On the (Hidden) Attributes of God
Abstract
Jeff Speaks argues that perfect being theists should refrain from attributing attributes to God and adopt agnosticism about the nature of God. The reason why they would make such a restriction is because of the problem of hidden attributes. Even if a perfect being theist manages to attribute to God a set of attributes that manifests no inconsistencies, the most sensible choice on the nature of God, according to Speaks, would still be agnosticism. Speaks argues that while it is possible for a theist to propose a coherent set of God’s attributes, he cannot guarantee that no conflict will arise between this set and God’s hidden attributes (those that are cognitively inaccessible to humans). I formulate three objections to Speaks’ view: an objection from the impossibility of showing inconsistency, an objection from the partial hiddenness of the attributes, and an objection from the simplicity of God. The first objection consists in pointing out that it is impossible to establish the occurrence of an actual inconsistency between visible and hidden attributes. The theist of perfect being may insist that the mere possibility of inconsistency between attributes is not the same as its actual occurrence. If so, then no strong reason can be seen for the perfect being theist to be compelled to advocate agnosticism about the nature of God. The second objection is contained in the remark that Speaks’ position appeals to the notion of attributes implicit absolutely. However, it is possible to retain the notion of hidden attributes while at the same time weakening it somewhat by speaking of the partially hidden attributes. This weaker notion of latent attributes does not force the theist to adopt agnosticism, for if he ascribes partially hidden attributes to God, he nevertheless has some knowledge of God. The third objection emphasises that by changing the conception of transcendence, Speaks’ notion of hidden attributes can be abandoned. The theist thus has at least three ways to avoid being agnostic about the nature of God.
References
Speaks Jeff, The Greatest Possible Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
Hudson W. Donald, „The Concept of Divine Transcendence”, Religious Studies 15 (3) (1979): 197–210.
Kvanvig Jonathan, „Divine Transcendence”, Religious Studies 20 (3) (1984): 377–387.
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