also point to the difficulties of the papacy in maintaining political neutrality in practice, especially in the face of the Habsburg-French rivalry that had developed in Europe since the Italian Wars. It should be emphasised that for the policy of the Holy See, the priority had always been the defence of its own statehood and religious interests and not active involvement in big politics. It often meant the necessity of “matching” the papal political line to the actions of the strongest Catholic power of the time, thus clearly bending the attitude of impartiality⁴³. Also, Paolo Prodi concluded that the papal aspirations for universal paternity of Catholic Europe constituted the neutrality “inconstant and not entirely real,”⁴⁴ adjusting its profile to the current political need. “The purpose of the papacy was to maintain its own universalist function in the inevitably polycentric world of early modern politics,”⁴⁵ Prodi emphasised. Another problem in affirming the pope’s position as the *padre comune* of early modern Europe resulted from the confessional fragmentation of the Old Continent, which resulted from the Reformation processes. The Holy See, for obvious reasons, could not put itself in the role of a mediator between Catholic and Protestant states.⁴⁶

The causes of the diplomatic fall

Despite the historiographical controversies surrounding the political role of the Holy See in the interstate system of early modern Europe, there is no doubt that it became drastically reduced starting from the second half of the seventeenth century. The political writers of the era

43 Visceglia, *The International Policy of Papacy*, 31. Cfr. Prodi, *Il sovrano pontefice*, 339; Gregorowicz, *Tiara w grze o koronę*, 98–99. Cfr. Dorota Gregorowicz, “Problem papieskiej neutralności wobec rywalizacji o tron w Rzeczypospolitej w wyniku abdykacji Jana Kazimierza Wazy”, in: *Sztuka roztropności. Dyplomacja Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec Rzeczypospolitej, Europy i świata*, red. Krzysztof Ozóg, Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 2020), 141–161.

44 Prodi, *Il sovrano pontefice*, 339.

45 *Ibidem*, 303: “L’obiettivo è di conservare attraverso la mediazione tra gli Stati e le Chiese locali la propria funzione universalistica in un mondo politico ormai irrimediabilmente policentrico.”

46 Lucien Bély, “La médiation diplomatique au XVIIe siècle et au début du XVIIIe siècle”, in: *Armées et diplomatie dans l’Europe du XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Actes du Colloque de 1996. Bulletin nr 16, 1992), 129–132; Tallon, *L’Europa del Cinquecento*, 165–166; Gregorowicz, *Tiara w grze o koronę*, 99.

denied the pope any right to international arbitration, both according to moral and political issues.⁴⁷ The declining importance of papal diplomacy as part of the Enlightenment process of gradual secularisation of European society was emphasised by Paolo Prodi.⁴⁸ Also, according to Lucien Bély, the decisive factor in the crisis of the political role of the papacy was the deconfessionalisation of political relations after the Peace of Westphalia.⁴⁹ Heinz Schilling drew attention to these processes too. The German historian emphasised that during the seventeenth century, the interests of the state and society, broadly understood as *raison d'état*, shifted in the hierarchy before religious interests.⁵⁰ In particular, the modernisation of diplomatic techniques and the evolution of the practice of arbitration into the policy of international congresses, at which negotiations were conducted without the need of a mediator, proved disastrous for the Holy See.⁵¹ Alain Hugon also underlined the progressive secularisation of interstate relations as the main reason for the collapse of the political role of the papacy. The French historian pointed out how significant changes in diplomacy were introduced by the codification of international law, which emancipated politics from Christian elements.⁵² Conversely, according to Gérard Poumarède, the main reason for these processes was the evolution of the attitude of Christian Europe to the Ottoman Empire: if in the sixteenth century, papal mediations still constitute a warning to the princes against the Ottoman threat because it is precisely the restoration of consent in the Christian world that seems to be a necessary condition for the great expedition against the Port. In the following centuries:

the Holy See gradually drifted away from the main negotiations. Peace-keepers make it lose its heel, while most European rulers are less and less interested in eastern issues. Nevertheless, if the Turkish threat is still visible

47 Schilling, "The Two Papal Souls", 114.

48 Paolo Prodi, *Diplomazia del Cinquecento: istituzioni e prassi* (Bologna: Patron, 1963), 137.

49 Bély, "La médiation diplomatique", 48, 191–195.

50 Schilling, *Konfesjonalizacja*, 72–73, 460.

51 Alain Hugon, *Rivalités européennes et hégémonie mondiale, XVIe – XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2002), 111–115.

52 *Ibidem*, 111. Cfr. Alberico Gentili, *De iure belli libri tres* (Hanoviae: Excudebat Guilielmus Antonius, 1598); and Hugo Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis* (Parisiis: Apud Nicolaum Buon, 1625).

in the background of the negotiations in Vervins, [...] in Westphalia, Nimega, Utrecht, and Rastad, it seems to be slowly disappearing.⁵³

Additional factors were also the internal problems of the Holy See (economic inefficiency of the State of the Church, struggles between the nepotists and anti-nepotists, and moral divisions prevailing in the Roman Curia).⁵⁴

Thence, the crisis of the papal attitude of *padre comune* was related to the dynamic political and cultural changes in Europe starting from the second half of the seventeenth century. The Thirty Years' War and then the succession wars, along with their peace solutions, finally annihilated the remnants of the papal universalist idea, which was closely related to the concept of political neutrality. On the threshold of the eighteenth century, none of the European rulers had the scruples to deny the papal pretensions to the role of mediator in the Christian world. Even so, nowadays, we can still see the echoes of this papal position on the contemporary international political scene.

Conclusions

To conclude the above considerations, one should refer once again to the work of Blythe Alice Raviola mentioned in the introduction and use her apt quote:

the permanent apostolic nunciatures, operating since the end of the fifteenth century, have become the transmission belt of European diplomacy, guaranteeing Rome a vast, 'virtual' expansion. In this sense, the Papal State

53 Géraud Poumarède, *Il Mediterraneo oltre le crociate. La guerra turca nel Cinquecento e nel Seicento tra leggende e realtà* (Torino: UTET, 2011), 214–215: “Offrivano per mettere in guardia i principi della minaccia ottomana, poiché il ristabilimento della concordia nella Cristianità appariva sempre una condizione preliminare all'organizzazione di una vasta spedizione contro la Porta. Il suo relativo ritiro dai principali negoziati di pace non gli permettono più di farsi ascoltare, mentre una gran parte dei sovrani occidentali sembra disinteressarsi sempre di più delle questioni orientali. Tuttavia, se il pericolo turco si profila ancora sullo sfondo delle trattative di Vervins, sembra proprio che in Westfalia, poi a Nimega, Utrecht e Rastadt, scompaia a poco a poco dall'orizzonte dei plenipotenziari.”

54 Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna. Diplomatici, nobili e religiosi tra le due corti* (Roma: Bulzoni, 2010), 43; *Eadem, The International Policy of Papacy*, 58–62; Mario Rosa, *La Curia romana in età moderna* (Roma: Viella, 2013), 11.

ceased to be a 'small state' and became a supra-regional and supranational entity, further strengthened after the Council of Trent.⁵⁵

Alain Tallon rightly distinguished between two eras of developing the "international" vision of the State of the Church and the papacy in early modern Europe. After the Avignon crisis, during the Renaissance and the period of its territorial expansion, the Papal State functioned as a classical secular state, let's call it here – middle-sized, focusing primarily on strengthening its own political and territorial position, at least in the Apennine Peninsula. In the face of the Reformation movements' flourishing activity, it was clear that a profound reform of the Catholic Church became necessary also for the State of the Church's economic and political position. Since the beginning of the Council of Trent, the successive popes understood that in order to gain European recognition, respect, and status necessary for the papacy to introduce the Catholic Reform successfully, the political tactic of the Holy See needed to change radically. The new approach, according to Tallon, can be described, as said, as "active neutrality."⁵⁶ Its formulation was not only the result of papal authority's *double-soul* nature, the political and religious conditions of the then reforming Europe, but also of a conscious decision of certain Roman hierarchs. For the efficacious implementation of the Reform, the pope, above all, needed peace between the various states of Catholic Europe. At that particular moment, the main interests of the head of the Catholic Church coincided with those of the secular prince of the State of the Church. As a result, the pope gladly accepted the role of European mediator, easing political relations in the Catholic part of the Old Continent, which permitted him to maintain both of his ambitions: a universalistic position and strong territorial settlement in central Italy. In the face of the progressing fiscal and military failure of the Papal State, the tactic of maintaining political neutrality and using the idea of universal fatherhood to affirm the papacy's "international" status has to be considered an intelligent solution.⁵⁷

55 Raviola, *L'Europa dei piccoli stati*, 44: "Le nunziature apostoliche permanenti, attive da fine Quattrocento, divennero la cinghia di trasmissione della diplomazia europea garantendo a Roma un'enorme estensione virtuale. In tal senso, lo Stato della Chiesa smette di essere un piccolo stato e diviene in potenza un'entità sovra-regionale e sovranazionale, ulteriormente accresciuta in influenza e autorità dopo il Concilio di Trento."

56 Alain Tallon, "Conflicts et médiations dans la politique internationale de la papauté", in: *Papato e politica internazionale*, 118–119.

57 Wojciech Tygielski, *Z Rzymu do Rzeczypospolitej. Studia z dziejów nuncjatury apostolskiej w Polsce, XVI i XVII w.* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Fundacji „Historia pro Futuro”, 1992), 61; Alain Tallon, "Les missions de paix de la papauté au XVIe siècle", in:

Due to the dualistic position of the pope both as a head of a secular state and as Holy Father of all Catholics, the papacy and the State of the Church achieved a particular position in the early modern diplomatic network. Its relations with the other states were asymmetrical in a specific, confessional way. Nevertheless, at some point, with the release of European society from the confessional ties that used to define all fields of life, the role of the papacy, and consequently of the Papal State, was doomed to gradual degeneration and finally – to a decline. Nowadays, if we consider the aspect of territoriality – the Vatican is the smallest state in the world, but if we reflect on the Catholic Church's role in international politics – it still has to be considered.

Bibliography

Books and Monographs

- Anderson Matthew Smith, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919* (London–New York: Longman, 1993).
- Andretta Stefano, *L'arte della prudenza. Teorie e prassi della diplomazia nell'Italia del XVI e XVII secolo* (Roma: Bibliink, 2006).
- Andretta Stefano, “Cerimoniale e diplomazia pontificia nel XVII secolo”, in: *Cérémonial et rituel à Rome: (16.^o–19.^o siècle)*, éd. Maria Antonietta Visceglia, Catherine Brice (Roma: Ecole française de Rome, 1997), 201–222.
- Banaszak Marian, *Z dziejów dyplomacji watykańskiej: poselstwa obediencyjne w latach 1534–1605. Cz. 3, Poselstwa monarchów i republik* (Warszawa: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1975).
- Barbiche Bernard, “La diplomatie pontificale au XVII siècle”, in: *Armées et diplomatie dans l'Europe du XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Actes du Colloque de 1996. Bulletin nr 16, 1992), 109–127.
- Bellini Piero, *Sede Apostolica e realtà politiche fra l'Evo Medio e l'Epoca Moderna* (Torino: G. Giappichelli Editore, 2015).
- Bély Lucien, *L'art de la paix en Europe. Naissance de la diplomatie moderne. XVIe–XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: PUF, 2007).

Guerres et paix en Europe centrale aux époques moderne et contemporaine. Mélanges d'histoire des relations internationales offerts à Jean Bérenger, éd. Daniel Tollet, Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2003, 168: “La politique de médiation entre les Etats catholiques correspondait à la vocation du pape comme chef spirituel et à ses intérêts comme prince temporel, et il est bien difficile de séparer l'un de l'autre. [...] Pour s'imposer comme médiateurs, les papes devaient être capables de faire pression sur les Etats concernés. Malgré sa faiblesse militaire, Rome disposait d'atouts et savait les faire valoir.” Cfr. *idem*, “Conflicts et médiations”, 117–119.

- Bély Lucien, "La médiation diplomatique au XVIIe siècle et au début du XVIIIe siècle", in: *Armées et diplomatie dans l'Europe de XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Actes du Colloque de 1996. Bulletin nr 16, 1992), 129–147.
- Blet Pierre, *Historie de la Représentation Diplomatique du Saint Siège des origines à l'aube du XIX siècle* (Città del Vaticano: Archivio Vaticano, 1990).
- Caravale Mario, Alberto Caracciolo, *Lo Stato Pontificio da Martino V a Pio IX* (Torino: UTET, 1978).
- Cardinale Igino, *Le Saint-Siège et la diplomatie: aperçu historique, juridique et pratique de la diplomatie pontificale* (Paris: Desclée, 1962).
- Carta Paolo, Dorota Gregorowicz, "Nunziature e politica nel '500. L'istituto e i suoi aspetti critici", in: *Ambassades et ambassadeurs en Europe (XVe–XVIIe siècles)*, éd. Jean Louis Fournel, Matteo Residori (Genève: Droz, 2020), 441–466.
- Fedele Dante, *Naissance de la diplomatie moderne (XIIIe–XVIIe siècles): l'ambassadeur au croisement du droit, de l'éthique et de la politique* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, Dike, 2017).
- Feldkamp, Michael Frank, *La diplomazia pontificia. Da Silvestro I a Giovanni Paolo II: un profilo* (Milano: Jaca Book, 1998).
- Fletcher Catherine, *Diplomacy in Renaissance Rome: The Rise of the Resident Ambassador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- Gentili Alberico, *De iure belli libri tres* (Hanoviae: Excudebat Guilielmus Antonius, 1598).
- Gregorowicz Dorota, "Problem papieskiej neutralności wobec rywalizacji o tron w Rzeczypospolitej w wyniku abdykacji Jana Kazimierza Wazy", in: *Sztuka roztropności. Dyplomacja Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec Rzeczypospolitej, Europy i świata*, red. Krzysztof Ożóg, Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 2020), 141–161.
- Gregorowicz Dorota, *Tiara w grze o koronę. Stolica Apostolska wobec wolnych elekcji w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów w drugiej połowie XVI w.* (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 2019).
- Grotius Hugo, *De iure belli ac pacis* (Parisiis: Apud Nicolaum Buon, 1625).
- Hugon Alain, *Rivalités européennes et hégémonie mondiale, XVIe–XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2002).
- Livet Georges, *L'équilibre européen de la fin du XVe à la fin du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: PUF, 1976).
- Mallet Michael Edward, *Diplomacy and War in Later Fifteenth-Century Italy* (London: British Academy, 1981).
- Mattingly Garret, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London: Penguin Books, 1965).
- Pastor von Ludwig, *Storia dei papi dalla fine del Medio Evo compilata con sussidio dell'Archivio segreto pontificio e di molti altri Archivi. Vol. IX, Storia dei papi nel periodo della Riforma e restaurazione cattolica. Gregorio XIII (1572–1585)* (Roma: Desclée, 1925).
- Pieper Anton, *Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ständigen Nuntiaturen* (Freiburg: Herder, 1894).

- Pizzorusso Giovanni, “Appunti sulle edizioni documentarie delle «Nunziature d’Italia»”, in: *Gli archivi della Santa Sede come fonte per la storia moderna e contemporanea*, a cura di Matteo Sanfilippo, Giovanni Pizzorusso (Viterbo: Sette città, 2001), 33–58.
- Poumarède Géraud, *Il Mediterraneo oltre le crociate. La guerra turca nel Cinquecento e nel Seicento tra leggende e realtà* (Torino: UTET, 2011).
- Prodi Paolo, *Il sovrano pontefice: un corpo e due anime. La monarchia papale nella prima età moderna* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013) (first edition – 1982).
- Prodi Paolo, *Diplomazia del Cinquecento: istituzioni e prassi* (Bologna: Patron, 1963).
- Ranke von Ludwig, *Storia dei papi* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1965).
- Raviola Blythe Alice, *L’Europa dei piccoli stati: dalla prima età moderna al declino dell’antico regime* (Roma: Carocci, 2008).
- Riccardi Luca, “An Outline of Vatican Diplomacy in the Early Modern Age”, in: *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy. The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450–1800*, ed. by Daniela Frigo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 95–108.
- Rosa Mario, *La Curia romana in età moderna* (Roma: Viella, 2013).
- Schilling Heinz, “Die konfessionellen Glaubenskriege und die Formierung des frühmodernen Europa”, in: *Glaubenskriege in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, ed. by Peter Herrmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 123–137.
- Schilling Heinz, *Konfesjonalizacja. Kościół i państwo w Europie doby przednowoczesnej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2010).
- Schilling Heinz, “Konfessionalisierung und Formierung eines internationalen Systems während der frühen Neuzeit”, in: *Die Reformation in Deutschland und Europa. Interpretationen und Debatten*, ed. Hans R. Guggisberg and Gottfried G. Krodel (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993), 591–613.
- Schilling Heinz, “The Two Papal Souls and the Rise of an Early Modern State System”, in: *Papato e politica internazionale nella prima età moderna*, a cura di Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Roma: Viella, 2013), 103–116.
- Silvano Giordano, “Uomini e apparati della politica internazionale del papato”, in: *Papato e politica internazionale nella prima età moderna*, a cura di Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Roma: Viella, 2013), 131–148.
- Tallon Alain, “Conflicts et médiations dans la politique internationale de la papauté”, in: *Papato e politica internazionale nella prima età moderna*, a cura di Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Roma: Viella, 2013), 118–119.
- Tallon Alain, *L’Europa del Cinquecento. Stati e relazioni internazionali* (Roma: Carocci, 2013).
- Tallon Alain, “Les missions de paix de la papauté au XVIe siècle”, in: *Guerres et paix en Europe centrale aux époques moderne et contemporaine. Mélanges d’histoire des relations internationales offerts à Jean Bérenger*, éd. Daniel Tollet, Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 165–180.
- Tygielski Wojciech, *Z Rzymu do Rzeczypospolitej. Studia z dziejów nuncjatury apostolskiej w Polsce, XVI i XVII w.* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Fundacji „Historia pro Futuro”, 1992).

- Verga Marcello, “L’Impero in Italia. Alcune considerazioni introduttive”, in: *L’Impero e l’Italia nella prima età moderna / Das Reich und Italien in der Frühen Neuzeit*, a cura di Matthias Schnettger, Marcello Verga (Bologna-Berlin: Il Mulino-Duncker&Humblot, 2006), 11–24.
- Visceglia Maria Antonietta, “Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico”, in: *Cérémonial et rituel à Rome: (16.°–19.° siècle)*, éd. Maria Antonietta Visceglia, Catherine Brice (Roma: Ecole française de Rome, 1997), 117–176.
- Visceglia Maria Antonietta, *Roma papale e Spagna. Diplomatici, nobili e religiosi tra le due corti* (Roma: Bulzoni, 2010).
- Visceglia Maria Antonietta, “The International Policy of the Papacy: Critical Approaches to the Concepts of Universalism and Italianità: Peace and War”, in: *Papato e politica internazionale nella prima età moderna*, a cura di Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Roma: Viella, 2013), 17–62.
- Wojtyska Henryk Damian, *Papiestwo – Polska 1548–1563* (Lublin: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 1977).
- Wojtyska, Henryk Damian, “Prymasostwo – nuncjatura. Dzieje relacji instytucjonalnych”, in: *Prymasi i prymasostwo w dziejach państwa i narodu polskiego*, red. Wiesław Jan Wysocki (Warszawa: Pax, 2002), 85–107.

Journal Articles

- Fattori Maria Teresa, “Per una storia della curia romana dalla riforma sistina, secoli XVI–XVIII”, *Storia del cristianesimo* 35/3 (2014): 787–848.
- Galasso Giuseppe, “Le relazioni internazionali nell’età moderna (secoli XV–XVIII)”, *Rivista Storica Italiana* 111/1 (1999): 5–36.
- Sowerby Tracey, “Early Modern Diplomatic History”, *History Compass* 14/9 (2016): 441–456.