Kim and the Pairing Problem for Dualism
Abstract
The philosophical history of metaphysics of mind can be narrowed into two problems: Mind and body causation and issues of the self or persons. Due to the rise of the scientific revolution the nature of mental states and its possessors has been reduced to brain and cognitive functioning or eliminated instead of the ontological basic substance of a soul. The other criticism of soul identity or substance dualism is the problem of mental causation. In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (2018), Jaegwon Kim argues against the intelligibility of Cartesian dualism and further extends that argument to any form of substance dualism by raising the question of mental causation or the traditional mind-body problem. His main attack comes from the essence of mind and the causal closure of the physical, together these provide an argument against the non-physical view of persons. The question, “can mental events cause physical events?” Is a problem for the dualist which he calls “the pairing problem.” Since causation requires a spatiotemporal relation between two bodies, and mind and body are distinct substances or properties, there’s no cause-and-effect pairing relation between minds and physical objects or bodies. Thus, according to Kim, the essence of an immaterial thinking substance, such as a soul, is unintelligible and should be rejected since it fails to answer the pairing problem. However, Kim has a misunderstanding of substance dualist views of the independent ontological status of a substantial self or soul. Further, Kim’s challenge does not take into account a causal powers ontology in which primitive is the free agentive causal subject. I’ll argue that a soul, though embodied, is a non-material primitive substance that has basic faculties to exemplify mental properties. One of the faculties of the soul is the instantiation of active agency. Further, the postulation of Gods existence, having a metaphysical internal structure and powers, is grounds for the existence of a soul with its own metaphysical, unified structure in which the dispositional properties of consciousness are located and exemplified. I conclude that mental causation is a coherent notion especially in light of the active powers of agent causation. Thus, Kim’s problem of mental causation becomes no problem at all.
Copyright (c) 2023 Ignatianum University in Cracow
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
- When submitting a text, the author declares that he/she is the Author of the article (hereinafter referred to as the “Work”) and:
- he/she owns the exclusive and unlimited copyright to the Work,
- is entitled to dispose of the copyright to the Work.
Declares that it does not infringe any third party copyrights or legal rights.
Declares that there is no conflict of interest.
2. At the same time, the Author grants the Ignatianum University in Cracowa royalty-free, non-exclusive and territorially unlimited licence to use the Work in the following fields of exploitation:
- recording the Work in a hard copy, as well as on a digital or magnetic medium;
- reproduction of the Work using any technique, without limitation of the number of editions or copies;
- distribution of the Work and its copies on any medium, including marketing, sale, lending, and rental;
- introduction of the Work into a computer memory;
- disseminating the Work in information networks, including in the Internet;
- public performance, exhibition, display, reproduction, broadcasting and re-broadcasting, as well as making the Work available to the public in such a way that everyone can have access to it at a time and place of their own choosing;
- within the scope of dependent rights to the Work, including in particular the right to make necessary changes to the Work resulting from editorial and methodical development, as well as to translate the Work into foreign languages;
The licence is granted from the moment of the transfer of the Work to the Ignatianum University in Cracow. The Ignatianum University in Cracow is entitled to grant further sub-licences to the Work within the scope of the right granted. The licence is time-limited and it is granted for a period of 15 years, starting from the date of its granting.
Authors are permitted and encouraged to publish their text online (e.g. in their institution’s repository or on the institution’s website) before or during the submission process as this may lead to beneficial exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of the published text (See The Effect of Open Access). We recommend using any of the following portals of research associations:
- ResearchGate
- SSRN
- Academia.edu
- Selected Works
- Academic Search
