Wittgenstein, Relativism, and the Second-Person Perspective
Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of the relativist implications of Witt‑ gensteinian non‑cognitivism. If moral and religious language are only an expression of language users’ attitudes, then both moral values and religious beliefs will be relative to just those language users. The paper attempts to respond to this charge in the following two ways. First, it seeks to show the common conceptual structure underlying the accusation of relativism as it relates to both Wittgenstein’s non‑ cognitivism and his position on scepticism, where the latter reflects his contextual‑ ist anti‑sceptical strategy (which is also charged with relativism). Second, it seeks to demonstrate that in both cases it is possible to offer a non‑relativist reading of Wittgensteinian thinking by affirming the commensurability of different world‑ views through an appeal to the second‑person perspective, taken as characteristic of the human way of living (or human “form of life”).
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