Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism
Abstract
In the article, I present the debate on doxastic voluntarism and its rela‑ tion to doxastic responsibility. I outline the discussion in the literature, focusing on Alston’s argument against doxastic responsibility, and then present my own position in this debate. I defend a conception of doxastic freedom that remains consistent with the principle of alternative possibilities. To this end, I provide an epistemological analysis of the phenomenon I call “doxastic self‑deception.” I also introduce the notions of “doxastic strategy” and “alethic impurism”—a view con‑ cerning the possibility of pragmatic reasons for beliefs. I conclude that doxastic responsibility is possible because we have the ability to self‑deceive, and at the same time possess metacognitive capacities that enable cognitive self‑control.
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