Concerning the supposed illusoriness of the self and free will
Abstract
Many philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists argue for the thesis that both the self and free will - as commonly understood by us - are illusions created by our nervous system. An example of such a line of argument can be found in Bruce Hood’s book `The Self Illusion: How the Social Brain Creates Identity'. I first consider the main ideas put forward by Hood in support of the view that the self and free will are illusions. Then I turn to criticisms of his arguments regarding the illusoriness of the self, citing arguments from philosophy and neuroscience. In criticizing his arguments for the illusoriness of free will, I advocate compatibilism and seek to focus on the elucidation of research into our everyday intuitions relating to free will.References
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