Friedrich August Hayek on Responsibility

Abstract

This paper examines F. A. Hayek’s views on responsibility. Its aim is to collect, analyze, and demonstrate how these views form a coherent concept consistent with his broader axiological framework. The discussion addresses, in turn, the meaning of responsibility, its subjects and objects, and the role of individual responsibility as a social value. The article shows that Hayek portrays responsibility both as an attribute of freedom and as a necessary condition for its existence. It presents arguments supporting the thesis that renouncing responsibility entails accepting the coercive management of human affairs, which inevitably leads to adverse consequences such as the denial of moral autonomy, loss of freedom, poor decision-making, and inefficiency. For Hayek, the proper subjects of responsibility are individuals, while its objects include primarily one’s own affairs and, under certain conditions, the affairs of others for whom one has voluntarily assumed concern. In his view, responsible behavior toward strangers consists in properly managing one’s own sphere of freedom and allowing others to do the same. By exercising responsibility over their own freedom, individuals—often unintentionally—contribute to the well-being of others beyond their immediate concern. In this sense, responsibility, while an individualist value, also serves as a social good. The article fills a gap in the existing literature on Hayek’s axiological thought and introduces his perspective into contemporary discussions on responsibility—one that emphasizes its close connection to freedom and its dual character as both a personal virtue and a social value, serving as a desirable alternative to state intervention in private life.