Stanley Cavell’s Philosophical Literary Criticism. An Outline of Method

An American philosopher Stanley Cavell (1926–2018) is one of those philosophers who, consciously starting from the assumption of the mutual complementarity of philosophy and literature, develop their theoretical reflection at the meeting point of both these fields and treating their reflection as a form of writing. In Cavell’s opinion, literature is in no way inferior to philosophy in terms of its cognitive values. He goes so far as to question the validity of the rigid, insurmountable division into these two areas, and describes his own writing as epistemic criticism which is a kind of philosophical literary criticism. Although he comes from the analytical school, Cavell remains extremely critical of this tradition of philosophizing, accusing it, as he puts it, of “forgetting the human voice”, losing touch with reality and being alienated from life and in the result calling analytical philosophy “the discipline most opposed to writing, and to life”. At the same time, he turns to the continental tradition and tries to combine these two different intellectual traditions on the basis of his considerations. In this way, Cavell places himself at the intersection of various intellectual currents. His area of interest is also extremely wide and varied, including philosophy, literature, film, theater and music.

In my article I intend to focus on a few chosen aspects of Cavell's work that is still not recognized enough in academic studies, namely on the Cavell's use of philosophical concepts and chosen methods used by Cavell to analyze literary texts -the paraphrase method, the problem of the open work, the literalization of language method (in the context of Cavell's analysis of Beckett's Endgame), the problem of the ordinary connected with Cavell's version of the ordinary language philosophy (in the context of the chosen features of Wittgenstein's philosophy).In concluding part I also make some provisional remarks on Cavell's hermeneutics and also suggest that it could be fruitfully read in the context of the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and his philosophy of the Other.

Introduction
It is well beyond the scope of this article to present a more thorough outline of the methodological issues at play in Stanley Cavell's  (1926-2018) hermeneutics, let alone an analysis of his writings or an even cursory discussion of his ideas.I will therefore limit myself to sketching out a brief outline of selected features of his philosophy and largely skip over the specific philosophical problems with which he grapples.
Choosing an appropriate methodological toolbox for the interpretation of Cavell's writings is far from a straightforward task.One would be hard-pressed to find another contemporary philosopher equally absorbed, if not infected, with literature; this preoccupation manifest itself even in his writing style, so distinct from what we would normally think of as typical philosophical discourse.Not only does Cavell continually navigate the borderlands between literature and philosophy (considering the two disciplines as adjacent), but he also explicitly investigates the presence and status of philosophical problems philosophical problems in literary (con)texts; he is avowedly interested in the scope and range of their mutual relationships and the mechanisms by which philosophical problems emerge within the fabric of a literary work (such as Shakespeare's or Beckett's).Cavell is keenly aware that the answer to these questions will vary depending on whether we take the perspective of a philosopher or a literary scholar.
In a monograph on Cavell, David Rudrum 2 aptly observes that in contrast to other authors working on the borderline between literature/ criticism on the one hand and philosophy on the other, Cavell does not couch his reflection in a technical jargon evocative of famous literary theorists such as Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, or Bakhtin.Nor does he develop a method or theory of his own that could be accurately labeled as "Cavellism".Although he does rely on certain textual strategies, they never determine his interpretation of the works to which he turns his attention.Cavell himself described his highly idiosyncratic "method" of literary analysis as "epistemological reading", and his writing as "philosophical literary criticism"; 3 on the margins of his book on Shakespeare, he openly confessed that, ultimately, he was not really sure who he was writing for: lovers of philosophy or fans of literature. 4

Literature or philosophy
In his fundamental work, The Claim of Reason, 5 which serves as a sort of intellectual background, methodological toolbox, and point of departure for his later thinking, Stanley Cavell writes: Some say that philosophy is literature, some say it is science, some say it is ideology, some say it doesn't matter which of these, if any, it is. 6sewhere he writes: My motivation, as far as I can remember, has been to write.In music, it was to write.When music fell apart for me, it's not exactly that I thought the writing I did was bad.I felt it wasn't anything I was saying, just something I had learned to do.The road that took me to philosophy was an attempt to discover a way to write that I could believe. 7ere is no doubt that what we encounter in Cavell is a kind of philosophical and literary syncretism, or, to use a term coined by Zofia Zarębianka, dispersed philosophy, i.e. a from of writing in which philosophy itself, far from systematic in its ambitions, is equal to, permeates, and sometimes dominates over the literary layer of the text.Authors who write in this way infuse the literary matter of their text with philosophical meaning. 8What seems to be at stake here is a kind of philosophy as described by Richard Rorty: Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing.It is limited, as is any literary genre, nor by form or matter, but by tradition. 9 a similar vein, in one of his minor texts, entitled The Investigations' Everyday Aesthetics of Itself, 10 in which he analyzes the style of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Cavell observes that none of the available philosophical theories of aesthetics allow for a sufficient, much less exhaustive, appreciation of the literary qualities of Wittgenstein's text; likewise, none allow to establish the mutual relationship that holds between its literary form and what Cavell refers to as a "philosophical work".Conversely, there exists no critical literary aesthetics that we can fall back on to fully express and articulate the philosophical value of Wittgenstein's work, let alone elucidate the symbiotic relationship that holds between the philosophical dimension of Philosophical Investigations (or, for that matter, Shakespeare's plays) 11 and the highly unconventional use they make of literary conventions.Why? Because, argues Cavell, Wittgenstein and Shakespeare create their very own aesthetics therefore both Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Shakespeare's dramas can be studied in terms of an "aesthetics of itself ". 12 The literary value of a brilliant philosophical text, Cavell argues, is something universal, because "the literary is essential to the power of philosophy, at some stage the philosophical becomes, or turns into, the literary".13 Why, then, at the risk of oversimplification, is a work like Cavell's better described as philosophical rather than literary?Possible criteria might include language, style, and themethod by which it formulates its problems. 14Let us have a brief look at some of the characteristic features of Cavell's writing style.15

Language, style, method
In Cavell's writings, one can identify several underlying assumptions about the fundamental goals of any linguistic communication: aside from its truth content (i.e. the broad and thus rather problematic criterion of interpretive validity), communication should be effective, that is, based on a range of persuasive techniques; above all, however, it should stimulate and inspire readers to perform their own independent text analysis.To achieve this end, Cavell frequently resorts to various ingenious methods, including literary devices, such as original, often ambiguous metaphors that always "give food for thought", but may seem highly problematic in an analytical, academic text.Cavell also employs strictly philosophical methods from the toolkit of ordinary language philosophy, especially those borrowed from J.L. Austin, whose program Cavell alludes to in his formula: "what we should say when". 16hus, Cavell's language abounds in neologisms, linguistic and syntactic mannerisms, as well as unobvious metaphors and other typically literary stylistic and rhetorical devices, usually absent from the language 13 Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988): 109.In "The Investigations' Everyday Aesthetics of Itself " Cavell writes: "Part of my sense of the Investigations as a modernist work is that its portrait of the human is recognizable as one of the modern self, or, as we are given to say, the modern subject".Cavell, "The Investigations' Everyday Aesthetics of Itself Aesthetics of Itself ", 25. 14 Used in reference to fiction writers, the word "method" may seem rather out of place, but it may be warranted, if only for those whose prose is highly discursive in style, while still clearly identifiable as literature on account of its artistic value.Such authors would include, for instance, Marcel Proust and Robert Musil.15 For more information on the methodology of research on the mutual relationships between literature and philosophy, see also: of philosophical exposition, including rhetorical and stylistic devices that verge on the incomprehensible, no less because of Cavell's experimental, multilevel syntax. 17His writing is not so much a straightforward exposition as a linguistic experiment that often brings to mind the formal experiments of modernist prose rather than a traditional philosophical essay.Cavell's language is also highly subjective, often dominated by a confessional tone (it is by no means accidental that some of the texts he alludes to include St. Augustine's Confessions and Thoreau's intellectual autobiography, Walden 18 ), drawing on his individual experience and reading. 19

The literary vs the philosophical. The problem of the open work
If we accept that the structure of a literary work is open, dialogic, based on ambiguity and metaphor, and that it retains its essential indeterminacy before it takes a specific shape in our mind, which gives readers ample leeway for subjective interpretation, these qualities may also be tentatively applied to the literary-philosophical prose of Cavell himself.This holds especially true for those works in which he analyzes a literary text but, as if on purpose, leaves it up to the readers to decide on its interpretation.One of such Cavellian strategies is to merely propose, rather than impose, a reading; the goal is to inspire readers and open up a field of possibility, where they can come up with readings of their own.Cavell's interpretations can be said to sensitize readers to the interpretive potential of literature.However, Cavell's interpretive essays themselves exhibit the stylistic features of an open work.As proposed readings of literary questions or issues, they produce interpretive problems in their 17 A case in point is the opening sentence of the first chapter of The Claim of Reason, which takes up half a page.Disowning Knowledge can also be considered as an experiment in style and language.18 See: Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy: 22. Cf. idem, The Senses of Walden (New York: The Viking Press, 1972).19 In one of his autobiographical passages, Cavell writes in his characteristic style: (…) "So I philosophized as continuously as I could, incorporating literary texts when they would insist, and whatever of the literary came into my manner, without embarrassment (lines and images from Wordsworth, Yeats, Blake, Shakespeare, Dickens, Melville, Kafka, Conrad, Mann, Proust, and so forth had impressed me, say, become unforgettable for me, before philosophy had, or rather, before I was taught differences between literature and philosophy), and I periodically offered as a sort of overriding justification of my practices-or rather as a source of coherent tips to reading the results of such efforts-my readings of Wittgenstein's Investigations (…)".own right and thus potentially lend themselves to a similar analysis by readers20 .
To use a category proposed by Bakhtin, we can say that texts by Cavellthe interpreter, as a reader of other authors, have a dialogic21 or open structure.We are dealing with a literary text and its reading at the same time, a reading that is ambiguous and open enough to warrant an interpretation of its own, a meta-text, as defined by Bakhtin, which involves the mutual interaction of distinct voices. 22n this context, we might recall the distinction between "objectivizing language" and "poeticizing language", introduced by Hans Blumenberg in Speech Situation and Immanent Poetics. 23Poeticizing language is characterized by unstable syntax and shifting meanings, allowing for the previously mentioned "opening up" of interpretation.No wonder, then, that Cavell, who often opts for this particular interpretive strategy, puts his readers to test after test.He is often precariously poised on the verge of, and sometimes slides right into, incomprehensibility, the flip side of his interpretive suggestiveness.However, exegetic clarity or complete transparency are never his goal: he often circles around his subject as if to illuminate it from a variety of angles, drawing readers deeper and deeper into his complex narratives.Never does he outline the problem at hand in a straightforward manner; Cavell always thinks along with his writers.24

Selected features of Cavell's interpretive strategies. The paraphrase method
All this, however, does not mean that there are no elements that could be reliably identified as part of a typical Cavellian interpretive strategy.To the contrary.Firstly, Cavell makes a distinction between research intuition and research hypothesis, and understands his own reflections as an instance of the former. 25He does not usually develop a single interpretive intuition around the analyzed work, but rather tests out ("testing" is one of his favorite words 26 ) a variety of intuitions at the same time, searching for an appropriate tone and a voice best suited to articulate them. 27hile a hypothesis requires some kind of proof or evidence in the strict sense of the word, an intuition calls not for proof but for a kind of understanding, informed by an intuitive insight into the meaning of the text at hand. 28Thus, for instance, Cavell's hypothesis that Shakespeare anticipates skepticism is not really a research hypothesis, but an interpretive intuition.It is not a hypothesis because there is not, and cannot be, any incontrovertible evidence to clearly demonstrate that Shakespeare indeed (strictly speaking) "analyzes" a model of that or another cognitive attitude (e.g.skepticism) in his plays. 29s an example of interpretive intuition, Cavell proposes an analogy between the skeptical reasoning of Descartes' First Meditation and the narcissism of the quintessential Shakespearean skeptic, Othello. 30his also serves as a good example of Cavell's paraphrase method, discussed in greater depth elsewhere, which allows him to create what one of his scholars referred to as the "models of skepticism", 31 exemplified by Shakespeare's tragedy. 32In Cavell's interpretation, Othello, for instance, is a personification of Cartesian skepticism, while Desdemona plays a role analogous to that of the Cartesian God. 33t this juncture, we may ask ourselves about the status of this labyrinthine method and its reliance on analogical reasoning.How far can we reasonably go in welding together ideas as remote and distinct as, on the one hand, a strictly epistemological hypothesis, formulated by a philosopher (in this case, Descartes) to support an argument, and, on the other, a poetic, by no means obvious, version of skepticism that Cavell interprets out of a Shakespearean tragedy?It seems that the ontologies of these two worlds, i.e. the real world, which is the focus of ontology and metaphysics in the Cartesian experiment on the one hand, and the depicted world of a poetic work on the other, are completely incommensurable. 34To what extent, if any at all, can we then apply Cartesian methodological skepticism as an interpretive key to one of Shakespeare's multifaceted literary metaphors? 35he dilemma is not resolved by Cavell's own admission that he is engaged in "philosophical literary criticism", since, speaking in Kantian terms, doubts can arise as to the very conditions of possibility of such "philosophical literary criticism" in the first place.The meta-level on which Cavell moves thus sends us off to yet another meta-meta-level, always shrinking from any final act or exhaustive understanding of the work at hand.
Cavell is fully aware of the difficulties inherent in his interpretive program.In anticipation of such objections to his method, and, in particular, in order to refute the charge that he treats "philosophizing" literature as a certain form of philosophical "illustrationism", he writes:  (Cavell, Disowning  Knowledge, 6), which suggests a certain parallelism, an analogy between two spheres: the tragic sphere and reality as conceived of by the skeptic.The postulate that such analogy obtains is not a satisfactory solution, since the analogy as such is problematic and its legitimacy may be questioned.
The misunderstanding of my attitude that most concerned me was to take my project as the application of some philosophically independent problematic of skepticism to a fragmentary parade of Shakespearean text, impressing those texts into the service of illustrating philosophical conclusions known in advance. 36sewhere, he observes that: (…) the burden of my story in spinning the interplay of philosophy with literature is not that of applying philosophy to literature, where so-called literary works would become kinds of illustrations of matters already independently known.It would better express my refrain to say that I take the works I am drawn to read out in public (beginning with those I have listed of Shakespeare) as studies of matters your philosophy has (…) intellectualized as skepticism, whether in Descartes's or Hume's or Kant's pictures of that inescapably, essentially, human possibility. 37

Toward the ordinary. The literalization of language
An important role in Cavell's methodology is played by a "turn to the ordinary", for which he is heavily indebted to Austin. 38The postulate is part of the anti-philosophical, anti-metaphysical program of late Wittgenstein, who argues that traditional philosophy is based on a fundamental error: that of separating words from the meanings they have in colloquial language.Colloquial language is their proper domain.As such, words have no meaning other than the meaning we assign to them in everyday language, and any attempt to endow them with such exotic meanings, says Wittgenstein, results precisely in what philosophers have engaged in for centuries, i.e. philosophically sanctioned nonsense. 3936 Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 1. 37 Ibidem, 179.38 Cf.Cavell, In quest of the Ordinary, 3-15.39 Cf. the famous remark about the "the bruises which the understanding has suffered by bumping its head against the limits of language" (L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Blackwell Publishers 1986, 23).However, the above statement should be qualified with two remarks by Wittgenstein himself: "The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed.That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules" (PI, par.125) Elsewhere Wittgenstein says: "When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless.But a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation" (Ibid., par.500).It is not some ficticious meanings as such which are To demystify such nonsense, including philosophical statements, such as those of "metaphysical" discourse, would be to bring language back to itself, as Wittgenstein puts it, i.e. to play "language games" consistent with our linguistic practice. 40 Wittgenstein scholar observes: In the later work, philosophical utterances "sublime the logic of our language" not because they gesture outward toward some ineffable but metaphysically significant realm beyond the ordinary.Rather, they are an effect of language's failure to do so, to hint at anything truly metaphysical, truly beyond ordinary language games. 41is strategy closely corresponds to Cavell's "turn to the ordinary".Cavell himself acknowledges its affinities with late Wittgenstein and views it as the goal of liberating language from its pseudo-meanings, which seem to be especially the domain of metaphysics. 42In a text devoted to Beckett, Cavell writes: The sort of method I try to use consistently in reading the play [Beckett's Endgame], [is] one in which I am asking of a line either: What are the most ordinary circumstances under which such a line would be uttered?Or: What do words literally say. 43n such a way as to allow its own sublime language to refer and point to something beyond itself.
It is only if this condition is met, if the language of literature is specific and "non-ordinary", that critics can claim that they have uncovered an occult, metaphorical meaning of a work, hidden beyond a facade of unambiguous, non-problematic meanings, i.e. that they have managed to decipher its "deeper" or "metaphorical sense". 44n his analyses of various works of literature, Cavell declares that, whenever possible, utterances must be interpreted using the methods of philosophy that studies how words are used in their natural element, i.e. colloquial language (as in the philosophical program proposed by J.L. Austin 45 ).The problem with this argument is that a method that applies the reductionist approach of colloquial language philosophy to some (albeit not all) literary texts, especially as sophisticated as those by Shakespeare, Emerson or, indeed, Cavell, necessarily poses certain difficulties and seems to be rather limited in application.
The minimalism of contemporary literature, such as Beckett's, no doubt warrants this approach to a greater extent. 46In his analysis of Beckett's Endgame, Cavell attempts to defuse the tension between "the ordinary" and "the literary", observing that what Beckett intends to do in this play is de-metaphorize the metaphors built into the very fabric of language, a strategy he refers to as a "literalization of meaning". 47The strategy is essentially anti-literary in its attempt to cut right through to the literal meanings of the language, which, according to Cavell, Beckett believes to represent the very residue of meanings as such. 48This sheds a new light on Cavell's "turn to the ordinary", which Simon Critchley describes as follows: 44 Cf.Rudrum, Stanley Cavell and The Claim, 86.45 Cavell argues: "How we "lead words back" to their everyday use may be said to be done by following Austin's apparently innocuous directive to ask ourselves what we say when (that is, in varying contexts)".Cavell, The Pitch of Philosophy: 7. In the context of defining "ordinary language philosophy" Cavell writes: "There the problem is also raised of determining the data from which philosophy proceeds and to which it appeals, and specifically the issue is one of placing the words and experiences with which philosophers have always begun in alignment with human beings in particular circumstances who can be imagined to be having those experiences and saying and meaning those words.This is all that 'ordinary' in the phrase 'ordinary language philosophy' means (…)".The ordinary is the object of a quest, a task, something to be achieved and not an available fact (…) On Cavell's reading, Beckett is not telling us that the universe is meaningless, rather meaninglessness is a task, an achievement, the achievement of the ordinary or the everyday". 49e key word here seems to be "achievement".The problem is that literalization, an attempt to de-metaphorize meaning, is tantamount to reductionism, which is fundamentally opposed to how everyday language "works", as the pragmatists would say.To reach down to a postulated primary, fundamental meaning would be to describe not actual language as it is used in communication, but a certain methodological postulate; it would not be a point of departure, but a point of arrival, achieved by an author after a long and arduous journey during which language has been gradually, analytically "purified" 50 .
The same is true of Cavell: his concept of "the ordinary" is also no more than a postulate.As pointed out by Critchley, "the ordinary" is not an actual fact but a goal. 51At the same time, paradoxically, it opens up a space of possible reflection: 52 Cavell interprets the message of Wittgenstein's Tractatus in a similar vein when he observes: Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts, it is much more essential for our investigation that we want to learn nothing new from it.We want to understand something that is already open to view.For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand.On this view, philosophy would no longer be a way of discovering new truths, especially metaphysical truths, which, as Wittgenstein showed, do not exist.To the contrary, it would be a never-ending, inexhaustible quest to describe and understand the world.
The world in question, however, is not the world of philosophical fictions.Nor is it identical with the world unproblematically given to us in daily experience.Rather, it is a world given as a task, a riddle with no final solution, an inexhaustible source of mutually incompatible interpretations, bringing to mind Wittgenstein's metaphor of his own Philosophical Investigations as a "collection of field notes". 54In his work, Wittgenstein does not aspire to any final conclusions, heuristic syntheses; he does not even propose to step beyond what is empirically given.In this context, Cavell quotes Wittgenstein's another well-known dictum: Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.For what is as it were hidden is of no interest to us. 55

Conclusions
An advantage of Cavell's thinking is that even though it may often be elusive and difficult to put in discursive terms, it opens up a horizon that transcends the simplistic dichotomy of philosophy and literature, showing that the relationship is complex and ridden with problems.In addition, the text as such, be it philosophical or literary, is the ultimate object of Cavell's hermeneutic manipulations.As observed by Gerald Bruns, Cavell's is a variety of Romantic hermeneutics, whose final goal is not so much to understand a text as to understand the Other as the Other.What is particularly Romantic in a hermeneutic program of this kind is the allegorical nature of its overarching desire to understand and capture the Other more fully even than one understands oneself, which can be achieved only by abandoning the standard definition of objectivity. 56n ultimate point of reference for Cavell, one that goes beyond pure understanding, is sensitivity to the other person, prefigured by the Other of Levinas, as invoked by Bruns and Cavell himself. 57The primary task that Cavell sets before his own philosophy, it seems, is to overcome the 54 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3. 55 Cavell, The Pitch of Philosophy, 5. 56 Bruns, " Stanley Cavell's Shakespeare": 621.57 Cf. e.g.: Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy, 12.  difficulties on which we stumble in our attempts to transcend ourselves in our cognitions.
It is in this sense that the entire philosophical oeuvre of this American author, including his literary interpretations, expresses an attempt to step beyond the solipsistic "Self ".An apt metaphor for our imprisonment in the "ego" is the entrapment of our intellect in skepticism, as analyzed by Cavell,58 the great believer in the humanist tradition.
32 Cf.Michał Filipczuk, "Szekspir a sceptycyzm.Otello w interpretacji Stanleya Cavella", IDEA -Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych 29/1 (2017): 240-263.Othello is but one of such "literary models of skepticism".The others are King Lear, Macbeth, Hamlet and The Winter's Tale, which are also extensively analyzed by Cavell in Disowning Knowledge.33 Ibidem.Cf.Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 125-135.34 As noted by G.L. Bruns, "What Othello and Descartes have in common is that, in order to overcome, or destroy, their doubt (…) they are willing to give up (in Othello's case, kill) the world, call it the other, or the body, or the human".Gerald L. Bruns, "Stanley Cavell's Shakespeare", Critical Inquiry 16/3 (1990): 614.35 The problem discussed here is not put to rest by Cavell's argument that "the tragedy is an interpretation of what skepticism is itself an interpretation of " Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 42. 46 Cavell's interpretation of Beckett's Endgame is seen by some as the most clearly philosophical analysis of a contemporary work of literature (see: Rudrum, Stanley Cavell and the Claim, 85-99).47 Cavell, "Ending the Waiting Game", 122.48 Ibidem, 122-124.
53 49 Simon Critchley, Know Happiness -On Beckett, 178-179.Quoted after: Rudrum, Stanley Cavell and The Claim, 88.50 Cf.Rudrum, Stanley Cavell and the Claim, 99-98.51Por.Michael Fischer, Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 125-130.52 Cavell writes: "Because the philosophy in question is one whose originality is partly a function of its stress on the idea of the ordinary or everyday, especially its way of allowing philosophy's return to what it calls the everyday to show that what we accept as the order of the ordinary is a scene of obscurity, self-imposed as well as otherim- posed, fraudulent, you might say metaphysical (the thing Emerson calls conformity and Nietzsche calls philistinism), it links its vision with aspects of the portraits Kierkegaard and Marx and Heidegger and Walter Benjamin make of what Mill calls our mutual intimidation, what Proust, we might say, shows to be our mutual incorporation".Cavell, "Introductory Note to Literary Wittgenstein", in: The Aesthetics of Itself: 19.53 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, par.89: 65.Quoted after: Cavell, "The Investigations' Everyday Aesthetics of Itself ", 23.