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{Bart P. Wille}
{Bart P. \kapit{Wille}}
{Review of \textit{>>An Inquiry into Modes of Existence<<}}
{Review of \textit{>>An Inquiry into Modes of Existence.\eoln
An Anthropology of the Moderns<<} by Bruno Latour}
{Recenzja książki Bruno Latoura \textit{<<An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. An Anthropology of the Moderns>>}}%kor+
\index{Wille, B.P.}
\index{Latour, B.}

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\foreignlanguage{english}{
\summary{
\ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} latest study of the moderns is a~continuation 
of a~life-long project. 
Just like \textit{We Have Never Been Modern}, it’s mainly a~theoretical 
work in which sociology, anthropology and philosophy are coming 
together\footnote{
\cite{Latour:WeHave}, p.~7.}. 
The starting point is the same: 
“The moderns have never been modern, but they have 
believed they are modern”\footnote{
\cite{Latour:WeHave}, p.~14.}. 
There are many similarities with his previous works, although his modes of existence 
are a~huge step in the network ontology. 
For many years he attacked the ontological foundations of traditional sociology. 
Now, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} finally gives an example of how his idea of 
an ontological pluralism, the network metaphor and empiricism come together. 
The result is a~multiplicity of various modes of existence, each with their own 
characteristics and epistemology. 
In this critical review, we will focus on a few recurring topics. 
We will start by setting the stage for \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} modes of existence 
and their keys, anti-fundamentalism and the network metaphor. 
As a~result, we come across a confusing alternation between a~descriptive 
and a~normative style. 
Next, there will be a~critical examination of his \textit{“moderns”} 
and the new concept Double Click. 
Finally, we discuss an unusual use of the age-old idea of transcendence. 

Before we go further into the listed topics, it seems only fair to refer 
to the official website of the book.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:Immanence}.} 
In my opinion, it stands out among other websites dedicated to philosophy 
books for the quality of its design and it’s knowledge of the subject. 
}{}

\tytul{1. Empirical metaphysics and ontological pluralism}

At the last two pages of the book, the reader finds a~list of the fifteen 
modes of existence \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} detected in the world of 
the moderns: fiction, religion, law, politics, etc. 
They all have their own way of being. 
Their goal, inner workings and epistemology are all unique.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, p.~18.} 
Repeating these modes and \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} findings 
would be redundant. 
Yet, it is interesting how he came up with these fifteen modes. 
To understand his, what we might call, empirical metaphysics, 
we are forced to make a~small detour through the starting point 
of metaphysics as a~pre-empirical speculation on reality. 

Metaphysics as the study of the ultimate structure of reality has traditionally 
been a~rationalist enterprise. 
\ios{Descartes’}{Descartes, R.} first meditation in 
\textit{Méditations Métaphysiques}\footnote{
\cite{Descartes:Meditations}.} 
is an analytical way of turning into oneself. 
Central in his legendary work is his epistemological doubt, enforced by both God 
and an evil demon. 
\ios{Kant}{Kant, I.} on the other hand asks the question: 
how is reality organized in such a~way that it makes itself understandable to us? 
\ios{Heidegger}{Heidegger, M.} starts a~phenomenological research of being 
in which he clearly denounces the so-called vulgar phenomena.\footnote{
\cite{Heidegger:Zijn}, p.~58-63.} 
All of these traditional ways of approaching metaphysics are pre-empirical 
or try to constantly overcome the everyday life empiricism. 

In \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} work, everything starts with empirical data. 
Epistemological skepticism can’t be a~reason to make metaphysics 
a~pre-empirical enterprise, since there is already a~metaphysical assumption 
in this epistemological skepticism. 
Not going into any details, we might bluntly summarize epistemological skepticism 
as a~gap between the looking-subject and the playing-for-dead-object. 
The same subject/object distinction is implicitly present in the metaphysical search 
for how reality has to be in order to make it perceivable to us. 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} elsewhere mocks \ios{Kant}{Kant, I.}: 

\cytuj{
One should add the comical role of 
being-there-just-to-prove-that-one-is-not-an-idealist 
role invented by Kant\index{Kant, I.} \kropki{} things are there 
but play no role except that of mute guardians holding the sign. 
We deny that we deny the existence of an outside reality. 
Quite a~function well worth hapless ``things in themselves''.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:ThePromises}, p.~32.}
} 

We can’t translate \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} works in one sentence, but his attack 
on the subject/object dualism is definitely the key throughout his thinking. 
This dualism is the weak point towards which \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} 
sent wave after wave of attacks. 
\ios{Descartes}{Descartes, R.} produces the subject by meditating. 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} prefers to produce a~different metaphysics, 
not based on meditation, but on experience in everyday life. 
Unlike \ios{Heidegger}{Heidegger, M.}, we shouldn’t start by studying 
the questioners of the ontological question in order to obtain 
the metaphysical questions.\footnote{
\cite{Kockelmans:Martin}, p.~23.} 
It’s the anthropological study of reality that will automatically include humans. 
In this way, a~kind off naive-looking empiricism is far less problematic 
as a~starting point than juggling with heavy metaphysical concepts 
without any eyes and hands. 

What is left is a~vague idea of following whatever we encounter. 
The metaphysician becomes an anthropologist, a~switch \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} 
cleverly made as well while jumping from the title \textit{An Inquiry into Modes 
of Existence} to the subtitle \textit{An Anthropology of the Moderns}. 
The network metaphor is a~way to describe the result of the act 
of \textit{following}.\footnote{
Network is not merely used as a~way to make the work of the researcher plastic. 
In a~second meaning, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} sees existence as such to be based 
on relations. 
In this way, an existant, actor and network are all synonyms.} 
Riding piggyback on an actor is like tracking down the paths it takes. It’s up to the researcher to detect clusters of actors.\footnote{
\ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} popular term „actant” is often used in his previous book 
as a~part of his object/subject independent vocabulary. 
The actant was a~replacement for the anthropomorphic actor. 
For some reason it has, after many years of good service, 
left \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} last book.} 

This leaves us at a~post-humanist position in the sense that humans 
aren’t the starting-point, goal or a~necessary intermediate. 
From here, others in the ANT family like A. \ios{Mol}{Mol, A.}\footnote{
\cite{Mol:TheBody}, pp.~54, 96 and 115.} 
and J. \ios{Law}{Law, J.}\footnote{
\cite{Law:ANT}.} 
have put forward the idea of chaotic performative realities. 
Besides the similarities, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} has taken a~slightly different path. 
In this new book, the modes of existences aren’t to be understood as clusters of actors, 
but rather interpretative keys. 

To understand this network metaphor as the anthropological/empirical work 
that needs to be done in order to come up with the metaphysical structure; 
we need to stop once again. 
Remember, there is no reason to accept any assumptions at this point. 
This includes the distinction between real and unreal, truth and falsity. 
Before we delve into the network metaphor, there are two simple, yet, 
massively important rules: (1) Everything we encounter is a part of reality\footnote{
\cite{Latour:WhenThings}, p.~109. 
In various sources we can find \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} criticism 
of so-called fetishes.}, 
and, (2) existence is an action and every action implies a relation.\footnote{
“This point is not relativist: all statements are not equal. 
It is relationist: showing the relationships between the points of view held by 
mobilized and by mobilizing actors gives judgements as fine a~degree 
of precision as one could wish for” (\cite{Latour:Technology}, p.~128).} 

\tytul{2. Categories/modes: Not just networks with knots}

With all of this in mind, we can finally see why \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} considers 
himself an anthropologist and at the same time writes about modes of existence 
in a~serious, metaphysical way. 
One should keep in mind that the metaphysical project of \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} 
was from the very start a necessary detour in the creation of a~proper sociological 
methodology. 
With Ian \ios{Hacking’s}{Hacking, I.} terminology, we might distinguish 
the historical epistemology of \ios{Shapin}{Shapin, S.} 
and \ios{Schaffer}{Schaffer, S.}\footnote{
\cite{Shapin:TheLeviathan}.}, 
the historical ontology of \ios{Hacking}{Hacking, I.}\footnote{
\cite{Hacking:Historical}.} 
and lastly ontology as a~philosophical discipline, necessary to reach a~methodology 
that includes a~historical epistemology and ontology. 
In this book, he follows the moderns (a~problematic term, as we will see later) 
and uncovers their implicit metaphysics. 
Reality is always in-the-making. 
Because of this, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} isn’t forced to search absolute 
and universal structures of reality, although the modes of existence are 
structures of reality nevertheless. 
There might be differences in the structures of reality between for example 
Aboriginals and the moderns. 
Acknowledging his limits, he follows the moderns and finds a~network. 
New to this book is the view that linkages between the different entities 
aren’t enough. 
One entity can be read in a~completely different way through the glasses 
of the mode.

The major problem with the reading and glasses metaphor we’ve only just 
used is its anthropocentric character. 
Crucial in this story is that we can’t speak of subjects reading an object-out-there 
in a~religious or political way. 
Interpretation is key, yet, there are no subjects to interpret. 
Taking this to the metaphysical level we might come up with 
Graham \ios{Harman’s}{Harman, G.} work in which every entity comes across 
another one, interprets it, but never really grasp it in its totality. 
\ios{Harman}{Harman, G.} doesn’t have an empirical metaphysics like 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} and the latter would disagree with the \textit{subterranean 
creatures}.\footnote{
\cite{Harman:ToolBeing}, p.~133.} 
For \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}, entities are only their relations. 
What the two do have in common is their search to write about interpreting 
entities in a~broad, post-humanist, way. 

All the modes of existence (or \textit{“categories”}) have their own actors, goals, 
epistemology, etc. 
Here \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} sees the moderns stumbling over their own feet. 
They often don’t respect their own categories. 
Namely, he sees how science has upgraded itself to be the supreme category. 
In debunking certain facts belonging to other categories, they used the wrong tools 
to interpret the fact and verify its validity. 
He sees this as an unacceptable evolution. 
None of the modes can dominate all the others.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, p.~316.} 
Every category has its own key. 
Knowing in what category you’re working in is essential in choosing the right key. 
This choosing is itself a category, named preposition.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, p.~57.} 

The new idea of modes with their own key for interpretation makes 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} vulnerable for problems he managed to avoid 
while he only had networks to worry about. 
Firstly, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} had to fight a~lot of accusations of relativism 
in the past.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:Pandoras}.} 
Within his theory he was able to avoid these. 
Differences in conceptions of truth were simply the result of a~different 
composition of links between actors. 
There were no transcendent categories with their own specific rules, 
only entangled links that created knots and unique situations out of which 
rules sprang. 

Networks could have knots with their own inner workings, but there was nothing 
platonic or transcendent about them. 
Modes on the other hand seem much harder to uphold on a plain metaphysical level. 
The mode is an interpretative key, but doesn’t originate from an anthropological study 
of the links and knots of the network. 
It’s unclear where the modes come from and they show a~remarkable resemblance 
with our ordinary conceptions of spheres in reality. 
By making them distinct metaphysical categories and warning against so-called 
categorical mistakes, it’s hard to see how this pluralistic social ontology isn’t relativism. 
Distinct modes with their seemingly transcendental state own their own sense of truth 
and are protected against other modes. 

Secondly, we seem to be able to categorize different modes of existence, 
something that \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} doesn’t do. 
Connected to this, the often used network has taken up new functions. 
For many years, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} was active as an Actor-Network Theory 
scholar next to academics like Michel \ios{Callon}{Callon, M.} 
and John \ios{Law}{Law, J.}. 
The addition of a~key for every category is considered by \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} 
a~(little) break with ANT. 
The network metaphor has become a~mode of existence next to all the other 
ones.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, p.~64.} 
Yet, the different modes of existence have very different functions. 
For example, preposition and double click are (possibly) present in modes 
like religion, law and economics, while these latter modes cannot operate 
within preposition and double click. 
In our opinion, the latter modes; religion, law and economics, should be 
considered knots in the network. 
Unfortunately, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} doesn’t spend much attention 
in categorizing his different modes. 
The preposition is knowing in what knot you’re working at that moment. 
In this way, the network itself, in my view, can’t be a~mode of existence 
like any of these two. 
The network is merely a~visualization of the whole of reality. 

When we return to \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} criticism of ANT, we acknowledge 
its relevance even without the network as a~mode of existence. 
Without a~key, ANTers followed the actors successfully, but they couldn’t really 
understand them. 
The homogeneity of networks can be broken, not by adding categories like 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} seems to have done now, but by bumping into knots 
in the network. 
It would certainly be ridiculous to approach a~church sermon similarly 
to the technical aspects of the microphone through which the sermon finds 
its way to the ears of the interested. 
But isn’t \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} one of the ANT scholars who, referring to 
Gabriel \ios{Tarde}{Tarde, G.}, draws the focus to connections? 
You don’t need a~theologian to understand the technical aspects of the microphone. 
The latter is more connected with the electricity company, Chinese factories 
and a~long list of innovative engineers. 
A~single connection with the Holy Word won’t be enough to make a~complex 
knot in which both highly define each other and a~common epistemology would spring. 
Therefore, the physical presence of a~microphone in a~church doesn’t make them 
part of the same knot. 
Networks in ANT have never been solely based on either space or time. 
It’s through the anthropological study that we come across these modes of existence, 
each with their own interpretative key. 
We should beware of the seemingly transcendental move \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} makes. 

Making room for other categories/modes is \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} main incentive 
for writing this book.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, pp.~72, 141.} 
As a~Catholic theologian, it’s not surprising to see his efforts in the creation 
of a~space within reality for religion. 
By demanding respect for the ways of being of every mode of existence, 
he in fact rejects any scientific objection towards religious claims, although 
we should add that he equally condemns religious claims about scientific objects. 
The ghost of relativism has returned together with the addition of the categories. 

\tytul{3. Confusion: Descriptive or normative?}

The main issue we have in reading \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} anthropology 
of the moderns is a~tension between the descriptive and normative aspect. 
In his view, all the described modes are part of reality in the modern world. 
At the same time, there is always something normative in there as well. 
If reality is something \textit{done}, it seems contradictory for \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} 
to make remarks on how the moderns are \textit{doing} it wrong. 
When every mode of existence has its own epistemology and ethics, who is 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} to decide in all of this? 
Isn’t he making a so-called Category Mistake or granting himself a~meta-mode? 
The answer might lie within his own theory. 
The upside of a~\textit{reality in the making} is its possibility to change, no matter 
how difficult it is at the moment. 
Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways, 
now \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} interpretation is itself an action for change. 
Academics as creative actors in a~political-ethical project. 

\ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} goal is to explain how reality is today in the modern world 
and what changes he deems fit. 
The most remarkable example here is religion. 
For many years, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} studied laboratories and the workings 
of scientists in general. 
In this book, he finally recognizes the time to be ripe to exploit the space he created 
himself during the past thirty years. 
The details of religion as a~mode of existence can be read in the book. 
What is difficult to find, is the reason why we should accept the boundaries 
between the categories. 
Whenever scientists are debunking a~religious claim, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} 
denounces this debunking because they don’t understand what religion is for. 
Simply put, the key of science is different from the religious key. 
He calls this a~\textit{“category mistake”}. 
In opposition to a~mistake of the senses, it’s not a~matter of improving your 
equipment, moving a~bit closer or working harder. 
An application of a~key from one mode of existence would be to read 
and judge beings in another mode of existence.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, p.~50-51.} 
This position itself is defendable. 
The main issue for us is how \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} describes the modes 
of existence and later disagrees with how the creators, ie. the moderns, 
function within this reality. 
The category mistakes are a~value judgment based on a~meta-epistemological rule. 
Namely, don’t mix the modes and keys. 

With Ian \ios{Hacking’s}{Hacking, I.} terminology we might call 
\ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} anthropology of the moderns a~contemporary 
historical ontology. 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} writes about the contemporary social ontologies and becomes 
an actor in the creation of his own topic of research. 
The book becomes a~political-ethical project. 
Limiting oneself to the description would be an academic fortification of the existing 
ontological categories. 
Andrzej W. \ios{Nowak}{Nowak, A.W.} pleas in this respect through his 
\textit{imagined ontologies} for a progressive program.\footnote{
\cite{Nowak:Ontological}.} 
It’s the acknowledgment of the agency of the researcher and an awareness 
of the political-ethical position taken. 
At the same time, both \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} and \ios{Nowak}{Nowak, A.W.}, 
are constructive and positive in their study. 
Seeing the ontological categories as socially constructed doesn’t make them unreal 
and definitely doesn’t destroy them. 
Only through creation (by imagination) the ruling categories can be replaced.\footnote{
“Slechts door te scheppen kunnen wij vernietigen!” --- 
“Only through creation, we can destroy!” (\cite{Nietzsche:DeVrolijke}, p.~81-82.} 

In\ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} metaphysical views, reality is constantly in the making. 
More than ever before, this book tries to become a~serious actor in this creative process. 
His descriptive anthropology of the moderns is accompanied by his own agenda. 
In effect, he pleads for the re-institutionalization of the different categories. 
The combination of both the descriptive and the normative aspects make 
this book a~bit sneaky. 

\tytul{4. The moderns}

Notwithstanding the meticulous attention for ontological assumptions in sociology, 
there is a~remarkable naivety in the use of \textit{“the moderns”} 
by \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}. 
The problem with the moderns, according to \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}, is the gap 
between their definitions or theory and their practices. 
There seems to be a~similar problem in \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} 
use of \textit{“moderns”}. 
But while \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} applauds the moderns in their practices 
and denounces their metaphysical theories, we will do the opposite with 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}. 

Referring to \textit{We Have Never Been Modern}, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} writes: 

\cytuj{
The “we” of the somewhat grandiloquent title did not designate a~specific people 
or a~particular geography, but rather all those who expect Science to keep 
a~radical distance from politics. 
All those people, no matter where they were born, who feel themselves pushed 
by time’s arrow in such a way that behind them lies an archaic past unhappily 
combining Facts and Values, and before them lies a more or less radiant future 
in which the distinction between Facts and Values will finally be sharp 
and clear.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:WeHave}, p.~8.} 
}

\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} explicitly defines the moderns not in terms of geography. 
Instead, it’s the function of Science as a~supreme judge and mode of existence 
that is under attack. 
It’s Science with a capital “S” because it is an all-encompassing, absolute 
and a~fixed category with strong beliefs about Truth and progress. 
Science as studied by \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} and many others in the Studies 
of Science and Technology is, according to \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}, different 
in that it’s one mode of existence. 
Here science loses its capital “s” because its existence and content are constantly 
in the making and don’t automatically encompass the whole of reality. 

Unfortunately, when we accept this definition, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} himself 
often miss-uses \textit{“moderns”}.  
Already in the introduction he jumps from \textit{“moderns”} 
to \textit{“the West”} and \textit{“Europe”}\footnote{
\cite{Latour:WeHave}, p.~16.} 
as if they were synonyms. 
Yet, no one can accept the complete absence of geography in \textit{“Europe”}. 
Therefore, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} violates in his use of the word \textit{“modern”} 
his own definition of it. 
The problem rises whenever \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} moves from an abstract 
to a~political argument.\footnote{
Although even in his metaphysical argument he has used the phrase 
“European ontology” (\cite{Latour:Reflections}).} 
Even when we accept for a~moment the equalization of modern and European 
and ignore the geographical aspect, the political views on Europe are quite improvident. 
Is there any political scientist who considers Europeans as one group with a~single 
set of beliefs? 
Differences in religion, politics, and social and economic status are all neglected. 
A~bizarre move for someone who claims to be more empirical than empiricists 
and more materialist than materialists.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:CanWe}. Materialism in the sense of actors we encounter 
(whether it are humans, microscopes or bacteria), without the postulation of 
a~transcendent entity “matter”.} 
We might assume that a~thorough study of politics will come up with a~knot 
of Europe, similar to the studies made of science by \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}, 
but \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} himself so far hasn’t begun such a~study 
and writes about politics in a rough and idealistic way. 

In multiple reviews of \textit{We Have Never Been Modern}, many already 
problematized the vagueness of \textit{“the moderns”}.\footnote{
\cite{Elam:Living}, p.~4.} 
Reading this book, it doesn’t look like \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} has listened 
to those critics. 
The importance of the moderns plays less in the metaphysical argument explained 
at the start of this article. 
But \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} does claim a~political project as well. 
In this context, the conflicting usage of \textit{“moderns”} is problematic. 
The moderns are functioning like the bourgeoisie in Roland \ios{Barthes’}{Barthes, R.} 
oeuvre. 
They are the ill-defined and overtly stupid straw men. 
Like the Walkers, they are destructive in their behavior, yet, 
we almost feel sorry for them because of their brainless behavior. 
Hopefully political scientists will work in a more \ios{Latourian}{Latour, B.} 
manner than \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}. 

\tytul{5. Double Click: The moderns’ cheating trick}

Double Click (DC) is one of the modes of existence. 
Unlike the previously mentioned modes, we can’t think of DC as a~knot 
in the network of reality. 
DC is a~way of operating within the categories. 
It reduces existence into information as an unmediated and thus untransformed being 
on its own, moving around freely. 
Criticism of such shortcuts has been present in \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} 
works from day one. 
The idea of irreducibility is already a~key element in the second part of 
\textit{The Pasteurization of France}\footnote{
\cite{Latour:ThePasteurization}, p.~151-236.} 
and has been repeated in more understandable words later on.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:Comments}, p.~67.} 
This is a~philosophical stance connected to other contemporary thinkers 
like the flat ontology of L.R. \ios{Bryant}{Bryant, L.R.}.\footnote{
\cite{Bryant:TheDemocracy}, p.~67.} 
In \textit{An Inquiry into Modes of Existence} he shows how DC is used 
in a~range of different modes of existence. 
The concept is new, but the idea has been in \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} work 
for a~while. 
It’s the highway the moderns use without ever having to build and maintain 
the road and vehicles on it. 

Referring to \ios{Descartes}{Descartes, R.}, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} writes 
about DC as the Evil Genius. 
It’s a~way to jump from the searching subject to the object-out-there. 
In \ios{Descartes’}{Descartes, R.} case, the means to get information (the senses) 
have already been cut off by the axe of skepticism. 
For \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} on the other hand, DC is a~means to get information, 
while ignoring all the necessary mediators.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, p.~93.} 
Using DC has the upside of moving very fast. 
The downside is that moderns consider information and facts as independent pieces 
of the universal Truth. 
The result is an absolutist or fundamentalist view on reality in which there is no 
room for the multiplicity of modes. 
In order to gain access to this Truth, the moderns must find means to transport 
the world-out-there into their books of knowledge without any transformation. 
In particular, academics within the Studies of Science and Technology (SST) 
have been vehemently attacked by scientists and other philosophers for degrading 
scientific facts to merely social constructions. 
Yet, all they did was describe what is happening inside and around laboratories, 
an act unrightfully interpreted as an attack on objectivity\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, p.~154.} 
In \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} words, they showed the mediators the path from 
the Amazon forest to the academic paper.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:Pandoras}, p.~24-79.} 
Nobody can claim the Amazon forest and an academic paper are the same, 
only a~series of transformations can take you from one to the other. 

Generally, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} prefers attacking straw men. 
By postulating DC as a~vile tool of the moderns, he ignores some of the relevant 
comments made during the science wars. 
The straw man mister Modern is as a~dummy always an easy target. 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} seems to avoid a~direct encounter by neglecting footnotes, 
a~bad habit he has for years. 
Maybe he sees them as an unnecessary rhetoric devise, building impenetrable walls 
around the text.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:Science}, p.~56-61.} 
To us, the opposite is the case. 
For example, when we take a~look at the criticism of 
Jean \ios{Bricmont}{Bricmont, J.} and Alan \ios{Sokal}{Sokal, A.}\footnote{
\cite{Sokal:Intellectueel}, p.~112.}, 
they don’t always disagree with the correctness of the descriptive studies made 
in the SST. 
They simply don’t understand why we should observe what scientists are doing 
in such a~banal fashion. 
What \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} has called DC here isn’t accepted by anybody. 
\ios{Sokal}{Sokal, A.}, \ios{Bricmont}{Bricmont, J.} and everybody else knows 
we don’t jump from the Amazon forest straight to an academic paper. 
It isn’t the work of the scientists that is denied, but it is the interpretation 
and metaphysical consequences of this work that were at stake 
in the \textit{science wars}. 

The question is whether knowledge is the result of an archaeological inquiry 
in which the eternal Truth underneath was discovered or the transformation 
of and by different actors into a~new one? 
The same goes for the DC \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} finds in economics. 
The shop clerk and his costumer are probably (vaguely) aware of all the institutions 
needed in order to keep transactions running smoothly. 
Just like studying science, the economist might ask: 
why should we study these mundane things? 
Maybe, at least in this specific case, we truly have never been modern! 
In our view, the fundamentalism of Truth maligned by \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} 
doesn’t have DC as a~necessary consequence. 

\tytul{6. Continuity/immanence and discontinuity/transcendence}

The classical distinction between immanence and transcendence is largely thrown 
overboard in \textit{An Inquiry into Modes of Existence}. 
This classical transcendence is called \textit{“the bad transcendence”} 
by \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:AnInquiry}, p.~277.} 
These are the absolutes and universals that he has been fighting for ever, 
as noted before. 
The immanence and transcendence used by \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} is different from 
the classical views and isn’t necessary religious. 
The question is not whether God is in or beyond our world, let alone 
a~\ios{Kantian}{Kant, I.} search for the conditions to make experiences possible. 
\ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} highjacks the words to address the problem 
of existence.\footnote{
We would add „through time”, but this would imply a~simplistic view 
of time as a~straight arrow forward.}
Continuity and immanence are synonyms, idem ditto for discontinuity 
and (small) transcendence. 

It’s unclear to us why \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} uses such an important concept 
in the history of philosophy like transcendence, especially as the meaning 
of transcendence doesn’t show any correspondence with previous meanings. 
Even \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} himself acknowledges that small transcendence 
is merely a~part of immanence. 
On the website we read: 

\cytuj{
Immanence, for AIME [\textit{An Inquiry into Modes of Existence}], 
is synonymous with good [or little] transcendence, that which identifies 
hiatuses and the passages necessary for the prolongation of courses 
of action.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:Immanence}.} 
}

The often used network metaphor and the idea of reality in the making seem 
a~far better fit in explaining the same idea. 
The meaning is so different from the traditional use of transcendence that 
we can’t even see it as a~kind of monster \ios{Deleuze}{Deleuze, G.} 
claimed to make.\footnote{
\cite{Deleuze:Letter}, p.~6.} 
The incredibly interesting changes \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} made in the meaning 
of social constructivism (a~concept he, unfortunately, has dropped a~while ago) 
during the past decades, while keeping the original social constructivism 
(at least for a~while) makes sense. 
To summarize, \textit{“social”} isn’t a~kind of \textit{stuff}, instead it indicates 
a~set of relations between actors. 
\textit{“Constructivism”} shows how every actor is \textit{made} out of many 
different actors.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:ARelativistic}.} 
For example, a~building is constructed in a~collaboration (social) of many different 
actors: architect, bricks, pencils, masons… 
But the small leaps an actor has to take in order to subsist aren’t transcending anything. 
Within the network metaphor there simply isn’t any transcendental position possible, 
a~fact \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} happily agrees with, while he confusingly uses 
the word anyway. 

\tytul{7. Conclusion}

\ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} latest book fits well within the long list of works he 
published since \textit{Laboratory Life} in 1979.\footnote{
\cite{Latour:Laboratory}.} 
As a~philosophical system builder he has been working on a~pluralistic 
and empirical metaphysics for a~while. 
New concepts like Double Click fit well within his already developed thought. 
Unfortunately, together with \textit{“the moderns”}, the same DC served 
in this review as an example of a~defect in all of \ios{Latour’s}{Latour, B.} works. 
It’s a shame he uses far too often weak straw men instead of actual opponents. 
It’s hard to predict what the result would be in a direct confrontation. 
In our opinion, \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} will be able to keep his metaphysical project. 
But he might be surprised in how similar the outcome will be once the metaphysical 
foundation of the humanities is changed. 

\textit{An Inquiry into Modes of Existence} gives us a~description of the modes 
of the moderns and hints at how \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} would like them to function. 
Researchers can use the various works of ANT scholars like 
Michel \ios{Callon}{Callon, M.}, John \ios{Law}{Law, J.} and Bruno \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} 
with all their methodological tools in order to study certain topics. 
The normative aspect \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} adds in this work is quite new compared 
to his previous works and those of other ANT’ers. 
Nevertheless, we do think that the recognition of a~political-ethical project 
will grow importance in the future through the work of \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.}, 
\ios{Nowak}{Nowak, A.W.} and others. 

Ultimately, this book does present something new. 
It’s the application of a theory \ios{Latour}{Latour, B.} has been working on for decades. 
The addition of modes has changed quite a~lot. 
But it’s hard to see what the role of his denigrated networks will be, how he will 
remain an empirical anthropologist and whether he can hold off relativism. 

\bigskip

\textbf{Acknowledgment}
for proofreading and correcting goes to David O'Donnell.

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\end{elementlit}