The Amodality of Language

Abstract Concepts and Core Cognition

Abstract

Amodality is the thesis that concepts are not constituted by modal-specific representations. In this paper I assess the prospects for uncovering support for this claim in language by two different means. First, I examine the question of the amodal character of abstract concepts, but find it to be inconclusive pending a clearer account of the role of sensorimotor representations in language processing. Second, I evaluate the possibility of there being amodal primitive concepts in the context of Carey’s account of representational primitives in core cognition. Despite their alleged iconicity, which seems to favor a modal view, I contend that there are grounds for regarding them as amodal in nature. I also challenge the discontinuity thesis that regards early primitives as being unrelated to mature, newly linguistically created primitives.

Published
2024-12-30
How to Cite
Manrique, F. M. (2024). The Amodality of Language: Abstract Concepts and Core Cognition. Forum Philosophicum, 29(2), 277-292. https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2024.2902.03